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Abstract
This thesis is composed of four chapters. The first one investigates the impact of
immigration on housing markets. The rest study the effects of transport policy on
economic outcomes.
Chapter 1 provides causal estimates of the effects of an increase of foreign-born
population on house prices. I use data for the Spanish provinces between 2001 and
2010. In order to infer causality I construct an instrument based on past location pat-
terns by immigrant nationality. I find positive effects of the increase in the share of
foreign-born population on both rental and purchase prices. The estimated elasticit-
ies are 0.6% for rental prices and 2% for purchase prices. I also investigate the rela-
tionship between immigration and native location (native displacement) and I find
that immigrants attract natives to the same regions they locate. When I re-estimate
the effects using solely the variation on population growth which is due to exogen-
ous location of foreign-born, I find that estimates are around 30-40% smaller than if
we ignored the relationship between immigration and native location decisions.
Chapters 2 to 4 investigate the effects of road improvements on aggregate and
individual economic outcomes, using data for Great Britain during the period 1998-
2008. Chapter 2 develops the methodology to estimate the economic impacts of
transport improvements. We summarise the existing evidence and the theoretical
channels through which transport policy can impact firm, worker and aggregate
economic outcomes. To capture the effect of road improvements, we construct a
measure of accessibility to employment through the road network. For this pur-
pose, we collect novel data on 31 major road improvement projects and combine
this information with the trunk road network in Great Britain in 2008. This informa-
tion is used to calculate optimal travel times between locations at each point in time,
which are used in the computation of the accessibility measures.
The last two chapters discuss the empirical results, for ward and firm outcomes
(chapter 3) and for individual labour market outcomes (chapter 4). I find positive ef-
fects of accessibility on ward employment and number of plants, a limited effect on
plant employment and no effect on productivity. Accessibility from workplace has
substantial impacts on individual wages and total hours worked, while accessibility
from home only seems to have an effect on reducing the travel time to work.
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Introduction
I Overview
I.1 Spatial economics as a discipline
Since the publication of Krugman’s works at the beginning of the 90s (Krugman,
1991a,b), there has been a renewed interest to include geography within mainstream
economic analysis. The research described in this thesis provides solid empirical
evidence to answer a number of open questions in urban and spatial economics.
Economics is the social science that studies the production, distribution and con-
sumption of goods and services. It analyses the distribution of resources among
economic agents (firms and workers). It also examines the way inputs (labour, cap-
ital and intermediate goods) are combined and transformed into final goods and
services, which are distributed and consumed. Spatial economics is specifically
concerned with the allocation of resources over space and the location of economic
activity. This covers location theory, spatial competition and regional and urban
economics (Duranton, 2008). It is connected to other areas of economics like in-
ternational trade, real estate economics and local public economics. It embraces
what geographers call “economic geography” and economists call “geographical
economics” (following the definitions of Martin, 1999).
As discussed in Duranton (2008), the importance of the spatial dimension de-
pends on the type of economic question we are investigating. Some questions are
intrinsically “spatial”, i.e. the spatial dimension plays a central role. For example,
why are there cities? Why do they grow? Where do firms locate? For other ques-
tions we are trying to unveil what is the relative importance of space. For instance,
do technological spillovers depend on geographical proximity? Do countries that
are closer trade more? Finally, for other economic questions the importance of space
is much smaller. For example, the determination of interbank interests rates is quite
unlikely to be affected by space.
Economic agents (firms and workers) are distributed across space and they in-
teract spatially. The frequency and “quality” of these interaction depend on their
location and on how close they are to other economic agents. These interactions can
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affect economic outcomes and thus impact where the economic agents locate. For
example, the performance of a worker in the labour market depends on his charac-
teristics (age, gender, qualifications, ability) but it can also depend on how close he
is located relative to jobs. If his home and job are spatially separated, he has to spend
part of his working day traveling to work. The length of this commute may affect
his labour/leisure optimal choice, his labour market status or even his productivity
(van Ommeren & Gutie´rrez-i-Puigarnau, 2011). If workers live closer to firms, these
have better access to potential employees and might find it easier to adjust their em-
ployment when facing a productivity shock (Overman & Puga, 2010). Other firms
and workers might find it profitable to relocate into these employment cores (also
called agglomerations) in order to gain from proximity. This example illustrates
how the interactions between workers and firms depend on their location and how,
if interactions have meaningful effects on economic outcomes, the concentration of
economic agents in the space can endogenously determine the location decisions of
agents.
Spatial economics encompasses urban economics and economic geography. Ac-
cording to the definition of Quigley (2008), urban economics deals with the spa-
tial arrangements of households, firms, and capital in metropolitan areas. It also
studies the externalities which arise from the proximity of households and from
land uses, and the public policy issues which arise from the interplay of these eco-
nomic forces. In short, urban economics studies cities and why they exist and grow
(Glaeser, 2008). On the other hand, the various definitions of economic geography
(Combes et al., 2008b; Brakman et al., 2009) stress the unequal distribution of eco-
nomic activity across space. This branch of spatial economics concerned with the ex-
planation of these inequalities. It searches to understand the nature, extent, causes
and consequences of these disparities.
Two branches of the spatial economics literature have received a great deal of at-
tention in the last years, both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. The
“new” economic geography (or NEG) (Krugman & Venables, 1995; Fujita et al., 2001)
studies the uneven distribution of economic activity across space using a general
equilibrium framework and rigorous microeconomic foundations. Even if many of
its mechanisms had been largely discussed in the “proper” economic geography
literature1, Krugman and followers put the role of space at the centre of the main-
stream economics discussion.
The main contribution of NEG is to give micro-foundations to the emergence of
economic agglomeration and spatial inequality (Venables, 2008). The core building
blocks of new economic geography models are product differentiation (modeled
1See Overman (2004); Duranton & Rodrı´guez-Pose (2005) and Duranton & Storper (2006) for an
extensive discussion on the dialogue between economists and geographers.
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through a love of variety assumption), increasing returns to scale and transport
costs, which together create pecuniary externalities in agents’ location choices. When
combined with either factor mobility or intermediate inputs, these three building
blocks give rise to forces of cumulative causation and agglomeration (Redding,
2010).
At the same time, a large body of theoretical and empirical literature has been
devoted to investigate the existence, magnitude and causes of agglomeration (see
Puga, 2010, for a review) and the concentration of economic activity in cities (Glaeser,
2008). Differently to NEG, this literature explains the existence of agglomeration due
to the productivity advantages of being located in cities. Agglomeration economies
concern the positive externalities that arise from economic concentration and that
might have positive effects on firm and worker productivity. The spatial clustering
of industries in specific places gives rise to increased interactions between economic
agents which can be capitalised into higher productivity and wages. The mechan-
isms behind these interactions have attracted considerable attention.
The most common classification of agglomeration economies is that of Marshall
(1890), which identifies three mechanisms: input sharing (linkages between input
suppliers and final producers), labour market pooling (think local labour market
interactions) and knowledge spillovers. Duranton & Puga (2004) provide an al-
ternative classification of the mechanisms that give rise to local increasing returns:
sharing, matching and learning2. Some papers have tried to empirically disentangle
the different mechanisms through which agglomeration economies are operating
(Rosenthal & Strange, 2001; Jofre´-Monseny et al., 2011). Empirically, the different
mechanisms are however hard to distinguish (Overman & Puga, 2010) and agglom-
eration economies are difficult to identify (Combes et al., 2011). Substantial attention
has been given to the fact that wages are larger in cities (see for example Combes
et al., 2010).
The research carried out in this thesis relates to these core issues of spatial eco-
nomics. The issues under investigation, which are explained in detail below, are
connected to urban labour economics, transportation, agglomeration economies,
spatial mobility, real estate and regional economics. This thesis aims to contribute
to these literatures by answering original research questions using rigorous empir-
ical methods. The rest of the introduction is organised as follows. Section I.2 sum-
marises the research methodology followed in this thesis.Section II provides a brief
summary of the chapters. Finally, section III explains the main contributions of my
research.
2Although many other forces can lead to agglomeration, like natural advantages, consumption
amenities or historical accidents. See Strange (2008) for a review.
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I.2 Research methodology
This thesis is divided in two parts. The first part, chapter 1, studies the impact of
immigration on housing markets, using data for Spain between 2001 and 2010. The
second part, chapters 2 to 4, studies the impact of transport policy on aggregate
and individual economic outcomes, focusing on road construction in Great Britain
between 1998 and 2008. This second part comprises a methodological chapter (2)
and two chapters in which the empirical results are discussed (3 and 4). A com-
mon methodological approach is applied thorough this thesis, which is the standard
methodology in applied economic studies and, in particular, in what has been called
“geographical” economics (as discussed by Overman, 2004).
A comprehensive review of the literature helps to identify gaps in the existing
empirical evidence and to formulate relevant research questions which have not
been satisfactorily addressed in previous studies. The analysis of the relevant re-
lated papers allows us to define a set of theoretical predictions on the expected
effects of the interest variables on outcomes. The research questions are therefore
guided by existing theories and empirical evidence. They are formulated in order to
be clear and specific. In this sense, an effort is made to synthesize complex phenom-
ena into simple research questions. We prioritize the rigorous answer of a simple
question over the investigation of wider issues.
Given that our empirical approach is based on the estimation of reduced-form
empirical specifications, the statement of clear theoretical predictions is important
for the formalisation of the empirical equations and for the interpretation of the size
and sign of the estimated coefficients. Specifically, section 1.2.2 of chapter 1 dis-
cusses the channels through which changes in the population size of regions caused
by immigration inflows might affect housing demand and prices. Section 2.2 of
chapter 2 reviews the different channels through which transport policy, in particu-
lar road construction, affects worker and firm economic outcomes.
The empirical methodology is developed in order to test the hypothesis derived
from the theoretical framework. The expected empirical relationships between the
outcome variable and the explanatory variable in which we focus our analysis (re-
gressor of interest) are formalised into empirical specifications which are tested in
the data. In the thesis, the empirical specifications are discussed in detail. The
outcome variable and regressor of interests are clearly identified and the different
elements of the equations and how they affect the outcome variable are carefully
explained. The variables are accurately defined in order to capture the economic
relationships which we are interested in. To quantitatively assess the potential ef-
fects we perform regression analysis and apply several econometric techniques. We
rigourously estimate coefficients that summarise the nature of the economic rela-
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tionship under study.
To carry out the empirical exercises several datasets are used, both for Spain and
Great Britain. The geographical level of analysis was chosen to provide an appropri-
ate setup for the testing of the research hypothesis. An effort is made to employ the
best available data and spatial units for the research questions investigated. For ex-
ample, in the first part of the thesis, to be able to assess the effect of immigration on
house prices, I collect data both on housing purchase and rental prices, because both
prices are relevant indicators of housing markets. With the aim of appropriately cap-
turing the effects of immigration, to calculate the total number of immigrants I use
register data on the population of foreign-born in each spatial unit, instead of using
a weighted total derived from a sample. The geographical unit used is the province,
which, as discussed in the text, is the best unit available to approximate for labour
and housing markets. Alternatively, in the case of the assessment of the economic
effects of transport policy, to measure transport policy we use road construction.
In particular, we capture the effects of road construction by using a measure of ac-
cessibility to employment from a given location. With respect to the spatial unit, in
this part of the thesis we perform the analysis using very small geographical units
(wards) because our identification strategy is partly based on the use of small spatial
scale.
The aim of the regression analysis is the estimation of causal effects, so particular
attention is devoted to the correct identification of the parameters of interest. This
involves the estimation of unbiased parameters which can be interpreted as causal
effects. Omitted variable bias, reverse causation, simultaneity bias, spurious cor-
relation, unobserved effects, measurement error or poor proxies can challenge the
validity of our estimates.
Identification is important for two reasons. First, even if interesting, simple as-
sociations or partial correlations can be uninformative or misleading when drawing
policy implications from the empirical results. If we want to be able to derive policy
recommendations from our empirical results it is crucial to estimate the effects in
the correct direction of causality3. Secondly, sometimes the theoretical predictions
on the expected impacts can be ambiguous and the direction of the net effects is un-
clear. Hence, obtaining robust empirical evidence becomes of increasing importance
in order to learn about the different theoretical channels which might be driving the
results. Causal estimates are thus more informative than partial correlations when
linking the results to the theoretical framework.
Even though randomised or natural experiments would be the ideal setting to
estimate causal effects, as noted by Duranton (2008), it is difficult to find these ex-
3For the economic geography field, Combes (2011) argues that addressing endogeneity appropri-
ately is basic to be able to draw policy implications.
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periments within the spatial economics field. Consequently, we rely on other eco-
nometric techniques in order to claim causality of our estimates. The identification
strategy we follow can be summarised in the following points4:
1. We use longitudinal datasets (panel data), both at the aggregate level (panel
of regions) and at the individual level (panel of workers and firms). This
has three advantages. First, it allows us to control for unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of the observation units which might be correlated
with the regressor of interest and the outcome variable inducing bias in our
estimates (fixed-effects estimation). We can furthermore control for common
yearly shocks by using time dummies. Secondly, it allows us to explore the
timing of the effects (for example lagged effects) as we observe the individu-
als at several points in time. Finally, in the case of aggregate observations
(provinces in chapter 1 and wards in chapters 3 and 4), since the number of
spatial units is fixed, using panel data allows us to increase the number of
observations used in the regressions which improves the precision of the es-
timates and the validity of the econometric tests.
2. In order to reduce omitted variable bias, besides using fixed-effects estima-
tion and time dummies, we include several control variables in the estimated
empirical specifications which might be correlated with the interest and the
outcome variables at the same time. Attention is paid to the issue of “bad
controls” (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).
3. When necessary, we make use of instrumental variables techniques. Instru-
mental variables estimation, if the instruments are valid, allows us to infer
causality when there are reasons to believe our estimates could be inconsistent
due to endogeneity, reverse causality or measurement error. The instruments
that we use and their validity (relevance and exogeneity) are discussed in de-
tail in the main text.
4. In chapters 2 to 4 we use micro-datasets (individual datasets). This has again
three advantages. In the first place, even for aggregate outcomes, we construct
the variables aggregating up from the individual observations. This allows
us to control the way the variables are defined and constructed, which would
not be possible if we were using aggregate datasets. Secondly, it allows us to
exploit the small geographical scale and to focus on specific observations in
order to tackle endogeneity issues (more on this in the relevant chapters). Fi-
nally, micro-datasets include a large number of observations and, as discussed
above, this has advantages in terms of precision and hypothesis testing.
4More details are given in the chapters.
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The last steps of the empirical methodology are the interpretation of the coef-
ficients and the testing of the robustness of the results. From the set of different
regression results, we choose a preferred specification and we discuss the size and
sign of the causal estimates. These are compared to previous findings in the liter-
ature and discussed in relation to the theoretical predictions. Finally, we test the
robustness of the main results to the use of different data, specifications, inclusion
and exclusion of controls, etc. These allows us to improve the external validity of
our findings.
II Summary of the chapters
II.1 Chapter 1: Spatial impacts of immigration: Evidence from the
Spanish housing market
Chapter 1 investigates the effect of large immigration inflows on the growth of house
prices. I study the effect of changes in foreign-born population on the growth of pur-
chase and rental prices. I use the case of Spain during the period 2001 to 2010 to test
my hypothesis in the data. The study of the impact of immigration on economic
outcomes has produced a large body of empirical literature in the recent years, es-
pecially the study of its labour market effects. However, evidence on the effects of
immigration on prices is scarcer. The Spanish case has attracted substantial attention
of researchers due to the large immigration inflows that the country experienced
since the beginning on the 2000s. At the same time, there has been a large increase
on house prices, specially purchase prices. These almost doubled in the boom years
(2001 to 2008), and slowly decreased since the beginning of the housing crisis.
Immigrants can influence house prices via their effects on housing demand and
costs. Neglecting the effects on costs (by providing labour in the construction sec-
tor), for a given housing supply and population in the province, an immigration
inflow increases demand for dwellings pushing prices up. In the long-run, both
population (natives) and housing supply adjust, so the total “net” effect on prices
depends further on how supply and natives respond to immigration inflows.
In this chapter I estimate a similar specification to that of Saiz (2007), using first-
differences fixed-effect estimation and instrumental variables. My observational
units are the 50 Spanish provinces during the period 2001-2010. Provinces are the
smallest geographical unit for which data is consistently available and I argue in the
text that they are a good approximation to housing and labour markets.
Initially, I regress the lagged annual inflow of foreign-born over the initial popu-
lation (the “immigration ratio”) of a province on the annual growth of house prices.
The estimated specification includes controls, fixed effects and trends in order to
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reduce omitted variables bias. To deal with the endogeneity of immigration in-
flows due to unobservables which drive both immigration and price changes, I
use a instrumental variable strategy. I construct an instrument based on past loc-
ation patterns by immigrant nationality. The instrument is carefully constructed. In
the most demanding instrumental variables (IV) results, I find causal elasticities of
prices with respect to immigration of 2.7 for purchase prices and of 1.05 for rental
prices. These estimates are comparable to previous findings.
I then test the effect that immigration inflows have on the mobility of natives.
Natives might “crowd-out” from the provinces in which immigrants are locating
due to competition for amenities and services or discrimination, but they might also
move in if immigrants have desirable characteristics for natives (for example if they
like diversity or if immigrants provide desirable services for natives). I find that for
each 100 immigrants locating in a province, 43 natives moved to the same location.
The attraction effect is causally estimated and very robust across specifications.
I argue that overlooking this fact misleads the interpretation of the effect of im-
migration on prices, as the estimated coefficients using standard approaches like
that of Saiz (2007) capture the combined demand effects of immigrants plus nat-
ives. I propose a methodology to isolate the impact of immigrant demand from the
demand from natives. I regress the total population growth in a province on the
growth in house prices and I use exogenous variation on the location of immigrants
as an instrument for changes in population. This way, I only use the variation in
population growth which stems from immigration and not from increased native
inflows. I find coefficients which are around one third smaller than with the stand-
ard approach: the elasticities are 1.9 for purchase prices and 0.63 for rental prices.
This is consistent with the previous elasticities (2.7 and 1.05) being inflated due the
fact that the standard methodology ignores the impact of immigration on natives
location. I interpret the elasticities obtained with my methodology as the “net” ef-
fects of immigration on prices. Quantitatively, my estimates predict that around one
third of the total average annual growth of purchase prices and around one quarter
of the total average annual growth of rental prices can be attributed to the effect of
immigration on housing demand. I finally test the robustness of these results and
investigate the role played by housing supply.
II.2 Chapters 2 to 4: Economic Impacts of Transport Policy
Chapters 2 to 4 assess the impact of transport policy on economic outcomes, using
data for Great Britain during the period 1998 to 2008.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
Chapter 2 motivates the research, reviews the relevant literature and develops the
methodology to estimate the impacts of road construction on aggregate and indi-
vidual economic outcomes.
Transport policy is an important area of the economic policy of countries. In-
frastructure projects require large amounts of investment and their location can be
quite controversial. Therefore, the correct evaluation and assessment of transport
policy is very important for policy evaluation as a whole, and yet, little robust em-
pirical evidence exists. The aim of these chapters is to assess the impact that road
construction has on firms and workers. We focus on road construction due to the
importance that motor transport has both in the transportation of goods and in the
movement of workers (commuting).
In this chapter I first review and summarise the channels through which trans-
port policy as a whole and specifically road construction affect workers and firms.
On the one hand, the theoretical predictions on the net effects of transportation
improvements on firms and aggregate outcomes are ambiguous. Better transport
infrastructure brings places and people closer together, by reducing transport and
commuting costs. This has two effects on the actual size of markets. Firstly, for a
given location of firms and workers, effective density increases, as it becomes easier
to reach other locations using the improved transportation network. Secondly, new
infrastructure increases the attractiveness of locations, which may boost spatial con-
centration if firms and workers relocate. These effects may reinforce each other and
create positive agglomeration spillovers. Besides, improved access to markets also
strengthens competition, thus forcing the exit of the less productive firms and thus
increasing aggregate productivity. Finally, firms use transport services as a produc-
tion input, so changes in the supply and relative prices of transport affect the input
mix used by the firms and their demand of other inputs, for example labour.
On the other hand, transport policy affects labour markets through different
channels. First of all, reduced transport costs bring employers and workers closer to-
gether. Transport improvements change commuting costs and hence affect the size
of labour markets. For unemployed or inactive workers transport improvements
modify search costs and reservation wages, and in this way, they can help reduce
frictional unemployment and increase the employment probabilities of those who
are jobless. According to the so called “spatial mismatch hypothesis”, accessibil-
ity to jobs is an important determinant of labour market participation. Secondly,
improvements in the transport network can increase the scope of agglomeration
economies, as for a given physical distance employers and employees are nearer to
each other. Increased competition for jobs and workers (tighter labour markets) can
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foster productivity, and additionally we could see more and better job matches tak-
ing place in these enlarged labour markets. Finally, transport investments could be
capitalised into non-labour prices and affect congestion, which in turn affect loca-
tion workers and therefore residential sorting.
After reviewing the empirical evidence on some of the effects summarised above,
I describe the policy context of the paper. I then explain in detail the methodology
used to estimate the effects of road construction on workers and wards (in chapter
3) and on individual labour market outcomes (in chapter 4).
To capture the effect of road construction on economic outcomes we construct
an index of accessibility to employment using the road network from each loca-
tion at each year between 1998-2008. This measure is similar to the market-access
measures which have been used in the literature to assess the effect of market-size
and agglomeration on productivity and wages. This index captures the amount
of employment which is reachable using the road network and changes because
places become closer together due to road improvements. For a given location it is a
weighted sum of the economic size (employment) of the surrounding locations, in-
versely weighted by the cost of reaching them using the road network. The “costs”
are approximated by the optimal driving travel time between the locations. The
spatial unit we use is the ward, of which there are more than 10,000 in Great Britain.
To calculate employment at the ward level we use the Business Structure Database
(BSD), provided by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). This micro-dataset is a
register of all the alive establishments in the UK and it allows us to calculate the
employment at any spatial scale for all years between 1998 and 2008.
The first step on the construction of the accessibility is the identification of the
road improvements and the calculation of travel times. For this, we collected a
novel dataset on road construction undertaken in Britain between 1998 and 2007. We
combine this data with the 2008 road network to reconstruct the networks “as they
were” in the years prior to 2008. We then apply ArcGIS R© network tools to compute
least-cost (minimum journey time) routes between any pairwise ward combinations.
We use these travel times as the costs in the calculation of the accessibility indices.
In chapter 2, we also provide abundant description and summary statistics of the
travel times and the accessibility measures.
We estimate the effects of accessibility on aggregate and individual economic
outcomes using regression analysis. When regressing accessibility to employment
on economic outcomes, for example ward number of plants, there are three endo-
geneity issues we need to tackle. We exploit micro-data and small spatial scale in
order to address the sources of bias. Firstly, cross-sectional estimates of the effect
of accessibility on economic outcomes could be biased if the model does not cap-
ture underlying time-invariant factors (such as place specific productive advant-
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ages) that affect both effective density and economic outcomes. We use a fixed-
effects estimation method to address this problem. When we use fixed-effects we
exploit the within ward/individual variation over time. However, in the fixed ef-
fects framework, changes in accessibility can arise because of road improvements
and because employment relocates. The second endogeneity issue is that accessibil-
ity changes due to relocation of employment may be partly driven by the outcome
variable studied or be correlated with the same unobserved shocks. To address this
source of bias, we construct an instrument which uses accessibility changes stem-
ming only from the transport improvements. In practice, we construct an alternat-
ive accessibility index for which we fix employment at the beginning of the period
and we only change the travel times between wards, which vary annually due to
road construction. When deciding where to make transport investments, the gov-
ernment could be targeting specific areas because these have specific productivity or
wage trends. In order to reduce the possible bias caused by the endogeneity of the
placement of the transport investments, we focus on observations which are located
within 10, 20 or 30 kilometres of road schemes. This way, we compare individuals
and locations which are close to the improvements and we exploit the fact that the
impact of the improvements varies considerably even within the distance band. It
is quite unlikely that the improvements are aimed at specific individuals or wards
within those narrowly defined distance bands, specially after controlling for differ-
ent growth trends around the schemes.
Chapter 3: Aggregate and firm outcomes
In this chapter we present the empirical results on the effect of accessibility on ag-
gregate and firm outcomes. We test the effect of accessibility on ward employment,
number of plants and aggregate productivity. We also investigate its effects on in-
dividual outcomes: firm employment, total factor productivity, labour productivity,
gross output and average wages.
For the aggregate outcomes, we estimate a linear specification which relates the
outcome with accessibility. We use the fixed-effects IV strategy outlined above, and
focus on wards within 20 kilometres of road schemes. We use the BSD to calculate
ward employment and number of establishments for years 1998 to 2008. We find
positive effects of accessibility on total employment and number of plants, and also
positive effects on some sectors (specifically construction and producer services).
The elasticities are stronger and more robust for the results on the number of plants.
To obtain the ward productivity results, we use an additional data source, the
Annual Respondents Database (ARD), also provided by the ONS. The ARD dataset
provides balanced-sheet information on a sample of small firms and on the universe
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of big firms (over 150 employees). We combine this information with additional data
on the capital stock of firms. We implement a two-step strategy in which we first es-
timate yearly ward level productivity shifters and then regress them on accessibility
in the second step. We find no effects of accessibility on ward productivity.
We also investigate the effect of accessibility on individual firms outcomes. Over-
all, when we examine the effect of all major road transport improvements with
firm level data focusing on firms and plants that remain in situ before and after
the opening of new road links, we find insignificant effects on the employment and
productivity of firms. The fact that plant level employment is mostly unaffected
by accessibility suggests that the positive ward level employment effect is mainly
attributable to increased entry or decreased exit.
Chapter 4: Labour market outcomes
Finally, in chapter 4 we investigate the effects of accessibility on individual labour
market outcomes. We study the impacts on individual wages and hours worked
(both basic and total), on the probability of being employed and on travel time to
workplace. To investigate these outcomes we use two additional datasets.
We use the Annual Survey on Hours and Earnings (ASHE) to test the effect of
accessibility on weekly wages, weekly hours worked and hourly earnings, analys-
ing both for basic and total (which includes overtime). Due to data restrictions, in
our main regressions we use a panel of employees surveyed between years 2002 and
2008. This data has two main advantages. The first one is that the dataset is a panel,
so we are able to control for time-invariant individual unobservables. The second
one is that we have precise information of the location of the job and the home of
the worker. We use this information to tackle the problem of endogenous spatial
sorting due to changes in accessibility.
We regress individual outcomes on accessibility from both work and home, con-
trolling by optimal commuting time, in order to investigate the different effects that
accessibility from home or from workplace might have. We use the same distance-
band and instrumental variables strategy as in the previous chapter. We use indi-
vidual fixed-effects and instrumental variables, exploiting the changes in accessibil-
ity from work and home for each individual across time. We find positive effects of
both accessibility from work and home on wages and hours worked.
However, if workers are sorting spatially in order to take advantage of changes
in accessibility, we would not be able to identify the separate effects on labour mar-
ket outcomes which stem from (endogenous) sorting and those which are due to
changes in accessibility for a given location (externalities or spatial competition).
Sorting could be an outcome of accessibility or could be due to other unobservable
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reasons correlated with the labour market outcomes. To overcome this issue we
use individual-home-work fixed-effects and exploit the variation over time for in-
dividuals in a given location pair. When we do this, only accessibility from work
seems to have an effect, and it does so on basic and total wages and on total hours
worked.
These findings suggest that, at least partly, the effect of accessibility from home is
driven by spatial residential sorting. They also suggest that workers are affected by
changes in accessibility from workplace. The outcomes that adjust are those which
are “flexible”, i.e. wages and overtime. A possible explanation for these results is
the existence of some sort of agglomeration externalities due to increased spatial
competition in the workplace which is capitalised into wages, and due to higher
earnings, workers find it worthwhile to work longer hours. These results are very
robust to different specifications and the inclusion and exclusion of control vari-
ables.
In this chapter, we also study the effect of accessibility on other labour market
outcomes, e.g. employment status and travel time to workplace. To carry out this
research we use an additional dataset, the Labour Force Survey (LFS). This survey is
a household-based quarterly survey which provides abundant information on some
labour market outcomes (specifically employment status). The main drawbacks of
this data is that it provides limited information on the location of the job and that,
on an annual basis, it is not a panel of individuals.
We use repeated cross sections on individuals for the years 1998 to 2008 and
define “pseudo fixed-effects” and estimate a pseudo-panel. In practice, we allocate
a different fixed-effect to individuals with a combination of specific set of character-
istics (in our case gender age group and ethnicity). We exploit the variation of dif-
ferent individuals around the mean of a “representative” individual, defined by the
set of characteristics. We include additional controls and time dummies to reduce
omitted variable bias. Once again, we use the instrumental variables and distance
bands to tackle endogeneity issues.
With the LFS data, we can only estimate the effect of accessibility from home,
as we do not have information on where the individuals are working or looking
for jobs. We find no significant effects of accessibility on the probability of being
employed, and the coefficients become quite imprecise when we become particu-
larly rigorous with the endogeneity issues. We find some evidence on accessibility
from home on reducing travel time to workplace, which points in the direction of
accessibility affecting labour market outcomes through reducing commuting costs.
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III Contributions
This thesis contributes to the empirical spatial economics literature on three dimen-
sions:
III.1 Theoretical
The research carried out contributes to the theoretical debates on the effect of im-
migration on housing markets and on the effects of transport policy on economic
outcomes.
Chapter 1 thoroughly discusses the different theoretical channels through which
an increase in foreign-born population might affect house prices. An increase in
foreign-born population in a given location could affect prices via (increased) de-
mand and via (reduced construction) costs. If we focus on the effects which work
via changes in housing demand, using Saiz (2007) terminology, we can distinguish
between short-run and long-run effects. In the short-run, total population and hous-
ing stock of a regions are fixed. In the long-run housing supply (through construc-
tion) or housing consumption (through changes in housing density) might change.
In addition, native population might relocate spatially due to the immigration in-
flow into the region. Therefore, the “net” effect of immigration depends on how
housing supply and native population react to changes in foreign-born population.
I provide a careful discussion of these channels which adds to the existing discussion
in the literature and I design the empirical strategy based on the insights emerging
from this discussion.
Chapters 2 to 4 investigate the effect of transport policy on economic outcomes.
We assess the impact of road construction, measured using an accessibility to em-
ployment index, on aggregate and individual (workers and firms) outcomes. We
study numerous outcomes: employment, number of plants, productivity, wages,
hours worked, etc. Given the large number of outcomes we study, there are numer-
ous predictions of the effects of transport policy on them and the different channels
are intertwined. Chapter 2 includes a comprehensive discussion of these channels
and relates them to the empirical evidence. The different channels are connected to
different strands of the urban economics literature (agglomeration economies, spa-
tial mismatch hypothesis, spatial competition). This discussion contributes to the
existing literature by not solely discussing partial-equilibrium outcomes but by set-
ting out the interlinked mechanisms thought which transport policy affects firm,
worker and aggregate outcomes.
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III.2 Methodological
Both parts of the thesis also make substantial methodological contributions. Chapter
1 develops a methodology to isolate the “net” effect of immigration on aggregate
house prices. Standard approaches to estimate these effects fail to take into account
the effect that immigration inflows have on native population mobility. In fact, my
estimates predict that an inflow of 10 foreign-born into a province induces approx-
imately 4 natives to locate into the same province. Therefore, the estimated reduced-
form coefficient of a regression of immigration inflows on price growth would be
capturing both the demand effect stemming from immigrants plus the induced de-
mand effect by natives attracted to the same locations in which foreign-born are
setting in. In this chapter, I propose a methodology to isolate the “net” demand ef-
fect of immigration on prices from the total demand effect. In practice, I estimate the
effect that immigration has on house prices “via its effects on population changes”.
This allows us to gain insights both on the short and long run effects of immigration
inflows on province house prices underlined by Saiz (2007).
Chapters 2 to 4 investigate the impact that transport policy might have on eco-
nomic outcomes. We focus on road construction, making two major methodological
contributions. The first one is the construction of an accessibility index which cap-
tures the impact that road construction has on the amount of employment which is
reachable from a given location. We construct this index by combining the economic
size of locations (employment) and the optimal travel times between them. These
latter are calculated using an original dataset on detailed road schemes undertaken
in Great Britain during the years 1998 to 2008 and combining this information with
data on British major roads networks. This way, we are able to construct major roads
networks in Great Britain for every year in our period of analysis, which is not read-
ily available. To these data we apply ArcGIS R© network tools to calculate how long
it takes to cross any link in the networks and to compute least-cost (minimum jour-
ney time) routes between any pairwise ward combination. To our knowledge, this
is the first time that optimal travel times by road between wards are calculated for
Great Britain for every year in the period 1998-2008. In fact, our data allows us to
potentially calculate optimal travel times between any pair of locations, no matter
the spatial scale. Moreover, it is the first time an accessibility index of this nature is
constructed at such a small spatial scale on a yearly basis for such a long period of
time (11 years).
The second methodological contribution is the development of an identification
strategy which allows us to tackle the different endogeneity issues involved in es-
timation of the effect of accessibility on economic outcomes. This method allows
us to focus on the changes in accessibility stemming from road construction, so we
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can separate the effect of transport policy from the effect of spatial relocation of em-
ployment in the variation of accessibility. This strategy is explained in detail in the
text.
III.3 Empirical
The research carried out in this thesis also makes several empirical contributions.
First of all, the empirical strategy is carefully developed to be able to imply caus-
ality in the estimates. For this purpose, a substantial number of specifications are
estimated and a series of robustness checks are performed in order to check the
validity of the results. Special attention is given to the correct identification of the
coefficients. Thus, we are certain that the estimated effects are quite robust and,
when possible, are comparable with previous estimates of the literature.
Secondly, the research questions are picked in order to fill relevant gaps in the
literature. The existing evidence is critically reviewed in order to identify the areas
in which robust evidence is needed. Specifically, chapter 1 answers a question for
which empirical evidence already exists in the literature (what are the effects of im-
migration on house prices?) but does so in a more complete and informative way.
I study the effects on increases in foreign-born population on both purchase and
rental prices, and in the case of rental prices, this is new for the Spanish case. As
explained above, I also develop a methodology to be able to differentiate between
total and immigration-induced demand effects, which contributes to the empirical
literature of spatial effects of immigration in general. Moreover, I estimate the causal
impact of immigration on natives location for the Spanish case, which to my know-
ledge had not been done before.
In the case of chapters 2 to 4, they also make substantial empirical contributions.
The estimates of the effect of accessibility on productivity and wages add to exist-
ing evidence of the effect of agglomeration and market access on these outcomes
(see Mion & Naticchioni, 2009; Hering & Poncet, 2010; Martin et al., 2011, for some
examples), although they focus on one specific channel which affects the level of
agglomeration, e.g. road construction. There exists no previous evidence on the
effect of road construction on individual economic outcomes (firm and workers).
Moreover, we study how much road construction affects accessibility, which is also
novel. Finally, my findings also shed light on some of the predictions of the spa-
tial mismatch literature (see Inhanfeldt, 2006, for a review) and of the thin labour
markets theory (Manning, 2003).
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Chapter 1
Spatial impacts of immigration:
Evidence from the Spanish housing
market
1.1 Introduction
The study of the impacts of immigration has been a very active area of research
in the last 20 years. Large immigration inflows have substantial effects on the spa-
tial distribution of population within a country. Location choices of the foreign-born
directly changes the composition and size of the population residing in a given area.
Immigration inflows also influence the location decisions of natives, indirectly chan-
ging the population size of the different locations. An inflow of population affects
the labour force of an area, and therefore impacts not only average wages and em-
ployment rates, but also their distribution. Changes in the labour market conditions
will, as a result, affect other economic aspects such as productivity, skills composi-
tion, and ultimately growth and welfare. Not only immigrants affect the production
factors, they also consume amenities and housing services in the places they locate
and this way they influence the spatial equilibrium. As a consequence, the study of
effects of immigration on the housing markets becomes central from a urban eco-
nomics point of view.
Since seminal papers such as Borjas (1995), most of the theoretical and empirical
contributions on the study of the impact of immigration in receiving regions have
originated from the analysis of their labour market effects1. This strand of the im-
migration literature has focused on the analysis of the impact on natives wages and
on the (individual) distribution of wages. The existing evidence is mixed: gener-
1Hanson (2008), Dustmann et al. (2008b), Longhi et al. (2009) or Pekkala-Kerr & Kerr (2011)
provide recent reviews of the literature.
25
ally negative effects on the short run and positive on the long run have been found
(Card, 2007). In any case the estimated effects have been very small and the debate
on the labour impact of immigration is far from being over (Ottaviano & Peri, 2006;
Dustmann et al., 2008a; Ottaviano & Peri, 2008a; Borjas, 2009)2.
The spatial dimension of immigration has however not been sufficiently accoun-
ted for in most of the labour economics literature (Cushing & Poot, 2003). Increased
spatial competition on the consumption of goods, amenities and housing services
may push prices up; the sign and size of the impacts also depend on the response of
the supply of goods and on any induced relocation of natives following the foreign-
born inflows. The net effect on prices would then be the result of changes in the
demand side (positive effects through increased demand) and of changes in the
supply side (through low-skilled immigrants pushing down wages and costs). A
small number papers have provided evidence on the effect of immigration on (con-
sumption) goods prices (Lach, 2007; Corte´s, 2008; Frattini, 2008; Zachariadis, 2011).
They have mostly found negative effects of an increase of low-skilled immigration
on (generally immigrant-labour intensive) goods. The same supply-demand mech-
anisms discussed above would operate in the analysis of the effects of immigration
on house prices. Previous evidence for the US (for example Saiz, 2003, 2007; Ot-
taviano & Peri, 2011) has generally found positive causal impacts of immigration on
both rents and prices3.
In order to provide new evidence on the existence of the aforementioned effects,
this paper studies the impact of the large immigration inflows on house prices using
Spanish data. Between 2001 and 2010 both the number of foreign-born residing in
Spain and house prices significantly increased, providing a suitable setup to gain
further insights on the impact of immigrations on prices. Motivated by the substan-
tial size of the immigration inflows, the number of empirical works analysing the
impact of immigration in Spain on various economic outcomes has increased in re-
cent years. Most of the papers have focused on the labour market impacts (Bentolila
et al., 2008; Carrasco et al., 2008; Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2008a,b; Gonzalez
& Ortega, 2010), but a number of papers have studied other aspects like the effect
of immigration on output mix (Requena et al., 2009), trade (Peri & Requena, 2010),
productivity (Kangasniemi et al., 2009), or even crime (Alonso-Borrego et al., 2011).
A handful of recent works have also provided some evidence of the impact of im-
migration on house prices in Spain. Talavull de la Paz (2003) explores their different
determinants using a sample of Spanish cities during the period 1989 to 1999. She
2The study of immigration impacts has also analysed on other aspects, for example regional con-
vergence (Ozgen et al., 2009), innovation (Gandal et al., 2004), (Gauthier-Loiselle & Hunt, 2009),
productivity (Peri, 2009) or crime (Buonanno et al., 2011).
3Other studies are Greulich et al. (2005), which analyses welfare effects (real rents) or Stillman &
Mare´ (2008), which provides estimates for New Zealand.
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investigates the role of population and economic activity specialisation as explanat-
ory variables of cities prices differentials. She finds that population is strongly sig-
nificant in explaining house price levels while economic structure does not appear
to have any significant effect on house prices. Sosvilla-Rivero (2008) analyses the
effect of immigration for the regions during the period 1995-2007 and assesses the
over-valuation of the house prices with respect to economic fundamentals. He finds
that almost half of the over-valuation can be attributed to immigration flows, which
he interprets as a positive relationship between immigration and prices. Gonzalez
& Ortega (2009) find important positive causal effects of immigration inflows on
both house prices and dwelling construction. They focus on the period of “housing
boom” in Spain (1998-2008) and use a similar methodology to Saiz (2007). Their pa-
per is the closest to the present one, but their period of analysis is different and they
do not study the effects on housing rents. Finally, Garcı´a-Montalvo (2010) explores
the role of land regulation and immigration on Spanish municipalities during the
period 2001 to 2005 but, conversely to the other studies, he finds no effect of immig-
ration inflows using a long-differences instrumental variables estimation.
The scope of the present paper is related to the aforementioned. To study the ef-
fects of immigration on house prices I exploit a panel of Spanish provinces (NUTS3)
for the period 2001-2010. Fixed-effects and instrumental variables estimators are
used in order to infer causality between the immigration inflow and the evolution
of average house prices. I provide new evidence of the impact of immigration on
the average purchase prices and novel evidence of the effect on rental prices.
One of the main contributions of this paper is the analysis of the effects of im-
migration on Spanish local rental prices, which, to my knowledge, has never been
done before. I consider rents to be an important indicator of the demand for hous-
ing (from immigrants). Data analysis based on the National Immigration Survey
2007 shows that the housing tenancy choice of most immigrants (70%) is renting,
not owning. Therefore, a substantial part of the impact of immigration on purchase
prices could be indirect. Moreover, housing is not only a consumption good, but
could also be considered an investment asset. In this sense, foreign investment in
Spanish real estate has been substantial in the last years (Rodrı´guez & Bustillo, 2008).
These two reasons make the analysis of rental prices an important complement to
the analysis of purchase prices when interested on the impact of immigration on
housing services.
The period of analysis covers a subperiod of high boom (2001-2008) and bust
of the housing markets (2008-2010), which provides sufficient variation to adopt a
very demanding empirical strategy. I find estimates of the effects of immigration on
house prices comparable to previous findings (Saiz, 2007). The relationship between
immigration location and native location is also explored, using the empirical test
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suggested by Peri & Sparber (2011). I estimate a significant and positive causal
relationship between natives and immigrants location choices, which is very robust
across specifications. Motivated by this finding, I provide novel estimates which use
the variation in population attributable to exogenous immigration location choices.
If natives are co-locating in the same locations as immigrants, because these provide
some desirable services or because natives like diversity, standard estimates might
be capturing both the demand increase from immigrants but also the induced de-
mand increase from relocated natives. I argue that the estimates obtained using my
technique are non-biased estimates of the net effect of population changes due to
immigration. These turn out to be around 30 to 40% lower than those obtained with
the standard methodology used for example in Saiz (2007) or Gonzalez & Ortega
(2009). The estimated elasticities using this methodology are around 0.6% for rental
prices and between 1.3 and 2% for purchase prices. These results are robust across
specifications, to different data sources and to the use of different definitions of the
instrument.
Finally, I explore the role played by housing supply in mitigating the house
prices growth attributed to increased demand from immigrants. I find no signi-
ficant effect of the growth of housing stock on prices, conditional on changes in
demand induced by immigration. This could be due to financial constraints that
immigrants face when accessing housing ownership or due to substantial numbers
of non-occupied houses4.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 describes the empir-
ical strategy: the empirical specification is explained in 1.2.1, some issues related
to the estimation of causal effects of immigration on house prices are discussed in
1.2.2, the identification strategy is explained in 1.2.3 and finally the data sources and
some descriptive statistics are provided in 1.2.4 and 1.2.5. Section 1.3 discusses the
results and the robustness tests. Finally, section 1.4 contains the conclusions and the
discussion of the limitations of the analysis.
1.2 Empirical methodology
1.2.1 Empirical specification
In order to estimate the causal effect of changes in foreign-born population on the
growth of house prices (purchase and rental), I use a linear empirical specification
4In fact, the estimates of the Spanish Buildings Census 2011 for stock of non-occupied dwellings
(which includes non sold dwellings) is around 20%.
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similar to Saiz (2007). It takes the form:
∆ log(ri,t) = β
FBin f lowi,t−1
populationi,t−1
+ λt + γr + φ
′Zi + δ′∆Xi,t−2 + εi,t (1.1)
The geographical unit of observation are the 50 Spanish provinces i, which are
grouped into 17 regions r.5 t denotes time periods (years). ∆ log(ri,t) is the change of
the natural logarithm of housing purchase or rental prices in province i during year
t, the immigration ratio during t − 1 is FBin f lowi,t−1/populationi,t−1, λt are time
fixed-effects, γr are regional fixed-effects, Zi is a matrix of province time-invariant
attributes and ∆Xi,t−2 is a matrix of province time-varying controls. Finally, εi,t is a
random shock.
The independent variable of interest is the immigration ratio: it is defined as the
inflow of immigrants into province i during a given period divided by the popu-
lation in the province at the end of the previous period (original province’s pop-
ulation). The inflow of immigrants during t − 1 is calculated as the change in the
foreign-born population between January t− 1 and January t. Population in t− 1
denotes the stock of total residents (natives and foreign-born) at the end of period6
t − 2. Using an immigration ratio instead of gross inflows as the measure of “im-
migration” has three advantages. For a given housing stock, the changes in demand
which affect house prices depend on the number of immigrants moving into the
province and on the demand from existing residents. Bigger regions, in terms of
population, would be able to absorb larger numbers of immigrants, and could have
different house price growth dynamics than less populated regions. Standardising
the immigration inflow by the original population size of the province allows us to
take into account the “relative” size of the immigration inflow, which better captures
the effect of immigration on housing demand. By using the ratio we also eliminate
any unobservables that might equally affect both the numerator (immigration in-
flow) and the denominator (original province’s population). Finally, it allows us to
interpret the coefficient β as an elasticity: a 1% increase in the ratio has a β% effect
on the change in prices.
The immigration ratio is lagged one period with respect to the growth rate of
prices. For example, I expect a change in the immigration ratio during 2001 to have
an effect in prices the following year, i.e. between 2001 and 2002. The span of time
between the arrival of immigrants into a region and the reaction of housing services
prices is undetermined. Just after arrival into a province, immigrants start consum-
ing housing services immediately, as they need accommodation. It is likely that the
5Provinces correspond to the European NUTS3 and regions to NUTS2. I exclude the African
territories for their historical particularities and the lack of reliable data.
6The source of the population data dates the population numbers (total, foreign-born and natives)
on the 1st of January.
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initial housing tenure of just-arrived immigrants is renting, specially if they are eco-
nomic immigrants and they move into a location looking for a job. Therefore, the
effect of immigration inflows on rental prices could be contemporaneous or lagged.
The effect on housing purchase prices is more likely to be lagged. Unless immig-
rants settle into a region because of residential reasons (which is the case for a small
fraction of the immigrant arrivals since 2001), immigrants probably take some time
to accumulate enough wealth to buy a property. The main specification uses lagged
immigration ratio with respect to the changes in prices, but I also investigate the
contemporaneous relationship as a robustness test.
The first-differences setting eliminates any unobservable province characterist-
ics which might be correlated with the level of house prices and the level of foreign-
born population in the province. Time fixed-effects λt control for common shocks
affecting the growth of prices of all provinces in Spain in a given year (for example,
a tax deduction on mortgage payments, a subsidy to renting or a better financial
climate). There could still exist some unobservable factors at the region or at the
province level which are correlated with the changes in purchase/rental prices and
changes in foreign-born stocks (numerator of the immigration ratio) and which are
biasing the estimation of β. To reduce this bias, I add region fixed-effects γr (and
regional trends γr ∗ t in some specifications). These fixed-effects control for time-
invariant regional characteristics which might affect the prices growth and the im-
migration ratio and which are not common to the whole country. Alternatively I
include province fixed-effects (γi). These control for unobservables at the province
level which are correlated with changes in prices and in the immigration ratio and
correspond to a first-differences fixed-effects estimation.
Vector Zi contains time-invariant province attributes. They control for the fact
that provinces with different levels of the time-invariant characteristics might have
different growth trends in the levels house prices and in the stocks of foreign-born
population. Given that region fixed-effects (γr) are also included, the province at-
tributes control for differential growth trends of the provinces around their com-
mon regional trend. The matrix includes geographical characteristics (coast dummy,
length of the coastline, surface of the national parks), weather (average temperature
and average rain precipitation in January) and beginning of the period levels of sev-
eral amenities (number of restaurants and bars in 2000, number of retails shops in
2000, number of doctors in 2000 and a comparative index of the importance of the
tourism sector in 2000). When I use province fixed-effects, I control for all time-
invariant attributes, so Zi drops.
The vector ∆Xi,t−2 contains time-varying characteristics (in changes). Even if
our aim were to reduce the omitted variable bias, this would not be the case if the
variables included in Xi,t−2 were “bad” controls, in other words, variables that could
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well be outcomes variables in equation (1.1) (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). To try to
mitigate the effect of bad controls, I use a lag with respected to the immigration ratio,
so the variables are measured one year before the immigrants locate in the province.
Hence, I use the changes in the variables during t− 2, one period before the inflows
(t − 1) and two periods before the change in prices (t). I control for the growth in
gross domestic output (GDP) and the changes in the unemployment rate. Richer
provinces which are growing faster and employing more people could be attracting
more immigrants and thus could also have higher growth in house purchase and
rental prices. I also control for changes on the number of credit establishments and
on the share of saving banks because they could have affected the availability of
credit, which might have pushed purchase house prices up by influencing housing
tenure decisions (Cun˜at & Garicano, 2010).
If we believed there is high time dependence on both the immigration ratio and
on the growth of purchase/rental prices7, lagging the controls one period with re-
spect to the immigration ratio would not be enough to overcome the problem of
bad controls. In this case, we would not be sure that our control, for example GDP
growth, was not directly determined by prospects of future changes in prices and
immigration. Given that equation (1.1) controls for regional/province fixed-effects
and time fixed-effects, the time-varying controls would only be eliminating the bias
induced by annual changes in the province characteristics which are not captured
by these fixed-effects and which are affecting the change in prices and the change
in immigration ratio at the same time. In other words, a annual shock in GDP in
province which is not common to all province in Spain and which is different from
the average growth in the period. These changes are likely to be small, so the reduc-
tion in the bias caused by the introduction of time-varying controls is likely to be
small (which is the case, as explained in section 1.3). The empirical results are very
robust to the exclusion of ∆Xi,t−2, and the estimated β coefficient is very similar
with and without time-varying controls. The main results are obtained including
time-varying controls, but the qualitative conclusions would remain unaltered if we
excluded them.
1.2.2 How do immigrants affect house prices?
Correct identification of coefficient β would yield insights into the causal effect of
immigration on house prices. If we consider changes in foreign-born population
as a source of population growth (Card, 2007), large immigrants inflows would be
expected to have a positive impact on the evolution of housing purchase and rental
7The correlation between the immigration ratio and the lagged immigration ratio is 0.60, between
changes/lagged changes in purchase prices is 0.76 and changes/lagged changes in rental prices 0.50.
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prices. The economic intuition behind this is a simple demand-supply result. For a
given level of population in the region, after a large immigration inflow, increased
competition in housing markets forces both newly arrived immigrants and stayers
to bid higher to buy or rent a property. Given supply, a positive immigration inflow
into a region could be translated into an increase in demand of housing services,
thus pushing up prices and rents.
This is the intuition behind the model developed in Saiz (2007). Increases in
foreign-born population in a given location increases total population and then
pushes demand and prices in the short run. In the long run (net effects) we need
to take into account the effect of the changes on housing supply (construction), on
housing consumption (density) and on the mobility of natives or previous resid-
ents (displacement). I discuss the implications of considering these aspects on the
interpretation of coefficient β below.
Table A.1 shows that construction of new private dwellings between 2001 and
2010 was very high, of almost 5,000,000 houses. Given this large number, we would
expect increased supply to, at least partially, mitigate the rise in prices caused by
the increase in demand. In this paper I try to account for the effect of housing sup-
ply on house prices. Including supply changes in the estimation of equation (1.1)
as an extra control is very problematic, because even if lagged, housing construc-
tion is very likely to be a “bad” control for the reasons explained before. There are
difficulties to find a perfect instrument for housing construction with the currently
available Spanish data, hence conclusions drawn from these results must be taken
with caution.
In addition, we could argue for a limited effect of construction via a high number
of non-occupied dwellings. According to Census data, in 2001 15% of the housing
stock was empty. Although no official number exists, in 2010 the government re-
cognised the existence of around between 700,000 empty houses, while non-official
statistics quantify this number between 1.7 and 3 millions in 2008 (at the peak of the
boom) and at least 1.5 millions in 20108 (after the crisis started). This would suggest
that not all the new construction was occupied by new tenants or owners (maybe
because of credit restrictions or expectation on future growth in prices), so increased
supply did not help to alleviate price growth.
Immigration can also have an effect on prices through input costs, by pushing
down (construction) costs through lower wages (Gonzalez & Ortega, 2009; Zachari-
adis, 2010). According to the Wage Structure Survey (National Institute of Statistics),
in 2007 wages paid on the construction sector were around 10% lower than the aver-
age wages, and the average paid wages to non natives were much lower than those
paid to natives (20% lower for EU citizens, 55% for Latin American, 65% for East
8SEOPAN and Anuario Estadı´stico del Mercado Inmobiliario Espan˜ol (RR de Acun˜a & Asociados).
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European and 47% for the rest of the world, including North African immigrants).
On the other hand, immigrants employment is concentrated in the construction sec-
tor.
Table A.2 illustrates this fact. It displays the percentage of workers in the con-
struction sector over total employment, for the total labour force (immigrants plus
natives), for the native labour force and for the immigrant labour force. The last row
shows the proportion of immigrants over total labour force. In 2008, at the peak of
the housing boom, over 20% of the immigrants that work do so in the construction
sector, compared to the 12% of the total. In 2010, at the end of the period of analysis
(when foreign-born workers still represent more than 13% of the labour force), im-
migrants are still over-concentrated in the construction sector. If we compare these
proportions to the numbers at the beginning of the period, we notice that while in
1998 immigrants and natives were equally concentrated in the construction sector,
by the end of if immigrants disproportionably work in construction. Putting the
lower wages and the concentration of immigrants in low-paid jobs together, it can
also be argued that immigrants could negatively affect the growth of house prices
through pushing down the labour cost in the housing construction sector. However,
the lack of good quality data to test the cost hypothesis prevents us from drawing
strong conclusions.
Housing density remained relatively stable during the period. Table A.1 also
shows the ratio of population over total (private) housing stock9 during the period
2001 to 2010. Even if we cannot draw definitive conclusions, mainly due to the
lack of reliable data on housing vacancies, these numbers suggest that, if anything,
intensive construction kept the ratio of houses/population relatively stable (or even
increased it) over the period of analysis.
The net (long-run) effect of immigration inflows on any local economic outcomes
depends on what the literature has called “native displacement”. This issue gained
renewed interest after the publication of Borjas (2003). This paper criticized regional
immigration studies of the labour market impacts of foreign-born inflows, claiming
that the United States (US) works as a single labour market and that the existence of
displacement hampers the estimation of regional effects. Any estimated regional ef-
fect of an inflow of immigrants would be the net results of changes in labour supply
which results from the inflows plus any changes from natives relocation. The exist-
ence of native displacement has been used as an explanation for the lack of robust
estimates of the impact of immigration on wages across US labour markets.
The relocation of population across regions within a country would hinder the
identification of area-level effects, as the effects would dissipate throughout the
9Private housing in Spain represents around 90% of total stock.
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country10. This same issue would apply to the estimation of the effect of immig-
ration on house prices. For a given housing stock, immigration inflows increase
prices through increases in housing demand in the short run. Consequently, total
changes in housing demand in the long run depend on how and if the natives relo-
cate spatially after or at the same time as the immigrants arrive.
In a recent article, Peri & Sparber (2011) review the existing evidence of native
displacement in the US and, using simulated data, they test the relevance of the tests
which have been previously performed in the literature. They conclude that, based
on the existing tests, there is no robust evidence in favour of the existence of nat-
ive displacement in the USA. Due to the traditionally low native mobility in Spain
(Decressin & Fatas, 1995), we would expect natives to react little to immigration in-
flows. Yet, Spain had never experienced immigration inflows of the magnitude of
those of the last years, so this setting provides an interesting scenario to test internal
mobility11.
Peri & Sparber (2011) suggest to test the native displacement hypothesis using a
variation of the test proposed by Card (2007)12. We can use a “native ratio” in the
left-hand-side of an specification similar to (1.1) and estimate:
natives in f lowi,t
populationi,t
= α
FBin f lowi,t
populationi,t
+ λt + γr + φ
′Zi + δ′∆Xi,t−1 + εi,t (1.2)
where the variables in the right-hand-side denote the same elements as in (1.1). The
sign and size of α would inform us about the relationship between immigration
inflows and native relocation. If the estimated α is negative this would indicate that
natives are leaving the regions where the immigrants locate: displacement would
be complete if α = −1 or less than proportional if −1 < α < 0.
It is commonly assumed that immigrants would displace natives from the re-
gions they migrate into. Native population might move out from areas where im-
migrants move in for several reasons; for example competition in the labour market,
competition in the consumption of amenities or public goods or even segregation.
It could also be the case that immigration inflows have no effect on natives loca-
tion (α = 0), for example if immigrants specialise in different tasks than natives
(Ottaviano & Peri, 2008b), so they would not compete for the same jobs, or if they
10Numerous papers have investigated the relationship between immigration and natives mobility,
for example Card & DiNardo (2000), Card (2001), Hatton & Tani (2005), Borjas (2006), Card (2007),
Corte´s (2008) and Mocetti & Porello (2010).
11In their report, Ferna´ndez-Huertas et al. (2009) provide some non-causal evidence on the rela-
tionship between immigration and native location. They find positive correlations although they
claim that the size is negligible to have any considerable impact on the estimation of local effects of
immigration. Given my results, in section 1.3.2 I argue differently.
12Card’s specification uses population growth as the left-hand-side variable, which includes both
natives and immigrants.
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consume different goods (Mazzolari & Neumark, 2011). In this case we could expect
immigrants not to affect natives location decisions. Immigrants could even attract
natives to the location they settle in. This could happen if immigrants are attract-
ive to natives because they provide cheaper labour-intense goods (as suggested by
Corte´s, 2008) or because they generate positive externalities on natives wages or
rents (Ottaviano & Peri, 2006). Another plausible explanation for the existence of
“attraction” is that there exist unobservable time-varying characteristic or amenity
of a region which attract both natives and immigrants and that we are unable to
capture in our econometric model.
In his study of the effect of immigration on American rents, Saiz (2007) claims
that if native outflows completely off-set immigration inflows, we would expect
the increase in housing demand by immigrants to be completely balanced out by a
decrease of housing demand from natives. The total effect, and therefore the para-
meter β in equation (1.1), would be zero. If natives leave the area in greater numbers
than immigrants enter, β would be negative because it would mean total housing
demand (for a given supply) is decreasing. He suggests that finding a positive local
effect of immigration in rents allows us to reject the complete native displacement
in the labour market13.
If our aim is to draw conclusions on the (net) effect of immigration on prices,
it is therefore essential to estimate the effect of immigration inflows on native loc-
ation decisions. If no causal relationship exists between immigration location and
native re-location, then we can be quite certain that we are estimating the effect of
(increased demand from) immigration on prices. But if a sizeable causal relation-
ship exists, we need to be more cautious about the interpretation of our results. In
this paper I estimate the displacement hypothesis with Spanish data and I propose a
methodology to investigate the long-run effect of immigration on prices, specifically,
the effect of immigration on prices through its effect on total population changes.
This is discussed in detail in section 1.3.2.
Finally, other minor issues on the estimation of β should be considered, which
are discussed in the appendix (section A.1).
1.2.3 Identification strategy
As detailed in section 1.2.1 above, the first step to achieve correct identification
of the effects of immigration on prices is to include region and province fixed-
effects. These control for time-invariant unobservables at the region or province
level correlated at the same time with the immigration inflows and the growth in
13As discussed in section A.1, the total effect also depends on the relative income/access to credit
of natives and immigrants.
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prices. The fixed-effect estimator exploits the variation in price changes and immig-
ration inflows within provinces across time around the average changes during the
period 2001-2010 (net of common national shocks as we are including time dum-
mies too). We need a substantial amount of variation to be able to identify the β
parameter precisely. Because our period of analysis covers both a period of high
growth (2001-2007) and of economic crisis (2008-2010), there is a fair amount of vari-
ation in the data to be able to identify the parameter of interests even after applying
first-differences and including year and province fixed-effects in most specifications.
Nevertheless, even after including province fixed-effects, consistent estimation
of β still requires the regressor of interest to be uncorrelated with the time-varying
part of the error (local time-varying shocks affecting price growth and immigrant
location at the same time). If this is not the case, we would still be finding inconsist-
ent estimates of the coefficient we are interested in. There is no prior on the direc-
tion of the bias. The estimated β would be upward biased if immigrants are going
to provinces with positive shocks or better economic prospects, while it would be
downward biased if, for some reason, immigrants locate in province in which prices
are growing slower14.
In order to infer causality on the relationship between immigration and house
prices growth, I estimate equation (1.1) using an instrumental variables approach.
I construct the instrument adopting the “shift-share” methodology, which has ex-
tensively been used before, for example by Card (2001), Ottaviano & Peri (2006) or
Peri (2009). It exploits the fact that immigrants tend to disproportionately locate in
areas where immigrants from the same nationality/ethnicity have located before, to
take advantage of social and economic established networks. I use historical loca-
tion patterns (1991 for most specifications) to predict current location patterns, and
I use these predicted inflows as an instrument for the actual inflows.
The regressor of interest is the immigration ratio: immigration inflow during
t− 1 divided by total population (foreign-born plus natives) at the end of t− 2. The
population data is dated on the 1st of January. Denoting foreign-born population as
FBstock we can express the immigration ratio for province i as:
FBin f lowi,t−1
populationi,t−1
=
FBin f lowi,t−1
FBstocki,t−1 + nativesi,t−1
=
FBstocki,t − FBstocki,t−1
FBstocki,t−1 + nativesi,t−1
(1.3)
I construct the instrument following Peri (2009). I predict the stock of foreign-
born FBstocki,t−1 using previous location patterns by nationality, and I use this pre-
diction to calculate the immigration inflow of the numerator (calculated as change in
14In a similar exercise to the present one, Gonzalez & Ortega (2009) claim that, given that they
are controlling for economic prospects of the regions, it is expected than immigrants go to provinces
where prices grow slower, so we expect the parameter to be downward biased.
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the stock) and I also use it in denominator as part of total population. Other papers
on the impact of immigration on housing (Saiz, 2007; Gonzalez & Ortega, 2009) use
a similar instrument but the denominator uses actual population data, not including
the predicted foreign-born in the denominator, which is incorrect.
I denote provinces with r (i is the specific province for which we are calculat-
ing the share and R is the 50 provinces in Spain), time periods with t, nationalities
or ethnic groups with n (N being the total number of nationalities) and the years
I use to calculate the historical location patterns as base. A list of the nationalities
used (119 groups) appears in table A.4. To impute the immigrant population in each
province by nationality of origin, I first calculate, for each province and each nation-
ality, the share of immigrants (over the total number in Spain) that were located in
that region in the base year. The base year is the reference year of “past” location
patterns, which is normally some years before the start of our period of analysis.
The share is defined:
shareni,base =
FBstockni,base
∑Rr FBstocknr,base
=
FBstockni,base
FBstocknSpain,base
(1.4)
This share is the proportion of immigrants located in a particular province i over the
total immigrants from the same nationality located elsewhere in Spain, at some past
period of time base.
The imputed foreign-born stock of a specific nationality n in province i at time
t, imp FBstockni,t, is calculated allocating current total national stocks based on the
historical share:
imp FBstockni,t = share
n
i,base ∗
(
∑Rr 6=i FBstocknr,t
)
(1.5)
The current national stock of nationality n, ∑Rr 6=i FBstocknr,t, is calculated summing
the stock of foreign-born of that nationality in all provinces in Spain except i. I
exclude i to avoid using the stock I am trying to instrument for in the construction
of the prediction of foreign-born.
To calculate the imputed total (all nationalities) foreign-born stock in province i
at time t, we sum across nationalities:
imp FBstocki,t =∑Nn
(
imp FBstockni,t
)
(1.6)
I use the change of the imputed total foreign-born population to calculate the
imputed total inflow of immigrants (recall that population data is dated 1st January).
This imputed value is divided by the imputed population (imputed foreign-born
plus natives) in province i at the beginning of the period t − 1 in order to obtain
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the first instrument for the immigration ratio as defined in expression (1.3). The
instrument is constructed as follows:
IV1 ratioi,t−1 =
(imp FBstocki,t − imp FBstocki,t−1)
imp FBstocki,t−1 + nativesi,t−1
=
imp FBin f lowi,t−1
imp populationi,t−1
(1.7)
For this instrument to be valid it has to be sufficiently correlated with the im-
migration ratio but uncorrelated with the local shocks that affect house prices vari-
ations, conditional on the controls and fixed-effects. The relevance of the instrument
can be assessed by the value of the F-statistics of the instrument in the first stage
of the 2-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regressions, and additionally by using under-
identification and weak identification tests. The exogeneity of the instrument de-
pends on several conditions. Given the way the predicted foreign-born stock (1.5) is
constructed we need that15:
1. The unobserved factors determining the location of immigrants in one province
with respect to another in the base year (1991) is uncorrelated with the relative
economic prospects of the two provinces during the period of analysis (2001-
2010). In other words, immigrants in 1991 did not come in the prospects of
future growth during the 2001-2010 decade.
2. The only channel through which foreign-born geographical distribution in the
base year (1991) affects current changes in house prices is through its influence
on shaping the current immigrants location patterns (exclusion restriction).
3. The total (national) flow of immigrants in a given year (second term in the in-
teraction) has to be exogenous to specific unobservable province local shocks.
The choice of the base year determines the validity of conditions (1) and (2) but
also the strength of the instrument. If the base year is very close to t, the instru-
ment would be strong but its exogeneity can be jeopardised. If the base year is
very far from t, it is more likely that the instrument is exogenous, but it may not
be strong enough. For the main results, the IV is computed using data for the 1991
Census (foreign-born by country of nationality). In 1991 there was a sufficient stock
of foreign-born in each province from each nationality to assure that our instrument
is strong. Conditions 1 and 2 require that that location choices in base year are not
driven by factors correlated to current changes in house prices (Saiz, 2007). These
conditions are quite likely to be valid given that between 1991 and 2001 there was an
important economic crisis (1992-1993) followed by economic recovery and growth
(from 1997). We can assume immigrants were not able to predict future shocks (not
captured in the province nor in the time fixed-effects) ten years before our period of
15Adapted from Corte´s (2008).
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analysis starts16.
The validity of condition 3 depends on the way the second term of the interaction
is constructed. First, to avoid using the inflow for that we want to instrument in our
prediction (just scaled by shareni,base), the term ∑
J
j 6=i FBstock
n
j,t is defined as the total
inflow of immigrants from nationality n coming to Spain at time t minus the inflow
of immigrants from nationality n coming to province i at time t. But we still require
this term to be orthogonal to current local shocks. This assumption may be violated
if location in provinces other than i is correlated with unobservable economic condi-
tions of province i at a given point in time t. This is probable, specially if our spatial
units are small and the economic conditions that attract immigrants are spatially
correlated. For example, the economic condition in “economically big” provinces
(like Madrid or Barcelona) could influence the total number of immigrants decid-
ing to come to Spain, even if they end up locating somewhere else (based on their
ethnic networks). To solve this issue a similar strategy to Saiz (2007) and Ortega
& Peri (2009) is adopted. I compute the predicted total stock by country of origin
from the results of a gravity model which depends only on push factors. Details of
this procedure are given in the appendix (section A.2.1). Using the predictions from
equations (A.2) and (A.3), I redefine the instrument as:
IV2 ratioi,t−1 =
imp pred FBin f lowi,t−1
imp pred FBstocki,t−1 + nativesi,t−1
(1.8)
However, there could still exist a final issue with the construction of (1.8) which
might make the instrument invalid. Total population stock, which appear in the
denominator, is the results of the sum of the foreign-born (imputed prediction) plus
the natives. As discussed in section 1.2.2, the number of total natives residing in a
given province might depend on the number of foreign-born in the same location.
For this reason, I use a similar shift-share strategy to compute a prediction for the
location of natives imp nativesi,t−1, based on past location patterns. Details are given
in the appendix (section A.2.2).
Substituting the actual native stock by its prediction in equation (1.8), I finally
define the main instrument as:
IVmain ratioi,t−1 =
imp pred FBin f lowi,t−1
imp pred FBstocki,t−1 + imp nativesi,t−1
(1.9)
I use IVmain ratioi,t−1 in the main instrumental variables estimation results and
different variations of it (changing the base year share, the national inflow used and
16As a robustness check 1930, 1940 and 1985 location patterns is be used below. I also use 2001
location patterns as base year (first year of the period of analysis) to compute the instrument, which
makes it a very strong instrument but unlikely to be exogenous.
39
the prediction of the native stocks) in the robustness checks.
1.2.4 Data sources and variable construction
The spatial unit of analysis is the province (NUTS3). I exclude Ceuta and Melilla
because of their particular history and lack of data. I have population and economic
data for the 50 provinces during period 1998-2010. However, I focus on the period
2001-2010 for several reasons. First, Ferna´ndez-Huertas et al. (2009) and Bertoli et al.
(2011) recommend the use of population data coming from the population registers
(Padro´n) from 2001 because its reliability improves after that year. In section 1.3.5,
I test the robustness of the results to the inclusion of years prior to 2001. Secondly,
it is after 2001 that the stock of foreign-born starts increasing significantly. It could
be the case that most entries started in 2001 or that the stocks started to be correctly
measured after that year. To mitigate measurement error I then focus on 2001-2010
for the main analysis. Thirdly, the rental prices data is only available from 2001 so
focusing on this time period allows us to compare the rental and purchase prices
results over the same time period. Finally, using the housing boom and bust allows
adoption of a demanding estimation strategy as there is more variance in the house
price growth data.
The available data sources for population and foreign-born numbers in Spain
are the Census (each 10 years) and the population municipality registers (annual).
The number of residents in a municipality is registered by the city councils in an
administrative register called the Municipal Register (Padro´n). The annual records
of the municipal register, dated on the 1st January of each year, is obtained from its
updates. In 1996 a modification of register regulations was undertaken. A continu-
ous and computerised management system for municipal registers was introduced,
based on the coordination of all of the municipal registers by the National Statistical
Institute. This new system yields more accurate and up-to-date information. The
first population data available with this new system is dated 1st January 1996.
One advantage of this register is that it gives very precise information on the
population figures, on a yearly basis, for very small geographical units (up to census
sections). Another important advantage is that it collects the total number of foreign-
born residents even if they are illegal immigrants. However, it has two disadvant-
ages. For confidentiality issues, data availability on the characteristics of the pop-
ulation is limited (only age, gender and nationality). In addition, the immigration
figures may be over-estimated because immigrants have to actively cancel their re-
gister when they move out of the country (if they move within the country their
new register cancels out the old one). Alternatively, I could have used data from
the Home Office (Ministerio del Interior), which collects figures of residence permits
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and legal immigrants on an annual basis. However, using the register data has the
additional advantage that it is consistent with the total population data and that it
collects all foreign-born that reside in a given province, not only the legal ones.
The house price data comes from Uriel-Jime´nez et al. (2009), published by the
Valencian Institute of Economic Research (henceforth IVIE) jointly with the BBVA
Foundation (FBBVA). The database covers the period 1990-2007 and the IVIE prices
are calculated using the original data from the Spanish Housing Department (Min-
isterio de Vivienda). The Housing Department official data provides the average price
per square meter on dwellings purchases in the private sector. It is provided every
quarter for all the provinces. The original price data is calculated by the Housing
Department from the data provided by the Professional Association of Valuation
Societies (ATASA - Asociacio´n Profesional de Sociedades de Valoracio´n). It is a weighted
average of the valuation price and the number of valuations17. The IVIE dataset of
house prices is constructed by weighting the official prices provided by the Housing
Department to take into account the location of the dwelling and when it was built.
As the IVIE data is only available until 2007, the dataset was expanded until 2010
by applying the provincial price growth rates from the Housing Department official
data series.
Data on rental prices comes from the Housing Department and the National In-
stitute of Statistics (INE). I combine data from National Observatory of Rented Prop-
erties (Observatorio Estatal de la Vivienda en Alquiler) and the consumer price indices
(CPI provinces - rents component) to calculate the average rent price per square
meter of the each province, from 2001 to 2010.
As time varying controls I use the number of credit establishments in a given
province and the share of saving banks (to control for credit availability), the growth
of GDP and the growth of the unemployment rate. Data on the number of banks
comes from the La Caixa Spanish Economic Yearbook (La Caixa Anuario Econo´mico
de Espan˜a), which collects data at the municipality and the province level for sev-
eral socioeconomic indicators. Data on the growth of GDP comes from the Regional
Economic Accounts of the National Institute of Economics. The province unem-
ployment rate was calculated using the IVIE data on human capital (Estimacio´n de
las Series de Capital Humano 1964-2010) and it is defined as the ratio of unemployed
over working-age population.
I also use time-invariant province characteristics in the specifications without
province fixed-effects. These include: geographical characteristics (a dummy if the
province is located on the coast, the length of the coastline and the surface if the na-
tional parks, from the National Geographical Institute); weather conditions (average
rainfall and average temperature in January, from the National Agency of Meteor-
17There also exists data on transaction prices, but only after 2004.
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ology) and initial province attributes in 2000 (number of retails shops, number of
restaurants and bars, relative weight of the tourism sector, from La Caixa Spanish
Economic Yearbook; and number of doctors from the National Institute of Statistics).
1.2.5 Descriptive statistics
Table A.7 contains summary statistics of all the variables for the 50 provinces over
the 9 year period (2002/2010 for the prices and 2001-2009 for the population vari-
ables), i.e, for the all the 450 observations of the panel pooled. The mean total change
in log (annual growth) for rental prices is 3.3%, while for purchase prices is between
6.30 and 7.2%, depending on the source. Average provincial population growth if
12.5%, while the immigration ratio is 10.5%. The table also displays the summary
statistics for the province time-invariant attributes and the time-varying controls.
The final rows present summary statistics of the variables related to the supply of
housing, which are used in section 1.3.6.
Tables A.8 and A.10 show the mean and the standard deviation only for the
house prices growth and the population variables (the ratios). Table A.8 displays
the summary statistics for each province over the 9-year time period. The last rows
of both tables display the total (across provinces and years) mean and standard de-
viation, which correspond to the values in table A.7. Table A.9 display the sum of
the squares from the ANOVA decomposition to illustrate the sources of variation of
the variables across provinces. The analysis of these tables allows us to look at both
the spatial (provinces) and the temporal (years) dimensions of the summary stat-
istics. From these two tables we can infer that most of the variation in the growth
of prices is within provinces, especially for purchase prices. This fact allow us to
use a demanding empirical strategy (inclusion of region and province trends) and
still identify the parameters. For the population variables there is nevertheless more
variation between provinces than within them, except for the immigration ratio,
where the within and between variation across provinces is fairly similar. Table A.10
shows the statistics for each year across the 50 provinces. We observe that between
year growth of rents changes very little between 2002 and 2008, and it decreases
when the housing crises starts. For purchase prices these changes are even bigger,
as the growth rate becomes negative from 2009 onwards.
Figure 1.1 shows the Spanish average time evolution of the stocks (top panel)
and inflows (middle panel) of foreign-born and the share of foreign-born over pop-
ulation (bottom panel), between years 2001 and 2010. The share of foreign-born over
total population rose from 4.8% to 14% and the number of foreign-born increased
237% (from 1,950,452 the 1st January 2001 to 6,579,121 the 1st January 2010, according
to the Population register). In every year of the period, the inflows of foreign-born
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Figure 1.1: Immigration stocks and inflows 2001-2010
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were over 100,000 persons, and the average for the period is over 650,000. The three
spikes in the inflows in figure 1.1(b) correspond to three events described in Bertoli
& Ferna´ndez-Huertas (2011): the 2000 law which allowed access to municipality
public services when registered, the 2004 illegal immigration amnesty and the ac-
cession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007. We can also observe these peaks
in column 5 of table A.10 .
Figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix display several maps which show the spatial
distribution of the stocks of foreign-born, the changes in the stock between 2001
and 2010, the share of foreign-born at the beginning and the end of the period and
the total growth of foreign-born population. The different colours represent the 5
quantiles of the values of the mapped variable. The provinces on the coast and
Madrid are the ones which have higher levels of immigrants and have received
most of the inflows. In 2001 the highest shares of immigrants were also concentrated
on the coastal provinces and Madrid, but in 2010 many inner provinces have high
shares of immigrants. This is confirmed in map A.2.3, in which we can observe
that the regions with fewer immigrants in 2001 (map A.1.1) have been among the
ones which have experienced the highest growth rate in the amount of foreign-born
population between 2001 and 2010.
The top two panels of figure 1.2 shows the evolution of the average price in Spain
for the period of analysis. During the “housing boom” years (2001-2008) housing
purchase prices rose between 109 and 115%, followed by the construction sector
crises which decreased average prices around 12%, with strong regional disparities
both in the escalation and in the collapse of the prices. Rental prices also increased
importantly during this period, around one point above the general CPI index dur-
ing 2001-2010. During the whole period it raised 35%18.
Construction of new dwellings also increased greatly during these years; between
2001 and 2010 5,312,245 new dwellings were constructed. The bottom panel of 1.2
shows the evolution of the total and private housing stocks and table A.1 also dis-
plays the total stock of dwellings in Spain during 2001-2010. Figure A.3 shows the
spatial distribution of the growth of prices and housing stock between 2001 and
2010 (long-differences). Purchase prices increased greatly in all provinces. Some in-
ner provinces (close to economic centers like Madrid, Barcelona, Sevilla or Valencia)
have experience the highest growth rates in purchase prices, probably due to the
fact that prices were lower in those provinces in 2001. These seem to be also the
locations in which construction has been concentrated, as we can see in the bottom
18Rental prices are based on the whole stock of properties available for renting (the already rented
and the just rented), and are tightly connected to national CPI prices, so the scope for growth is
smaller than in the case of purchase prices. On the other hand, the changes on house prices depend
solely on new properties sold. Therefore, one can expect the increase on purchase prices to be much
more volatile than that of rents.
44
Purchase euro/sqm
Average: 1555.25
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(a) Growth of purchase prices
Rent euro/sqm
Average: 4.11
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.75
4.00
4.25
4.50
4.75
5.00
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(b) Growth of rental prices
Total stock
Private stock
16,000,000
17,000,000
18,000,000
19,000,000
20,000,000
21,000,000
22,000,000
23,000,000
24,000,000
25,000,000
26,000,000
27,000,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(c) Growth of dwelling stocks
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panel of the figure.
Most of the growth in prices and construction stopped in 2008 with the global
economic crises and between 2008 and 2010 prices have decreased and construction
of new dwellings has virtually stopped, but their levels are still above the average
values of the end of the 90s.
1.3 Empirical results
1.3.1 Effects of immigration on house prices
1.3.1.1 Fixed-effect estimates
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present the results of the estimation of equation (1.1), for rental
prices and for purchase prices respectively. These results are obtained using data
on annual changes on prices during the period 2002-2010 and data on the immig-
ration ratio lagged one period (2001-2009). The number of observations is 450 (50
provinces times 9 years). In all specifications the standard errors are clustered at
the province level, to allow for arbitrary correlation of the idiosyncratic shocks for
a given province across time, and are robust to heteroskedasticity. All specifica-
tions include time dummies to control for national shocks. Different columns show
results for different specification which diverge in the dummies and trends which
are included and in the included controls (time invariant, time-varying or both).
Specifications range from more to less demanding in terms of data variation: OLS
results (column 1 to 3) to first-differences fixed-effects model (column 8 to 10).
The first three columns of tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the results obtained by OLS,
adding time-invariant controls and time-varying controls in columns 2 and 3. The
estimations by OLS of columns 2 and 3 include extra time-invariant controls (dummy
if province is an island and dummy if the region has a single province), which drop
when introducing the regional dummies. Columns 4 to 7 include regional dummies:
column 4 only includes regional dummies, column 5 adds time-invariant province
attributes, which control for different growth trends of provinces with different
levels of weather conditions and amenities, and columns 6 and 7 add time-varying
controls and regional trends. Columns 8 to 10 include province dummies and corres-
pond to the first-differences fixed-effects model. Column 8 only includes the dum-
mies, and 9 and 10 add the time-varying controls and the regional trends19. The
specification in column 10 is very demanding, because it is identifying the paramet-
ers off the variation of provinces growth in prices and immigration rations around
the 2002-2010 means, conditional on common national shocks and a linear regional
19Province trends absorb too much variation and do not allow to identify the parameters.
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trend.
For all specifications displayed in table 1.1 the estimated effect of immigration on
rental prices is positive and statistically different from zero, except in the most de-
manding specification (in column 10). Focusing on the specifications with regional
dummies, the introduction of province time-invariant attributes increases the coef-
ficient from 0.303 to 0.418. This change would indicate that the (joint) correlation
between the included time-invariant province characteristics and the immigration
ratio is negative. In any case, in this specification regional dummies are included,
so the province time invariant characteristics control for differential growth trends
in the province relative to the regional trend. Therefore, the interpretation of the
change in the size of the coefficient becomes difficult. Adding time-varying controls
changes the coefficient slightly, which indicates that the inclusion or exclusion of
the time-varying controls does not affect our qualitative results because most of the
variation of these regressors is collected by the region and the time dummies and by
the province time-invariant characteristics. Adding the regional trends in column 7
decreases the coefficient a little bit more. Columns 8 to 10 repeat the specifications of
columns 4, 6 and 7 adding province dummies, i.e. the first-differences fixed-effects
model (with and without time-varying controls and with regional trends). The
coefficient decreases with respect to that of the specifications with regional dum-
mies. This would suggest there exist unobservable province characteristics (like
amenities) which attract immigrants and are positively correlated with rental price
growth. All models have reasonably high explanatory power, and the adjusted R2
are between 0.36 and 0.48.
The estimated elasticities of the changes in the immigration ratio on log changes
of rental prices presented in table 1.1 range from 0.28% to 0.42%. These numbers
would imply that an increase of the share of foreign-born on the original popula-
tion of a province of 10% would cause an increase on the rental prices between 2.8%
and 4.8% the following year. These numbers are much smaller than previous estim-
ates found by Saiz (2007), which are around 8-10%. A possible explanation is the
legal environment in Spain, as compared to the US case. In Spain the standard legal
tenancy agreement for privately let properties establishes (by default it is of 5-year
length) that the annual increase on the rental price would of the same amount as
the change in the national general consumer price index (CPI)20. Therefore, most of
the variation of changes in rental prices, given that we control for national CPIs by
including time dummies and for provincial trends by including province dummies,
would come from variation on provincial CPI indices with respect to the national
CPI and from growth in rental prices stemming from newly signed tenancy agree-
ments. Because of this, we can expect the impact of immigration on rental prices to
20Ley de Arrendamientos Urbanos 29/1994, del 24 de Noviembre de 1994.
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be limited, due to the existing legal limits to its growth21.
Table 1.2 displays the results for the effect of immigration on housing purchase
prices. The estimates are bigger than in the case of rental prices, as expected, and
range between 0.6 to 1.18. All models have high explanatory power; the adjus-
ted R2 are between 0.82 and 0.85. The coefficients are always positive, except in
the most demanding specification. OLS estimates suggest that provinces which
are islands, where the coast is longer, the weather hotter and drier, have more
natural parks and lower unemployment growth have higher increases in purchase
prices. From column 4 we include regional dummies. As before, the province time-
invariant attributes are negatively correlated with the prices and the immigration
ratios. Adding time-varying controls in column 6 increases the coefficient even fur-
ther. Finally, the estimates in columns 8 and 9 predict an elasticity of the purchase
prices with respect to the immigration ratio of slightly over 1. A 10% increase in the
ratio would imply an increase in the purchase price of around 12% on the following
year. As for the case of the effects on rental prices, these estimates are also below
Saiz (2007) estimates. This could be due to the different spatial and temporal scale of
the two empirical exercises, given that Saiz (2007) uses decennial data and different
spatial units (metropolitan areas) while I use annual data and bigger geographical
units (provinces). The more than proportional increase on prices could be caused
by a less than proportional response of the supply (due to non-sufficient construc-
tion or non-sufficient access to housing) or by induced increased demand by natives
if they are moving to the same places as immigrants. These potential explanations
would be examined in the following subsections. I first deal with the correct identi-
fication of the parameters of interest by using an instrumental variables estimation
strategy.
1.3.1.2 Instrumental variables
In order to be able to infer causal effects from the estimates of coefficient β in equa-
tion (1.1), I implement the instrumental variables strategy explained above. Tables
1.3 and 1.4 present the results using instrument as defined in equation (1.9). The pre-
dicted stocks and inflows of foreign-born by nationality from the gravity model es-
timation of columns 1 in tables A.6 and A.5 is used to construct imp pred FBstocki,t−1,
and year 1991 is used as the base year for the predicted location patterns of both nat-
ives and foreign-born. The tables have the same structure as tables 1.1 and 1.2. As
previously, time fixed-effects are included in all the specifications and the standard
errors are clustered at the province level. The tables also display some test of the
validity of the instruments. Details on them are given in section A.3.
21The smaller margin for adjustment of rents is also illustrated in figure 1.2. Rents grow slower
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Table 1.3 presents the results for changes in rental prices. As expected, the stand-
ard errors increase when we use instrumental variables. The estimated β are lar-
ger than in table 1.1 for all specifications. This would suggest that immigrants are
moving, conditional on the controls and the fixed effects, to provinces which are
experiencing negative shocks in the growth of rental prices, and therefore the OLS
and FE estimates are downward biased. Columns 4 to 7 include regional dummies.
The elasticities are around 1%, very similar to those found by Saiz (2007) for the US
context. Column 7 reports the results using region dummies and trends and time-
invariant and time-varying province characteristics. We can be quite sure about the
causal interpretation of these results, because the specification is already very de-
manding in terms of variation (which ensures the validity of the instrument) and
the instrument is strong. The coefficients in the last three columns (8 to 10) become
much smaller (the standard errors are very similar to those of the specification with
regional dummies). As explained before, given that rents growth is limited to CPI
annual changes for most rental agreements, the province dummies could be captur-
ing most of the variation in the growth rate of rental prices, so once we controls for
endogenous location of the immigrants by means of the instrument, the coefficient
is largely reduced and becomes insignificant. This could also be because the instru-
ment is weaker when introducing the province fixed-effects. The F-stat of included
instruments is lower than in columns 4 to 7, and it is not above the Stock-Yogo crit-
ical value at 10% (although it is identified at the 5% level). Given that the variation in
the instrument comes from national changes in the inflows of immigrants (captured
by the time fixed-effects) and from the past location patterns (capture by province
characteristics which are removed in the first-differences setting), it is reasonable
that the strength of the instrument is decreased when adding province fixed-effects.
Table 1.4 shows the results for changes in purchase prices. The standard errors
are more than doubled with respect to those of table 1.2. The results by OLS and only
including region dummies (columns 1 to 4) are insignificant when we use an instru-
ment, as compared to significant at the 5% level in table 1.2. When we control for
time-invariant province characteristics in column (5), the coefficient becomes statist-
ically different from zero at the 1% significance level and the size of the coefficient
is much larger. Some of the province attributes are also highly significant (and they
are jointly significant), which reinforces the need of controlling for provincial attrib-
utes in order to be able to correctly identify parameter β, even after the inclusion
of region dummies. Introducing regional trends in column 7 diminishes the coeffi-
cient marginally. Finally, columns 8 to 10 show the results using the first-differences
fixed-effects model with instrumental variables. The coefficients increase substan-
tially, and are highly significant. They suggest an elasticity of purchase prices with
than prices in the boom years but they also slow down less after 2009.
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respect to the immigration ratio of around 3% (for a 1% increase in the immigration
ratio). The specification of column 10, which is highly demanding, yields a positive
and significant at 5% level estimated elasticity around 2.7%. This number is very
similar to that found by Saiz (2007)) and confirm the findings of Gonzalez & Ortega
(2009), which with a similar methodology, find that a 1% increase in the immigration
ratio increase house prices 3.2%, using data for the period 1998-2008.
Previous research has found estimates of positive sign and similar magnitude.
Are the estimated elasticities size and sign what we would expect? If the supply
of housing is responding sufficiently to increases in demand, we should not ex-
pect an increase in foreign-born population to have such a large effect on house
prices growth. Indeed, as discussed in section 1.2.2, during the period of analysis
the construction of new dwellings was very intense, so we could have anticipated
a moderate effect of an increase in demand induced by the increase in foreign-born
population. However, as I show in subsection 1.3.6 below, the increase in supply did
not seem to have had an effect on moderating the increase in prices. This could be
because, even if new dwellings were constructed, they were not constructed in the
places where immigrants wanted or could afford to live, because immigrants had
credit restriction to access the housing markets or because many dwellings were not
occupied22.
Furthermore, if immigrants and natives are co-locating in the same provinces,
demand in these location could be increasing more than the resulted from foreign-
born inflows. If we want to be able to properly interpret the size of β, we need to
study the relationship between natives and immigrant location decisions.
1.3.2 Effects of immigration on natives location
Section 1.2.2 discusses the issues related to the interpretation of the coefficient β
when we do not take into account natives mobility. Specifically, standard tests of
the effect of immigration on local prices that estimate specifications similar to (1.1)
are unable to separate effects due to the increase on local housing demand from
foreign-born from the effect on prices which is due to (induced) changes in demand
from native population relocation Saiz (as noted by 2007). Using Saiz (2007) words,
it would be capturing the “long-run” total effect of immigration. The estimated
β would be the net result of increased increased demand from immigrant inflows
plus/minus any changes in demand due to inflows or outflows of natives. If im-
migrants actually attract natives, the estimated coefficient β would be the sum of
both changes in demand. We would not be able to disentangle the effect created
by increased demand from immigrants (inflows) from the changes in demand from
22In fact, some estimates suggest that around 15-20% of houses are unoccupied.
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natives. β would be capturing the effect of “total changes in demand” from both
natives and immigrants, which would be higher (upward biased) than the “net”
effect of immigration inflows on prices (through changes in total population).
In this section I estimate a causal relationship between native location and im-
migration inflows23. Table 1.5 shows the results of the estimation of equation (1.2).
Columns 1 to 5 show the results using regional dummies and province fixed-effects
and columns 6 to 10 repeat the estimations using instrumental variables (instrument
1.9). The specification vary in the inclusion of controls and the trends. I use the same
estimation strategy as in the estimation of (1.1). As the inflow of natives and immig-
rants are contemporaneous, the time-varying controls are lagged one period with
respect to time t.
As before, when instrumenting the immigration ratio coefficients increase sub-
stantially. Our preferred estimates are those of columns 9 and 10, which use the in-
strument and the first-differences fixed-effects estimation. These estimates predict
that a for each 100 immigrants locating in given province in a given year, around
43 natives located in the same province in the same year. Table A.11 shows the res-
ults using the “lagged” immigration ratio. The results are slightly weaker (i.e. not
significant in the most demanding specifications). Additionally, table A.12 in the
appendix shows the same results but using the immigration and native ratio for
people aged 16-64, assuming that is the working-aged part of the household who
takes the decision on relocating. The results are very similar: for each 100 immig-
rants aged 16-64 locating in given province in a given year, almost 37 natives aged
16-64 located in the same province in the same year, and around 18 in the following
year.
These findings suggest that natives and immigrants are locating in the same
provinces, mostly “contemporaneously”. This could be because immigrants have
some unobservable attributes which are desirable for natives, for example if nat-
ives like ethnic diversity or if immigrants are specializing in producing goods and
services which are desirable for natives.
Ferna´ndez-Huertas et al. (2009) find a comparable result for a long-differences
non-causal estimation from population growth regressed on the immigration ratio
for the period 2001-2008. Their prediction is of 11 natives for each 100 immigrants.
They argue that this number is sufficiently small to be negligible to have an im-
pact on compensation or reinforcement of the impact of immigration inflows on the
housing or the labour markets24. Nevertheless, my results contradict this assess-
23Other examples where the relationship between natives and immigration is explored are Stillman
& Mare´ (2008) and Ortega & Verdugo (2011).
24The different results could be due to the fact that these authors do not use instrumental vari-
ables in their estimation and they use long differences between 2001 and 2008, so they only use 52
observations. In fact, when they perform the estimation at the municipality level, using over 8,000
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ment because the size of the “collocation” is substantially larger. Hence, it is quite
likely that any impact of immigrants on the housing markets would be amplified by
the arrival of natives. I investigate this possibility in the following subsection.
1.3.3 Effects of immigration on house prices revisited
After finding a sizeable “attraction” of immigrants on natives, a natural extension
is then to test the effect of population on prices using “only” the variation in pop-
ulation caused by immigration inflows. Total population in a given province in a
given point in time is the sum of the foreign-born and the natives living in that re-
gion. If the location of immigrants is simultaneously determined as the location of
natives and it is positively related, the estimated coefficient β in equation (1.1) is ac-
tually capturing the effects of increased demand from immigrants plus the increased
demand from relocated natives, i.e. the effect of total population changes. In this
section I propose a methodology to isolate the effect of the changes that can be at-
tributed to immigration. I use exogenous variation on the location of immigrants
for a more direct test of the effect of immigration on house prices growth. By using
this procedure, we would be able to separate the “net” the effect of foreign-born de-
mand on prices from the total effect of immigration on prices (through changes in
total province population).
In section 1.2.3 I described the shift-share strategy followed to construct a predic-
tion for native location based on past location patterns (for stayer and for movers). I
used this prediction in the denominator of the instrument for the immigration ratio
(1.9). I can use this prediction to construct the equivalent for the native ratio:
IVnatives ratioi,t−1 =
imp nativesi,t − imp nativesi,t−1
imp pred FBstocki,t−1 + imp nativesi,t−1
(1.10)
As before, I construct this instrument using 1991 as base year and the prediction
from the gravity model of column 1 in table A.6 to construct imp pred FBstocki,t−1.
Table 1.6 explores the effect of natives and immigrants as separate population
groups on rental (top) and purchase (bottom) prices. They display the estimates of
the instrumental variable regressions which include regional dummies and trends
and the controls (table A.13 in the appendix replicates the estimates using province
dummies instead of regional dummies). The last row of the tables indicates which
is the instrument that we are using (1.9, 1.10 or both).
The first column instruments the immigration ratio with (1.9), which is equival-
ent to the results of tables 1.3 and 1.4. Column 2 estimates the effect of the native
ratio and instruments it with (1.10). Column 3 uses both ratios as dependent vari-
observations, they find very similar estimates to mine.
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ables, and uses both instruments25. Columns 4 to 6 use total population growth
as the regressor of interest and instrument it either with both ratios (4), with the
immigration ratio (5), with the native ratio (6).
Column 1 reproduces previous results of tables 1.3 and 1.4. In column 2 we use
the instrument for natives (1.10) and find that natives do not have an effect on rental
prices but do affect purchase prices. The instrument is very strong. Even if the in-
struments are strong, when accounting for changes in native ratios and immigration
ratios “at the same time” in column 3, only the coefficients for the immigration ratio
are significant and they are similar to those of column 1. However, models with two
endogenous variables are difficult to interpret and to identify 26. For this reason, in
the remaining of the section I focus in one regressor of interest.
Change in the log of rental prices in t REGION DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflow of immigrants in t-1 over population end t-2 1.047∗∗ 1.190∗
[0.504] [0.647]
Inflow of natives in t-1 over population end t-2 0.214 -0.215
[0.167] [0.266]
Inflow of population in t-1 over population end t-2 0.210∗ 0.629∗∗ 0.158
[0.121] [0.295] [0.120]
Change in the log of purchase prices in t REGION DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflow of immigrants in t-1 over population end t-2 2.166∗∗∗ 2.202∗∗
[0.757] [1.032]
Inflow of natives in t-1 over population end t-2 0.741∗∗∗ -0.054
[0.255] [0.525]
Inflow of population in t-1 over population end t-2 0.628∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗
[0.174] [0.399] [0.187]
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450
LM test stat under-identification (K-P) 12.62 16.54 10.19 21.24 13.18 18.31
P-value of under-identification LM statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-stat weak identification (K-P) 24.59 116.52 7.29 78.20 32.29 123.45
P-value Hansen J statistic 0.10
A-P F-test of excluded instruments (immigration) 15.61
A-P F-test of excluded instruments (natives) 78.52
Instrument(s) IMM NAT BOTH BOTH IMM NAT
Clustered (province) standard errors in brackets. t=2002/2010. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. N=450.
All specifications include year dummies, region dummies and trends and controls.
Table 1.6: Instrumental variables results rental/purchase prices - different population
groups
Column 4 use population growth as the main regressor and instruments it with
25For these specifications, last two rows of the tables display the Angrist-Pischke F test of excluded
instruments. Angrist & Pischke (2009) (paged 217-18) introduced first-stage F statistics (the AP tests)
for tests of weak identification when there is more than one endogenous regressor. In contrast to
the Cragg-Donald and Kleibergen-Paap statistics, which test the identification of the equation as a
whole, the AP first-stage F statistics are tests of whether one of the endogenous regressors is weakly
identified. They are in both cases over 10 and statistically significant.
26According to Angrist & Pischke (2009), tackling two causal questions at the same can raise ser-
ious issues. Moreover, a second endogenous variable would fall into the category of “bad control”.
http://www.mostlyharmlesseconometrics.com/2010/02/multiple-endogenous-variables-what-now/.
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both ratios. The instruments are exogenous (as indicated by the Hansen test) but
not too strong (the K-P statistic is around 7.5). Total population change has an ef-
fect on both rental and purchase prices (only on purchase prices in the specification
with province dummies A.13). The coefficient is smaller for rents than for purchase
prices, and significant only at the 10% level. This estimate would inform us about
the effect of total changes in population, stemming from both internal migrations,
immigration from abroad and natural population growth, but does not tell us any-
thing about the effect of immigration on prices. This is why in the remaining of the
chapter I present the results for both the immigration ratio and the population ratio.
When we use population growth as the main regressors and instrument it with
“only” one of the ratios, immigrants or natives, we are using “only” the variation
on population growth that can be attributed to exogenous location choices of that
group. This strategy allows us to isolate the effect of either natives or immigrants
on prices “via” its effect on population changes. This way, we remove the bias intro-
duced by simultaneous location of the other population group. For example, we can
use the exogenous variation on the location of foreign-born (1.9) to instrument the
total population changes in the provinces and try to isolate the sole effect of immig-
ration on prices. In this case, parameter β would be the causal effect of the “growth
in total population which is due to immigration inflows”, because we would be us-
ing only the variation in population growth which stems from exogenous changes
in the immigration ratio. In this setting, we expect the parameter β to be smaller
than the one found in column 1, because it would be “only” capturing the effect of
immigration through their effect on population changes.
The results confirm this intuition: the coefficients of column 5 are smaller than
those of column 1 and suggest that these are upward biased because the also capture
the effect of native demand. For natives only seem to have an effect on purchase
prices, and in fact, they do not have any effect at all when we introduce province
dummies in table A.13.
The strategy used to obtain the estimates of column 5 allows us to isolate the
short-run effect of immigration on prices or the effect on prices which is due only
to demand from immigrants (and not from “attracted” natives). Table 1.7 shows the
estimates for the same specifications as tables 1.3 and 1.4 using population growth as
the main regressor and instrumenting it with (1.9). Column 7 corresponds to column
5 of table A.13, and columns 8 to 10 show the estimates of the first-differences fixed-
effects models. If we compare the estimates of our preferred specifications (column
7 for rents and column 10 for purchase prices) of table 1.7 and tables 1.3 and 1.4, we
find that the estimates of the effect of immigration on price growth are around 40%
lower for rental prices and 30% for purchase prices in table 1.7. Given that we found
that for each 100 foreign-born, around 40 natives locate in the province in the same
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year, we can attribute this bias to the induced demand from native co-locating with
immigrants.
These findings seem to validate the adopted strategy in order to identify the
“sole” effect of immigration on prices. They point towards the existence of an
sizeable bias in previous estimates of the impact of immigration on prices (for ex-
ample Sosvilla-Rivero, 2008; Gonzalez & Ortega, 2009; Garcı´a-Montalvo, 2010, for
the Spanish case), because they disregard the causal relationship between immig-
rants and native location, or at least suggest a misinterpretation of the coefficient.
Coefficients obtained with the “standard” instrumental variables strategy would be
capturing the “long-run” effect of immigration, i.e. the combined effect of immig-
rants and natives. My approach, to use the variation in population changes driven
by immigration, allows us to estimate the “short-run” or net effect, in other words,
the effect on prices via demand that stems only from immigrants. The comparison
of the coefficients obtained with the two methodologies informs us about the effect
of induced native demand. Moreover, as done below, it is also important to control
for supply to be able to disentangle the net effect of immigration demand, because
in the long-run supply can also adjust. In the following sections I interpret the size
of the coefficients and then test the robustness of these results.
1.3.4 Interpretation of the size of the coefficients
Table 1.8 reproduces the main results of sections 1.3.1.2 and 1.3.3 to ease the compar-
ison with the results from the robustness checks (presented in section 1.3.5 below)
and to help with the interpretation of the size of the coefficients. It displays, for
rental and purchase prices, the estimates for the models with regional dummies
(columns 1 and 2) and with province dummies (columns 3 and 4); with and without
inclusion of regional trends. The four first rows show the results on the growth of
rental prices and the last four on the growth of purchase prices.
During the period of analysis, 2001 to 2010, purchase prices grew an average of
7.1% and rental prices grew an average of 3.3% (see table A.7 for more details). In
total, during this period, purchase prices grew over 81% and rental prices around
35%. The average population growth during the period was 1.25% while the aver-
age immigration ratio was 1.05% (again, see table A.7 for more details). Between
January 2001 and January 2010 population in Spain increased 14.4%, while the total
change in foreign-born with respect to initial population was 11.3%.
In the most demanding significant results of table 1.8, we find an elasticity of
housing purchase prices with respect to the population ratio (which is equivalent
to population growth) of 1.9 and an elasticity of rental prices of 0.63. The elasticity
with respect to the immigration ratio is 2.7 for purchase prices and 1.05 for rental
61
prices. We can combine this elasticities with the numbers above to interpret the
relative importance of immigration on total grow of house prices.
Thus, our findings suggest that the average annual growth in population caused
an average annual growth in purchase prices of 2.34% and in rents of 0.8%. This is
obtained multiplying the elasticities (1.9 and 0.63) by the average growth in popula-
tion (1.25%). This is around one third of the total average annual growth of purchase
prices and around one quarter of the total average annual growth of rental prices.
These proportions are quite substantial. The relative importance of immigration on
house price growth is even higher if we use the elasticities of prices with respect to
the immigration ratio (e.g. “long-run” or total effects), as these are larger.
Change in the log of rental prices in t REGION DUMMIES PROVINCE DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflow of immigrants in t-1 over population end t-2 0.946∗∗ 1.047∗∗ 0.151 0.126
[0.426] [0.504] [0.472] [0.579]
Inflow of population in t-1 over population end t-2 0.572∗∗ 0.629∗∗ 0.104 0.088
[0.247] [0.295] [0.323] [0.403]
Change in the log of purchase prices in t REGION DUMMIES PROVINCE DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflow of immigrants in t-1 over population end t-2 2.131∗∗∗ 1.847∗∗∗ 3.028∗∗∗ 2.720∗∗
[0.700] [0.652] [1.010] [1.264]
Inflow of population in t-1 over population end t-2 1.465∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 2.088∗∗∗ 1.912∗∗
[0.443] [0.399] [0.602] [0.841]
Region trends No Yes No Yes
Clustered (province) standard errors in brackets. t=2002/2010/ All specifications include year dummies and controls.
N=450. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 1.8: Instrumental variables results rental/purchase prices - summary of main results
In what respects to the total growth in prices between 2001 and 2010, population
growth cause an increase in purchase prices of 27.4% and an increase in rental prices
of around 9%. These also correspond to around one third and one quarter of the total
growth of purchase and rental prices between 2001 and 2010. Again, these numbers
could seem too large as a single factor (immigration inflows) would be explaining a
substantial proportion of the growth in the price of housing.
Given the magnitude of the immigration inflows and price increases experienced
during the period of analysis described in section 1.2.5, these proportions could
in fact be quite reasonable. Actually, approximately two thirds of the growth in
purchase prices and three quarters of the growth of rental prices would be explained
by other factors than immigration, like supply rigidity, speculative demand, empty
dwellings, changes in the cost of construction (taxes, land prices, materials), etc.
Therefore, the is still an important part of the growth of house prices which is not
explained by immigration.
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1.3.5 Robustness checks
In this section I present the robustness checks carried out in order to check the valid-
ity of my findings. The estimates are compared to those of table 1.8. Ferna´ndez-
Huertas et al. (2009) argue that one should focus only on immigrants aged between
16-64 (economically active) because they are the ones taking decisions related to
the housing and the labour markets. Gonzalez & Ortega (2009) also restrict their
sample to working-age foreign-born. Table 1.9 shows the results for the comparable
specifications of table 1.8 but restricting the foreign-born and the total population
only to people aged 16-64. Both the results using the immigration ratio and the
population growth are displayed. The coefficients are higher than for the baseline
results, specially for purchase prices. But given the size of the standard errors, the
point estimates of table 1.9 are included in the confidence interval of the estimates
of table 1.8.
Change in the log of rental prices in t REGION DUMMIES PROVINCE DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflow of immigrants in t-1 over population end t-2 1.329∗∗ 1.533∗∗ 0.196 0.170
(working-age) [0.610] [0.747] [0.614] [0.784]
Inflow of population in t-1 over population end t-2 0.817∗∗ 0.930∗∗ 0.140 0.125
(working-age) [0.354] [0.433] [0.437] [0.575]
Change in the log of purchase prices in t REGION DUMMIES PROVINCE DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflow of immigrants in t-1 over population end t-2 2.969∗∗∗ 2.668∗∗∗ 3.921∗∗∗ 3.686∗∗
(working-age) [1.007] [0.995] [1.322] [1.746]
Inflow of population in t-1 over population end t-2 2.091∗∗∗ 1.925∗∗∗ 2.815∗∗∗ 2.727∗∗
(working-age) [0.644] [0.605] [0.825] [1.233]
Region trends No Yes No Yes
Clustered (province) standard errors in brackets. t=2002/2010. All specifications include year dummies and controls.
N=450. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table 1.9: Instrumental variables results rental/purchase prices - population aged 16-64
Table 1.10 shows the results for changes in rental and purchase prices using the
immigration ratio and population growth during the same period as the growth in
prices, as opposed to the lagged ratio used in the main results. The results for total
and only working-age population are displayed. The effect of changes on rental
prices remain positive and significant and of very similar size to those of tables 1.8.
However, the results on purchase prices become very imprecise. This suggests that
immigrants choose renting as the tenancy status when they initially settle in the
country while the effect on purchase prices is lagged because they either take some
time to be able to afford buying a house or the indirect effect on prices (via purchase
by native in order to rent them to immigrants) is also delayed (a native buys a house
and the following year rents it to an immigrant).
Table A.14 estimates the same relationship as in table 1.4 but using different data
sources for the purchase prices. The top panels display the results using the data-
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Change in the log of rental prices in t REGION DUMMIES PROVINCE DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflow of immigrants in t over population in end t-1 0.994∗ 1.119∗ -0.042 0.012
[0.531] [0.586] [0.425] [0.416]
Inflow of population in t over population in end t-1 0.618∗ 0.691∗∗ -0.029 0.008
[0.324] [0.352] [0.298] [0.290]
Inflow of immigrants in t over population in end t-1 1.416∗ 1.645∗ -0.055 0.016
(working-age) [0.747] [0.860] [0.557] [0.565]
Inflow of population in t over population in end t-1 0.920∗ 1.052∗∗ -0.042 0.012
(working-age) [0.471] [0.526] [0.420] [0.425]
Observations 400 400 400 400
Change in the log of purchase prices in t REGION DUMMIES PROVINCE DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflow of immigrants in t over population in end t-1 1.315 1.029 1.107 0.631
[1.655] [1.541] [1.992] [1.926]
Inflow of population in t over population in end t-1 0.796 0.618 0.761 0.441
[0.985] [0.913] [1.344] [1.331]
Inflow of immigrants in t over population in end t-1 1.848 1.506 1.435 0.854
(working-age) [2.340] [2.259] [2.589] [2.603]
Inflow of population in t over population in end t-1 1.136 0.914 1.026 0.628
(working-age) [1.416] [1.356] [1.823] [1.900]
Observations 450 450 450 450
Region trends No Yes No Yes
Clustered (province) standard errors in brackets. t=2002/2009 for rents, t=2001/2009 for purchase. Significance levels:
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All specifications include year dummies and controls. Time-varying controls in t-1.
Table 1.10: Instrumental variables results rental/purchase prices - contemporaneous
inflows
base from IVIE. The left top panel restricts the sample to 2007, i.e., I do not use the
extended sample for 2008-2010 that I constructed by expanding the original data
with the Department of Housing data province annual growth rates. Excluding
years 2008 to 2010 removes the year of the housing “crises”. This limits the variation
of the data because it only uses the information on the “boom” years, in which the
both immigration and prices were increasing greatly. This is possibly why when we
control by regional trends the estimates become insignificant. The right top panel
extends the sample to include observations from 1999.27 The estimates are less sig-
nificant than in the baseline results even if the standard errors are very similar to
before. The estimates become even insignificant in the first-differences fixed-effect
estimation. This would point towards the existence of an attenuation bias due to
measurement error on the population data before 2001, as explained in section 1.2.4.
The bottom panels show the results using the data provided by the Housing De-
partment (average of the four quarters and only the 2nd quarter). The coefficients
are smaller and less precise than those of table 1.8 but reasonably similar.
Table A.19 adds a second instrument to be able to test the exogeneity of the in-
27Population and immigration inflows can be constructed from 1998, but data availability on some
of the time-varying regressors forces us to start using data from 1999. In any case, results not includ-
ing time-varying controls using data from 1998 are very similar.
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strument by means of the Hansen J statistic. I constructed a second shift-share in-
strument where I calculated the predicted inflow to a given province in a given year
of each nationality, (1.5), as the product of the inverse distance between the country
centroid to Madrid plus the euclidian distance from province i to Madrid (share)
and the national inflow is the inflow of this nationality to Italy28 (shift).
I use inverse distance to Spain to compute the prediction, inspired by Ottavi-
ano & Peri (2006), who use the distance from the closest gateway into the US in the
construction of the instruments for immigration29. Additionally, during the period
2001-2008 the European countries experience intense migration inflows (Pekkala-
Kerr & Kerr, 2011). I use the inflow from Italy because this country is not “too far”
from Spain in terms of distance, culture and economic conditions, because it had
high rates of immigration during these years (Buonanno et al., 2011) and because
is one of the few countries in the “OECD International Migration Statistics” dataset
for which we have fewer missing values. This instrument is not strong enough by
itself (the F-stat of the first stage is around 4.7) but as it is based on different vari-
ation sources as our main instrument it is sufficiently good to be used as a second
instrument to allow for the testing of the orthogonality conditions. The last row of
table A.19 shows the p-values of the Hansen test which in all cases confirm the exo-
geneity of our instrument. The coefficients are very similar to those of table 1.8, even
though the estimates for the effects on purchase prices are a bit smaller. Additional
robustness checks are available in the appendix (section A.4).
1.3.6 The role of housing supply
In this section I explore the role played by the supply on potentially mitigating the
increase in prices30. This analysis applies mostly to the effect on purchase prices,
because dwellings have always to be “bought” before they go to the rental market.
I provide the results for rental prices in the appendix for completeness but I only
discuss the results for purchase prices in this section. First I include some extra time-
invariant controls in the models to control for different price growth trends based
on some attributes of the provinces related to supply. Additionally, the growth in
the stock of (private) dwellings is added as an extra control. Given that this variable
28The data sources for the construction of this instrument are the “OECD International Migration
Statistics” for data on the stock and inflows of foreign born by nationality during 2001-2008 and the
CEPII gravity database for the distance from the country to Spain. The internal distance of Madrid
is calculated as (2/3) ∗√(area/pi).
29I also used distance to the closest port of entry, being the ports the 5 airports which according
to the Spanish Airports Regulator data on airport traffic in 2000. According to the Spanish National
Statistical Institute 63% of the immigrants between 1998 and 2010 arrived in Spain by plane. The
results are very similar, mainly due to the fact that the majority of entries are through the Madrid
airport.
30Section A.5 in the appendix explores the relationship of immigration with the construction sector.
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is quite likely to be endogenous, I finally construct an instrument for this variable.
Several attributes related to housing supply, and therefore to prices, are added to
the basic regression model of equation (1.1). These are time-invariant and control for
different trends on the growth of prices and foreign-born population. I include the
share of developable land in the province, orographic characteristics of the terrain
(height and ruggedness) and the percentage of rented and empty dwellings over
total dwelling in the province in 2001.
I control for the share of developable land because in these provinces land would
be potentially cheaper (for a given demand of land) so construction of new homes
could be more intense. Total area and total developable area31 were calculated using
GIS and raster maps of land use year for 2000, provided by the Corine Land Cover
data project (European Environment Agency). I use a relative index (Spain=100) of
average terrain height and ruggedness of each province, which are obtained from
Goerlich-Gisbert & Cantarino-Martı´ (2010). Orographic characteristics of the terrain
have been commonly used as proxies for supply constraints (Hilber & Vermeulen,
2009; Saiz, 2010). Provinces in which renting is more common can have different
trends in the growth of supply. The percentage of rented properties over total occu-
pied properties is obtained from 2001 Census data from the Spanish National Statist-
ical Institute (INE). I also include the proportion of empty homes over total homes.
Prices in provinces in which the proportion of unoccupied dwellings is larger could
be growing at a slower rate because the supply of homes is higher in these locations.
I also calculated the stock of (private) dwellings in the different years (from 1999
to 2010) combining data from the Housing Department. Data on the housing stock
is only available from 2001. Using the entry and exit flows I calculated a rate of
depreciation and I updated the stock of the dwellings for years prior to 2001 com-
bining the depreciation rate and construction of dwellings data. I focus on private
dwellings, but the results using total dwellings are very similar.
Table 1.11 shows the results on purchase and rental prices adding this extra sup-
ply controls. Columns 1 to 6 show the results for the immigration ratio and columns
7 to 12 for the population growth. All specifications instrument the immigration or
the population growth with (1.9). Columns 1 and 7 show the results for the spe-
cification using regional dummies and the set of original province attributes. The
equivalent coefficient for this specification in tables 1.4 and 1.7 is that of column 5,
which includes dummies and time-invariant province attributes.
Columns 2 and 8 add the province time-invariant characteristics related to sup-
31The categories included in developable land are: Green urban areas, Non-irrigated arable land,
Permanently irrigated land, Rice fields, Vineyards Fruit trees and berry plantations, Olive groves,
Pastures, Annual crops associated with permanent crops, Complex cultivation patterns, Land prin-
cipally occupied by agriculture, Agro-forestry areas, Broad-leaved forest, Coniferous forest, Mixed
forest, Natural grasslands, Moors and heartland, Sclerophyllous vegetation and Burnt areas.
66
C
ha
ng
e
in
th
e
lo
g
of
pu
rc
ha
se
pr
ic
es
in
t
R
E
G
IO
N
D
U
M
M
IE
S
P
R
O
V
IN
C
E
D
U
M
M
IE
S
R
E
G
IO
N
D
U
M
M
IE
S
P
R
O
V
IN
C
E
D
U
M
M
IE
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
In
flo
w
of
im
m
ig
ra
nt
s
in
t-
1
ov
er
po
pu
la
ti
on
en
d
t-
2
2.
13
1∗
∗∗
1.
91
9∗
∗
2.
41
6∗
∗∗
1.
86
7∗
3.
22
8∗
∗∗
2.
76
4∗
∗
[0
.7
00
]
[0
.7
49
]
[0
.8
65
]
[1
.0
38
]
[1
.0
18
]
[1
.3
86
]
In
flo
w
of
po
pu
la
ti
on
in
t-
1
ov
er
po
pu
la
ti
on
en
d
t-
2
1.
24
8∗
∗∗
1.
24
9∗
∗∗
1.
71
4∗
∗∗
1.
33
1∗
2.
23
4∗
∗∗
1.
92
7∗
∗
[0
.3
88
]
[0
.4
67
]
[0
.5
88
]
[0
.7
01
]
[0
.6
32
]
[0
.9
58
]
C
oa
st
du
m
m
y
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
[0
.0
07
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
06
]
Le
ng
th
of
co
as
tl
in
e
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
Lo
g
of
ho
ur
s
of
av
er
ag
e
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
(J
an
ua
ry
)
0.
01
3
0.
01
4
0.
01
4
0.
01
5
0.
02
1∗
∗
0.
02
0∗
0.
02
4∗
0.
02
2∗
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
09
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
10
]
[0
.0
12
]
[0
.0
14
]
[0
.0
12
]
Lo
g
of
m
m
of
ra
in
pr
ec
ip
it
at
io
n
(J
an
ua
ry
)
0.
01
0
0.
00
2
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
02
0.
00
8
0.
00
5
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
01
[0
.0
07
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
07
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
07
]
[0
.0
06
]
Lo
g
of
nu
m
be
r
of
re
ta
ils
sh
op
s
in
20
00
0.
01
3∗
∗
0.
00
6
0.
00
3
0.
00
3
0.
00
9∗
0.
00
6
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
07
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
05
]
[0
.0
06
]
[0
.0
08
]
[0
.0
05
]
Lo
g
of
nu
m
be
r
of
re
st
au
ra
nt
s
an
d
ba
rs
in
20
00
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
00
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
02
]
Im
po
rt
an
ce
of
to
ur
is
m
se
ct
or
-c
om
pa
ra
ti
ve
in
de
x
20
00
-0
.0
00
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
∗∗
∗
-0
.0
00
∗
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
∗
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
Lo
g
of
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
do
ct
or
s
-2
00
0
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
04
∗
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
02
]
Lo
g
of
th
e
su
rf
ac
e
of
na
tu
ra
lp
ar
ks
-2
00
0
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
02
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
03
]
[0
.0
02
]
Sh
ar
e
of
de
ve
lo
pa
bl
e
la
nd
in
20
00
(C
or
in
e)
0.
06
4∗
∗∗
0.
08
2∗
∗∗
0.
06
7∗
∗
0.
04
1∗
∗
0.
05
9∗
∗∗
0.
04
8∗
∗∗
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
23
]
[0
.0
27
]
[0
.0
19
]
[0
.0
18
]
[0
.0
18
]
R
el
at
iv
e
in
de
x
of
al
ti
tu
de
-0
.0
00
∗
-0
.0
00
∗∗
-0
.0
00
∗
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
R
el
at
iv
e
in
de
x
of
ru
gg
ed
ne
ss
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
[0
.0
00
]
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
re
nt
ed
pr
op
er
ti
es
in
20
01
0.
05
0
0.
10
8
0.
08
3
-0
.0
12
0.
04
4
0.
03
5
[0
.0
95
]
[0
.0
99
]
[0
.0
96
]
[0
.1
20
]
[0
.1
17
]
[0
.1
03
]
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
em
pt
y
ho
m
es
in
20
01
0.
07
8
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
20
0.
20
1
0.
15
0
0.
09
5
[0
.1
58
]
[0
.1
56
]
[0
.1
56
]
[0
.1
84
]
[0
.1
73
]
[0
.1
82
]
C
ha
ng
e
of
lo
g
of
G
D
P
in
t-
2
-0
.0
97
-0
.1
38
∗∗
-0
.1
19
-0
.1
53
∗∗
-0
.1
43
∗
-0
.1
74
∗∗
-0
.1
38
∗
-0
.1
72
∗∗
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.0
62
]
[0
.0
82
]
[0
.0
68
]
[0
.0
86
]
[0
.0
69
]
[0
.0
80
]
[0
.0
67
]
C
ha
ng
e
of
lo
g
of
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
tr
at
e
in
t-
2
-0
.1
11
0.
01
1
-0
.1
07
0.
01
7
-0
.1
00
0.
01
8
-0
.0
79
0.
04
1
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
63
]
[0
.0
79
]
[0
.0
67
]
[0
.0
81
]
[0
.0
61
]
[0
.0
78
]
[0
.0
67
]
C
ha
ng
e
of
lo
g
of
nu
m
be
r
of
cr
ed
it
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
ts
in
t-
2
-0
.1
84
-0
.1
12
-0
.1
97
-0
.1
22
-0
.1
94
-0
.1
29
-0
.1
82
-0
.1
16
[0
.1
42
]
[0
.1
28
]
[0
.1
52
]
[0
.1
38
]
[0
.1
41
]
[0
.1
30
]
[0
.1
44
]
[0
.1
33
]
C
ha
ng
e
of
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
sa
vi
ng
s
ba
nk
s
in
t-
2
0.
13
7
-0
.1
15
0.
16
2
-0
.0
97
0.
10
4
-0
.1
53
0.
17
1
-0
.1
00
[0
.1
64
]
[0
.1
45
]
[0
.1
68
]
[0
.1
56
]
[0
.1
65
]
[0
.1
37
]
[0
.1
65
]
[0
.1
49
]
Lo
g
of
ch
an
ge
of
st
oc
k
of
pr
iv
at
e
dw
el
lin
gs
in
t-
2
-0
.3
40
-0
.1
38
-0
.2
53
-0
.0
36
-0
.4
99
-0
.2
63
-0
.2
80
-0
.0
30
[0
.4
28
]
[0
.3
75
]
[0
.5
68
]
[0
.4
29
]
[0
.4
73
]
[0
.4
50
]
[0
.5
69
]
[0
.4
26
]
Ti
m
e
in
va
ri
an
tc
on
tr
ol
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
Su
pp
ly
ti
m
e
in
va
ri
an
tc
on
tr
ol
s
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
Ti
m
e-
va
ry
in
g
co
nt
ro
ls
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
R
eg
io
n
tr
en
ds
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
N
o
N
o
Ye
s
N
o
Ye
s
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
0
LM
te
st
st
at
un
de
r-
id
en
ti
fic
at
io
n
(K
-P
)
12
.6
6
9.
04
9.
34
9.
38
8.
06
7.
80
12
.5
6
9.
90
10
.6
2
10
.0
0
9.
63
8.
76
P-
va
lu
e
of
un
de
r-
id
en
ti
fic
at
io
n
LM
st
at
is
ti
c
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
01
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
F-
st
at
w
ea
k
id
en
ti
fic
at
io
n
(K
-P
)
24
.5
0
18
.8
0
15
.6
7
14
.8
2
16
.7
6
15
.6
3
30
.1
2
21
.0
4
16
.5
2
14
.3
0
30
.2
9
30
.2
8
C
lu
st
er
ed
(p
ro
vi
nc
e)
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.t
=2
00
2/
20
10
.S
ig
ni
fic
an
ce
le
ve
ls
:*
p
<
0.
05
,*
*
p
<
0.
01
,*
**
p
<
0.
00
1.
N
=4
50
Ta
bl
e
1.
11
:I
ns
tr
um
en
ta
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
re
su
lt
s
pu
rc
ha
se
pr
ic
es
-a
dd
in
g
su
pp
ly
co
nt
ro
ls
67
ply. The estimated coefficients are 1.9 for immigration and 1.25 for population. The
inclusion of these additional province trends, which are jointly highly significant,
reduces the coefficient significantly for immigration, but it still remains significant
at 10% level. This suggests that the coefficient were upward biased and that these
variables jointly control for factors which make prices grow faster. For the popu-
lation growth, the coefficients of specifications 7 and 8 are mostly identical. The
coefficient of the share of developable land is positive and significant, suggesting
that in provinces which had more developable land with respect to the region mean
had faster price growth. This could be because there was some speculative compon-
ent and this provinces were becoming more attractive, and therefore prices were
growing faster, because there was potential to built new real estate development.
The index of altitude is also significant but negative, even if the coefficient is very
small. Province which have higher altitude, with respect to the regional mean, had
slower growth in the prices.
Columns 3 and 9 introduce the time-varying controls, including the supply of
housing (change in the stock of private dwellings)32. The coefficient now decreases
with respect to that of columns 2 and 8. The coefficient on the growth of housing
stock is negative but insignificant. Columns 4 and 10 add the regional trends. The
remaining columns include province fixed-effects and controls. The only difference
of these results with respect to those of columns 3 and 4 of table 1.8 are the inclu-
sion of the growth of housing stock. The coefficients are very similar, but bigger,
which could be due to the fact that construction coefficient is negative, although
insignificant.
However, using the growth of housing stock as a control variable in table 1.11
could be problematic if more dwellings are constructed because developers expect
house prices to rise in the future, which is likely to happen in periods of high price
increases33. In order to mitigate the potential endogeneity of this regressor, I con-
struct an instrument for the stock of private housing in a given province. I use a
similar instrument as Amior (2011) and Saiz (2010). I construct a predicted stock
of housing combining the share of developable land in the provinces in 2000 (for
the initial spatial distribution) and the changes in total annual national stock. I drop
the share of developable land from the supply time-invariant attributes controls and
use the two instruments (for immigration and for construction) in the models that
estimate the effects of immigration on prices.
Results using this are presented in table 1.12. The tables display the results for the
immigration ratio (columns 1 to 4) and for population growth (columns 4 to 4). The
32I tried other supply proxies like log of gross inflow or ratio of inflow over stock, with very similar
results.
33Immigrant can also have a direct impact on dwelling construction, so the growth of housing
stock is a “bad” control by definition. This issue is explored in section A.5 in the appendix.
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specifications include regional dummies and province dummies, with and without
regional trends, and all include controls. The tables display the Angrist-Pischke and
the Kleibergen-Paap F-test which support the strength of the instruments. The es-
timated coefficients of the effects of immigration are very similar to that of table 1.11,
marginally bigger. The coefficients of the growth of dwellings stock is always negat-
ive but never significant. These results suggest that the increase in supply through
construction of new dwellings did not have a causal impact on the mitigation of
the growth of house prices. As discussed before, possible explanations to this could
be the high number of non-occupied dwellings in Spain or the reduced financial
capabilities of immigrants to buy a property, either because they earn less or have
less job stability (Carrasco et al., 2008) or because they are subject to tighter credit
constraints than natives (Dı´az-Serrano & Raya, 2011).
1.4 Conclusions
This paper provides causal estimates of the effect of immigration on house prices
(rental and purchase prices). Panel data for the Spanish provinces during the period
2001-2010 is used to obtain estimates on the elasticity of prices with respect to change
in the immigration ratio (immigration inflows over population). I use fixed-effects
and instrumental variables estimation techniques in order to be able to tackle the po-
tential endogeneity of the foreign-born location patterns and the growth in prices.
The equations estimated is based in Saiz (2007) and the estimates are very similar
to those found by him in the US context. They also confirm results obtained in
similar analysis (for example Gonzalez & Ortega, 2009). However, in this type of
analysis the relationship between immigrants and native location patterns is over-
looked. To be able to interpret the size of the estimated coefficients I then estimate
the “displacement effect” and I find a strong causal positive relationship between
immigrant and native location. This would suggest that estimates that do not take
this fact into account overestimate the “net” effect of immigration on prices.
I then use population growth as the main regressor and instrument it with a pre-
diction of the immigration inflows and stocks based on exogenous variation. This
allows me to use only the variation in population growth which “stems from im-
migration”. Approaches such as that of Saiz (2007) or Gonzalez & Ortega (2009) in-
terpret coefficient β as the effect of immigration on prices, which is correct, but these
authors are unable to separate the effects of immigration on prices via immigrant de-
mand from the effects on prices via immigrants affecting native displacement and
thus provinces total housing demand. This fact links back to Saiz (2007) discussion
on the channels through which immigration affects house prices and the existence
of “long-run” and “short-run” impacts.
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The estimates obtained with my approach are between 30 and 40% smaller than
those of the standard approach, i.e. those that use the immigration ratio as the main
regressor. This would suggest that, if we are interpreting β as the demand effect of
immigrants on prices, previous estimates were “too high” because they were captur-
ing the combined demand effect of immigration plus native induced migration. This
30–40% difference in the coefficients would be due to induced demand by native at-
tracted to the same regions in which the immigrants are locating. Quantitatively,
my estimates predict that around one third of the total average annual growth of
purchase prices and around one quarter of the total average annual growth of rental
prices can be attributed to the effect of immigration on housing demand.
Finally, I this chapter I also explore the role played by the increase in supply
on mitigating price growth cause by the increase in demand. I find no effect of
supply on prices, even after instrumenting it. This could be cause because prices
were growing based on expectations of future growth, but this statement is difficult
to test with the currently available data.
The first limitation of my analysis is its external validity. The relationship between
house prices and immigration is studied for a very particular period of house prices
boom and bust and intensive immigration inflows. The panel is too short to be able
to divide the data in sub-panels which would allows us to study the different rela-
tionships when prices are increasing or decreasing. A second limitation is the use
of spatial unit: in order to have a sufficiently long panels and a reasonable set of
control variables I use provinces as the geographical level of observation. Ideally
I could have used municipalities or urban areas to be able to study effects which
only occur at smaller spatial scales, but data is much more limited at this scale. A
third limitation is the lack of richer data on foreign-born population characteristics
(demographic and socioeconomic). If foreign-born that settle in Spain are less skilled
than natives it is likely that they could have a different effect on prices because their
purchasing power is lower. The Spanish Labour Force Survey provides data on a
sample of workers by nationality and skills, but it only captures “legal” immigrants
so it under-estimates the total number of foreign-born setting down in the country. I
believe the population registers capture better the actual size of the population vari-
ables but the measure of skills in this database is very poor34. A fourth data driven
limitation is the use of average purchase and rental prices which does not take into
account neither occupancy or any characteristic of the house (quality). If prices are
growing because “better” houses are being constructed in some regions but not in
others we could be over estimating the effect of immigration. The same would hap-
pen in secondary homes are concentrated in some provinces and they are pushing
34Essentially, the skill level categories are very aggregated and they are not updated, only recorded
when the register is created for the first time.
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prices up.
Finally, I have estimated separate models for rental and purchase prices even
if this two prices are very related to each other. If rental prices are relatively high
and credit is cheap, individuals would prefer ownership towards renting (specially
given that ownership ratios in Spain are among the highest in the world, over 80%).
At the same time, if purchase prices are high or credit constraints increase, individu-
als could start renting more properties increasing demand. So demand for purchase
and rents can change because population increases or because demand from one
type of tenancy is switched to the other type. The current analysis does not capture
this.
This set of limitations leave some questions open for future research. From 2004,
when the Housing Department was instituted as a different government depart-
ment separated from the Ministry of Public Works, the quality and quantity of hous-
ing market data available to researchers increased substantially. Agreements with
the College of Property Registrars (Colegio de Registradores de la Propiedad) and with
the Professional Association of Property Valuators (Asociacin Profesional de Sociedades
de Valoracio´n-ATASA) were set in order to make available richer statistics on hous-
ing construction, valuation and transaction prices. The Housing Department was
re-integrated in the Ministry of Public Works in 2010, but if the current effort on col-
lecting more and better statistics continues this would provide the necessary data to
provide some interesting new insights on some of the under-investigated determin-
ants of house price growth in the future.
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Data disclaimer
The work of chapters 2, 3 and 4 is based on data from BSD, ARD, ASHE and LFS,
produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and supplied by the Secure Data
Service (SDS) at the UK Data Archive and by the Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML).
The data is Crown copyright and reproduced with the permission of the control-
ler of HMSO and Queen’s Printer for Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical data
in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpret-
ation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may
not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates.
All the results have been granted final clearance by the staff of the VML and by
the staff of the SDS.
Additionally, any interpretations or opinions expressed in this presentation are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department for
Transport who also provided data to the study.
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Chapter 2
Economic Impacts of Transport Policy:
Methodology
2.1 Introduction
Road network is a hugely important part of infrastructure in all countries. Accord-
ing to Transport Statistics Great Britain, between 1998 and 2008, more than 90% of
passenger transport was done by road. As shown in table B.1, in 2001 over 80% of
the commutes in the UK were done by motor vehicles (cars, vans, buses or motor-
cycles), and this percentage increases in city size1. Moreover, in these years, around
65% of goods transport was also done by roads2.
New transport projects require large amounts of public (and private) investment
and they generate controversy about their placement. Between 1998 and 2008, in-
vestment in road infrastructure increased in Great Britain more than 60% in nom-
inal terms and around 40% in per capita terms. Investment in rail also increased
substantially (see table B.2). Investment in roads accounted for over 40% of total
infrastructure investment (roads, trains, ports and airports). As shown in table B.3,
the trunk and motorway network was extended by around 300 kilometres between
1999 and 20093.
Understanding the relationship between transport improvements and economic
outcomes is essential to the design of transport policy, and given the importance of
road transportation for the movements of people and goods, the correct identific-
ation of the impact of road investments is also important for economic policy as a
1Except for cities of over 1,000,000 inhabitants where commutes by train or tube represent a size-
able fraction.
2Especially transportation of agricultural products and live animals, of foodstuffs and animal
fodder, of crude, of manufactured minerals and of building materials.
3Transport Statistics Great Britain. We compare the length after 1999 because many changes
between 1998 and 1999 corresponded to reclassification of the trunk roads, as explained in section
2.4.
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whole. In the current and following chapters we investigate the causal impact of
road improvements on aggregate and individual economic outcomes using micro
data on firms and workers for Great Britain between 1998-2008.
The theoretical predictions on the net effects of transportation improvements
on aggregate and individual economic outcomes are numerous. We analyse the
effect on ward employment, number of plants and productivity (aggregate out-
comes), firms employment, productivity, gross output and wages (firm outcomes)
and workers wages, hours worked, employment status and travel time (labour mar-
ket outcomes).
Better transport infrastructure brings places and people closer together. This has
two effects on the actual size of the market. Firstly, for a given location of firms and
workers, effective density increases, as it becomes easier to reach other locations
using the improved transportation network. Secondly, new infrastructure changes
the attractiveness of locations, which may boost spatial concentration if firms and
workers relocate. These effects may reinforce each other and create positive agglom-
eration spillovers (as discussed by Ottaviano, 2008). On the other hand, improved
access to markets also strengthens competition, forcing the exit of the less product-
ive firms and thus increasing aggregate productivity (Melitz, 2003). Finally, firms
use transport services as a production input, so changes in the supply and relative
prices of transport affect the input mix used by the firms and their demand for other
inputs, for example labour.
The effects on labour markets also operate through multiple channels (the ef-
fects of transport on labour market outcomes are discussed extensively in Gibbons
& Machin, 2006). First of all, reduced transport costs bring employers and work-
ers closer together. Transport improvements change commuting costs and hence
affect the size of labour markets. According to the so called “spatial mismatch hy-
pothesis”, accessibility to jobs is an important determinant of labour market parti-
cipation. For unemployed or inactive workers decreased commuting costs modify
search costs and reservation wages, and in this way, they can help reduce frictional
unemployment and increase the employment probabilities of those who are jobless.
Secondly, improvements in the transport network can increase the scope of agglom-
eration economies, as for a given physical distance employers and employees are
nearer to each other. Increased competition for jobs and workers (tighter labour
markets) can foster productivity, and additionally we could see more and better job
matches taking place in these enlarged labour markets. Finally, transport invest-
ments could be capitalised into non-labour prices and affect congestion, which in
turn could affect location decisions of firms and workers.
Yet, the number of empirical studies that have tried to quantitatively assess these
effects is still limited. Given the unclear net theoretical predictions, the size and dir-
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ection of the effects of transport policy on economic outcomes is mainly an empirical
question (Gibbons & Machin, 2006).
In this chapter we describe the methodology used in order to identify the effects
that transport improvements might have on firm and worker economic outcomes.
The empirical exercises are performed in the next two chapters. We also provide
the theoretical background and review the existing empirical evidence that motiv-
ated the study. Then we describe the measure we constructed to capture the effect of
transport improvements. The measure we use is an index of accessibility to employ-
ment or effective density. It captures the amount of employment which is reachable
from a given location using the road network at every point in time. Improvements
undertaken in the road network may affect travel times between locations, and thus
directly affect effective density.
For this purpose, we construct a novel data set of road improvements carried out
in Great Britain at different points in time during the period 1998-2008. We combine
this data with road network data and use Geographical Information System (GIS)
network analysis tools to calculate optimal minimum travel times by road between
locations for every year in our sample. We use this information, jointly with inform-
ation on the exact location of plants and employment, to calculate accessibility to
employment in different years.
We analyse the effect of improvements carried out on major roads, which cover
trunk roads4, principal roads (class A) and motorways. Even if these roads only
represent 13% of total road network length (table B.3), they correspond to 65% of
driven kilometres5. We focus on major roads for two reasons. The first one is data
availability: detailed data on road projects is only available for major schemes. The
second reason is that transport policy is aimed at improving economic integration
and reducing congestion of wide areas (Highways Agency, 2009), so we can expect
the most substantial investments to be carried out on these types of roads.
Accessibility to employment measures the amount of employment which is reach-
able using the road network from a given location, inversely weighed by the travel
time to reach other locations. One advantage of using this measure is that it is not
constrained to artificial geographical boundaries like measures based on the dens-
ity of roads. Moreover, it allows us to use variation due to transport improvements
which affect optimal travel times, even if the location was previously connected to
the network. This measure is, thus, very appropriate in a setting like Great Britain
where road density was already high at the beginning of our period of study. The
construction of this measure is explained in detail in this chapter.
The geographical unit we use as the basis for our analysis is the electoral ward.
4Roads over which the Department of Transport has direct control.
5Transport Statistics Great Britain.
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Wards (as defined in 1998) are quite small areas and there are over 10,500 in Great
Britain. The average area of British wards is 21 square kilometres (they are smaller
in England, 15 km2, and much bigger in Scotland, 62 km2) and the average pop-
ulation estimate in 2001 (for England and Wales) is around 6,000 people6. Having
such a large number of units implies that we have variation in accessibility changes
due to road improvements even when we focus on areas close to where the road
improvement took place. Therefore, the fine geographical detail of our data allows
us to implement a careful identification strategy.
In order to add to the scarce empirical evidence, in the next two chapters we
test the impact of changes in accessibility on aggregate and individual economic
outcomes. We carry out regression analysis and estimate the effects of accessibility
on firm and worker economic outcomes. To be able to infer a causal interpreta-
tion our estimates we use a novel instrumental variables strategy that exploits small
scale spatial variation in the way road improvements change accessibility to em-
ployment. Chapter 3 analyses the results on firm level outcomes (employment and
productivity) and on aggregate outcomes (ward employment, number of plants and
aggregate productivity). Chapter 4 analyses the results on individual labour market
outcomes (wages, hours worked, commuting time and employment status).
In the current chapter we motivate the research and provide details of the con-
struction of the accessibility measures, which is be used in the empirical exercises
of chapters 3 and 4. Section 2.2 summarises the main theoretical channels through
which transport policy might influence firm and worker economic outcomes. Sec-
tion 2.3 reviews the existing empirical evidence on the effect of transport policy on
economic outcomes. Section 2.4 describes the policy context. Section 2.5 explains
the details of the construction of the accessibility measure and provides summary
statistics. Section 2.6 summarises the identification strategy, which is be developed
in more detail in chapters 3 and 4. Finally, section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical framework
The role of transportation in the spatial distribution of economic activity and eco-
nomic performance has become of increased interest to researchers in the last years.
Decreasing transport costs are considered to be a central driver of economic integ-
ration and of the rise of agglomeration externalities, but solid empirical evidence on
the channels through which these effects operate is still needed.
6This is for 2001 CAS Wards, which are slightly different from ours. This is the
only information available for ward population figures, and it is approximate as it is es-
timated. See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/population/population-change/
population-estimates for more information.
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2.2.1 Effects of transport on firms and aggregate outcomes
In chapter 3 we study the effect of transport improvements on firm level employ-
ment and productivity (total factor productivity) and on aggregate economic out-
comes (ward employment, number of plants and aggregate productivity). Firms
maximise profits conditional on the demand for outputs, the supply of inputs and
the production technology. The degree of competition in the outputs and inputs
market also affects the maximisation problem faced by the firm. Changes in trans-
port infrastructure can influence all these conditions and therefore impact firm out-
comes through several inter-connected channels7.
At the firm level, transport improvements affect the performance of firms. On the
one hand, they may improve the logistics and the internal organisation of firms, and
can change the optimal input mix choice. Transportation services are used as pro-
duction inputs and, if there is a substitution effect between inventories, labour and
transport services, the demand and input mix could be affected (Holl, 2006). Inter-
mediate input prices could decrease because of reduced transport costs or increased
competition between the suppliers. Wages could also change if productivity effects
are capitalised into wages or if wages are set as a function of commuting costs, which
are affected by the transport network (Gibbons & Machin, 2006). Changes in wages
or input mix can have an influence in the number of workers a firm employs.
Due to the changes in input prices firms might change the demand for inputs,
and depending on the internal returns to scale, this could affect their final output. If
output increases with respect to inputs more than proportionally (due to increasing
returns to scale), the output/inputs ratio changes. However, this is a scale effect and
total factor productivity would remain unaffected. Therefore, we could observe an
effect on labour producibility (the ratio of output to employment) but not on total
factor productivity (a genuine productivity shifter: firms produce more output for
the same amount of inputs).
Furthermore, better accessibility to consumers increases customer base (for ex-
ample by increasing market area, as suggested by Lahr et al., 2005). This allows
firms to expand production and exploit economies of scale. In addition to the poten-
tial scale effects discussed above, firms total factor productivity could be affected by
the wider economic benefits of transport (Graham, 2007). These refer to agglomera-
tion externalities (sharing, matching and learning – Duranton & Puga, 2004), which
can be internal to the industry (localisation economies) or driven by the size of the
market (urbanisation economies). Firms benefit from the presence of other firms
nearby (in the same or different sector of production) and from the increased prox-
imity to suppliers which arises from the improvements on the transport network.
7Our theoretical discussion draws mainly on Gibbons & Overman (2009) who provide an extens-
ive analysis on the potential productivity and scale effects of transport infrastructure.
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Agglomeration benefits act like a production function shifter, i.e. for a given amount
of inputs, the firm is able to produce more.
Transport improvements can also influence the number and location of plants.
If better transport infrastructure reduces the fixed cost of creating a firm or makes
better-connected locations more attractive places to start a business, the creation and
location of plants can be affected by transport policy. Related to this, if firms can take
advantage of the increasing returns to scale or benefit from TFP improvements, their
survival rates could be affected. Low-productivity firms which would have exited
the market otherwise could be able to survive in the locations in which transport
improvements take place. Moreover, entry and exit rates at the ward level could
be affected as firms relocate to better benefit from scale effects and agglomeration
externalities.
At the aggregate (ward) level, employment and productivity may consequently
be affected also through firms entering and exiting the ward. This process may
reinforce the scope for scale and agglomeration benefits. For example, aggregate
employment could increase because firms input demands increase (scale effects)
and because new firms move into the ward. And it could also increase because the
existing plants in the ward are employing more workers to take advantage of scale
or of the TFP effects.
Transport improvements can have different effects on firms and wards depend-
ing on the degree of competition in output markets. The greater the imperfection
in competition, the more pro-competitive a transport investment will be and the
greater the benefits for economic agents (Vickerman, 2007). In some cases the lack
of good transportation could act as an effective trade barrier for less-productive or
smaller regions. When transport infrastructure is improved, more-productive or
larger regions, which can enjoy economies of scale, might start exporting to the pre-
viously isolated location, thus increasing competition. In the short run, this might
harm the firms located in the smaller region, although it can benefit consumers be-
cause they have access to a wider range of goods and to cheaper final outputs. But
in the long run, if only the most productive firms survive, aggregate productivity
(and income) of the region would increase.
Hence, reduced transport costs can also increase spatial competition. If only the
“fittest” firms survive (as suggested by Melitz, 2003), then the number of firms and
aggregate productivity level could change. If we consider transport improvements
equivalent to a decrease in transport costs, in the core-periphery new economic geo-
graphy (NEG) model (Krugman, 1991b; Fujita et al., 2001) the reduction of transport
costs can actually give rise to “catastrophic” agglomeration, in which all economic
activity concentrates into one region.
In short, given that the theoretical predictions are many, the effect of transport
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improvements on the firm level and ward level outcomes remains an empirical
question.
2.2.2 Effects of transport on labour market outcomes
While most of trade and location theory regards transport investments as having an
effect on (goods) transport costs (Michaels, 2008, for example), urban labour theories
(Zenou, 2009) consider transport policy as having an effect on commuting costs and
therefore mostly operating through the labour market. Glaeser & Kohlhase (2003)
document the declining role of goods-transportation costs in developed countries
and highlight the increasingly important role of the mobility of workers in modern
economies. Transport policy affects labour markets through multiple channels (for
a review see Gibbons & Machin, 2006).
If transport improvements reduce commuting costs8, employers and employees
come closer together (spatial competition) and the effective size of the labour mar-
kets (scope) can be affected. This has a potential impact on multiple labour market
outcomes.
The tightness of the labour market, i.e. the ratio of unemployed relative to the
number of job vacancies, is affected by the accessibility and the size of the labour
market. If labour markets are more accessible to unemployed workers residing out-
side the labour market area, or the labour market becomes effectively bigger because
it is better connected, for a given number of vacancies the number of potential can-
didates would increase. This increases competition for jobs and might have two
effects. Firstly, unemployed workers living further away from jobs might become
employed due to the increase in accessibility. Secondly, due to increased competi-
tion, we could see an increase in the quality of job matches which could be translated
into higher productivity and wages.
If employers require workers with specific characteristics or skills, employees
can bargain to improve their labour market conditions (wages, hours worked, oc-
cupation) to compensate for longer commutes. However, if labour markets are
thin (Manning, 2006), i.e. workers have access to a limited number of potential
employers, longer commutes would not be fully capitalised into nominal wages.
Longer commutes can also have an effect on wages through its effect on productiv-
ity, if shorter commutes are related to healthier or more motivated workers (van
Ommeren & Gutie´rrez-i-Puigarnau, 2011).
Related to the these points, the spatial mismatch theory predicts that longer dis-
8Commuting costs involve both time and monetary costs. As the transport improvements we
study are driven by road construction, we focus on the effects of reduced commuting travel times as
a proxy for commuting costs.
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tance9 between residential location and job location can have negative effects on the
labour market outcomes of those living further away from employment centres. A
reduction in commuting travel times induced by transport investments would thus
affect search costs and reservation wages, therefore impacting observed wages and
unemployment rates. All these effects might impact labour market outcomes like
employment status (employed versus unemployed), unemployment spells, unem-
ployment duration and nominal wages.
Transport policy can also affect labour supply. It can weaken barriers to particip-
ation in the labour market, encouraging the entry of disadvantages groups (female
or low-skilled) into job search. It can affect hours worked if wages increase due to
transport improvements, making work more attractive; or even if increased com-
petition in denser areas induce young professionals to behave in a more rivalrous
manner (Rosenthal & Strange, 2008, the “rat race” argument in). Reduced commut-
ing costs could also affect hours worked if the changes in travel times and wages
affect the optimal labour-leisure choice.
The emergence of agglomeration externalities might also have positive effects
on workers earnings if urbanisation economies10 and proximity to markets (Krug-
man, 1991b; Krugman & Venables, 1995) give raise to productivity gains which are
capitalised into nominal wages.
Additionally, if better connectivity is regarded as an amenity of locations, im-
proved infrastructure could be capitalised into house prices (some evidence of this
is provided in Gibbons & Machin, 2005). In this sense, it would affect real wages,
which would change because of changes in nominal wages and in local prices. Net
changes in real wages would affect individuals real labour earnings, but if there is
capitalisation of accessibility into house values, for home owners there could be a
positive effect on their total wealth.
Real earning changes could also affect residential mobility and the commuting
versus migrating choice. Higher earners would find it profitable to commute longer
if they can afford better quality housing further away from their jobs. In addition,
transport investment could affect residential sorting if capitalisation into house rents
force low income workers (renters) to move away from areas where transport im-
provements have taken place.
As in the case of aggregate and firm outcomes, due to the multiplicity of channels
through which transport policy and decreased commuting times can affect labour
market outcomes, the estimation of robust causal effects is of considerable interest.
9Distance includes geographical distance but also bad public transport provision or poor access
to private transport (car).
10Sharing, matching and learning in Duranton & Puga (2004) terminology; input-output linkages,
labour market pooling and knowledge spillovers in the classical Marshall (1890) terminology.
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2.3 Empirical evidence
Even if some authors have explicitly included the role of transportation into spa-
tial economic analysis (Combes & Lafourcade, 2001; Puga, 2002; Behrens et al., 2004;
Venables, 2007), there is still a need to empirically establish the causal link from
transportation infrastructure to spatial economic performance, especially with re-
gard to the effects on individual outcomes.
There exists a substantial amount of empirical evidence on the effects of infra-
structure (including transport) on economic outcomes at the macro-level (for a re-
view see Gramlich, 1994; Straub, 2011). This literature has focused on the impacts of
investment in roads and public infrastructure on several outcomes, and the authors
generally estimate an aggregated Cobb-Douglas production function where infra-
structure or roads are treated as a factor of production (Garcı´a-Mila´ et al., 1996).
The effect of infrastructure has been estimated on outcomes such as aggregate pro-
ductivity (Aschauer, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Fernald, 1999), earnings (Chandra &
Thompson, 2000) or employment (Jiwattanakulpaisarn et al., 2009). Some papers
have tried to estimate the spillover effects on neighbouring regions to those where
the infrastructure investment takes place (Boarnet, 1998; Moreno & Lo´pez-Bazo,
2007).
A number of recent papers have estimated, using careful identification strategies,
the effect of roads on other economic outcomes using data for the USA11. Burch-
field et al. (2006) examine the effect of early public transport infrastructure and road
density on urban sprawl. They find a positive relationship between public transit
and density development, but no effect of road density on sprawl.
Using the 1947 planned Interstate Highway System as an exogenous source of
variation, Baum-Snow (2007b) studies the effect of highways on the process of sub-
urbanisation of American cities since the 50s, and on the changes in commuting
patterns since the 60s (Baum-Snow, 2010). He finds that a sizeable fraction of city
center losses in population between 1950 and 1990 can be attributed to highways,
and the presence of highways can also explain the increase of commuting flows
within suburban areas.
Michaels (2008) uses a similar source of exogenous variation to estimate the effect
of reduced trade barriers on the demand for skills. The Interstate Highway System
aimed to connect large cities, to serve national defense, and to connect with ma-
jor routes in Canada and Mexico, but in order to connect these nodes the highways
crossed many rural counties. A Heckscher-Ohlin theoretical model predicts changes
in the relative demand of skills at the county level when trade barriers are reduced
11Turner (2009) provides a review of recent evidence and a discussion of the methodological issues
involved in the estimation of the effects of transportation.
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through the construction of road infrastructure. He captures the effects highways
with an indicator which is activated if a highway crosses a county. He tests the effect
of this indicator on on domestic trade (trucking and retail sales), demand of skilled
labour (measured as wage-bill of nonproduction workers in manufacturing, relative
to production workers) and industrial composition. Rural interstate highways had
an important effect on trucking and retail sales, but no effect on changing the indus-
trial composition of the counties. He also finds evidence in favour of the predictions
of the model, i.e. that trade increases the relative demand for the abundant factor,
so demand for skilled workers increased in skill-abundant counties.
Hymel (2009) uses a cross section of US metropolitan areas to assess the impact
of traffic congestion on aggregate employment growth. The measure of congestion
used is the annual aggregate amount of time lost due to congested driving condi-
tions. He also uses the Interstate Highway plan and some other political variables
as instruments in order to estimate causal effects. His empirical results suggest that
increases in congestion significantly reduce subsequent employment growth.
Duranton & Turner (2011a) examine the effect of road construction on vehicle-
kilometres traveled (VKT) in US cities. They estimate the effects on a panel of met-
ropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) between 1983 and 2003 and exploit three instru-
mental variables to be able to infer causality in their estimates. They find that roads
cause traffic and that the elasticity is very close to 1. Using a similar strategy the
same authors investigate the effects of roads on urban growth (Duranton & Turner,
2011b) and on trade (Duranton et al., 2011). While an increase in the initial stock
of highways has a causal positive effect on subsequent population growth, these
authors find no effect of highways on the total value of exports.
Other papers (Faber, 2009; Donaldson, 2010) have focused on developing coun-
tries (highways in China and railroads in colonial India) to study the effect of the
reduction of transport costs, due to transport network development, on trade integ-
ration and consequent economic development. These papers also rely on the use of
instrumental variables to estimate causal impacts.
On the other hand, only a handful of papers have studied the effect of increased
accessibility on firms’ outcomes, and they have mostly focused on the analysis of
firm relocation (Coughlin & Segev, 2000; Holl, 2004a,b) or firm birth (Holl, 2004c;
Melo et al., 2010), all finding positive relationships between the presence of roads
and firms’ relocation and creation.
Our research is also related to the empirical testing of the effect of agglomer-
ation economies and market-access on firm productivity (for example Ciccone &
Hall, 1996; Henderson, 2003; Martin et al., 2011). Holl (2011) studies the relationship
between market access and firm productivity when market access changes due to
road investments and changes in population. She exploits data for a panel of firms
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during a period of intense road construction in Spain. When using plant fixed-
effects the estimates are imprecise, so she relies on GMM techniques in order to
overcome endogeneity problems, and she finds positive significant effects of market
access on productivity. Li & Li (2010) use the construction of the Chinese highways
system to evaluate the impact of improved transport infrastructure on the amount
of inventories held by firms, arguing that the reduced inventories due to road con-
struction improve efficiency and aggregate productivity.
A large fraction of the evidence of the effect of transportation on labour market
outcomes has been provided by the empirical testing of the spatial mismatch hypo-
thesis (SMH). The spatial mismatch literature has focused on explaining, both from
an empirical (Rogers, 1997) and a theoretical perspective (Gobillon et al., 2007; Gau-
tier & Zenou, 2010), the relationship between the poor access to jobs of disadvant-
aged groups (like low-skilled, ethnic minorities or females) and their poor labour
market outcomes (mainly unemployment or inactivity).
Most of theoretical and the empirical evidence has been developed in the US con-
text. In the last decades many low-skill jobs have been relocated to the city suburbs
due to suburbanisation. Poorer individuals and ethnic minorities remained resid-
entially segregated in city centres, due to mobility constraints and cheaper house
prices. If these city centres are poorly connected to the suburbs (due to the lack of
good public transport links) or if these groups have worse access to private trans-
portation (like cars), then their performance in the labour market is endangered due
to poor access to potential vacancies. There exists abundant empirical evidence on
the spatial mismatch hypothesis (SMH) but mainly for the US (for a review see In-
hanfeldt, 2006). Some recent papers have studied some aspects of the SMH using
data for France (De´tang-Dessendre & Gaigne´, 2009; Gobillon et al., 2011), for the UK
(Patacchini & Zenou, 2005) or for Spain (Matas et al., 2010).
Another channel through which transport policy affects labour market outcomes
is by changing commuting costs (which can be proxied by commuting time or com-
muting distance). A reduction in commuting time and costs associated with trans-
port improvements enables people to increase the scale of their job search and could
also encourage potential workers to participate in the labour market (Vickerman,
2002; Jiwattanakulpaisarn et al., 2009). There are a few papers that have tested
the impact of commuting distance on labour market outcomes. van Ommeren &
Gutie´rrez-i-Puigarnau (2011) and Gutie´rrez-i-Puigarnau & van Ommeren (2010) look
at the effect of a reduction in commuting distance induced by a establishment-
relocation (within the same firm) on hours worked and absenteeism (productivity).
Mulalic et al. (2010) use changes in distance commuted caused by relocation of firms
to study the effects of commuting on wages. Search costs can also lead to thin local
labour markets which may explain the positive gradients between wages and com-
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muting times (Manning, 2006).
Finally our research is also related to the effect of agglomeration economies and
proximity to markets on nominal wages (Combes et al., 2008a; Mion & Naticchioni,
2009; Hering & Poncet, 2010). Workers which are located in denser areas are able
to capitalise positive agglomeration externalities on wages. The identification of
the effects of agglomeration economies is not straightforward (Combes et al., 2011).
Combes et al. (2010) point out two major problems with the identification of the ef-
fects of agglomeration on wages. Denser or better connected places might attract
more workers and this in turn increases agglomeration (which they refer to as the
“endogenous quantity problem”). They suggest the use of instrumental variables
to deal with this problem. Also, more able workers might sort into dense areas in
order to take advantage of the agglomeration externalities (which they refer to as
the “endogenous quality problem”). To deal with this second problem, the authors
suggest using individual panel data to control for unobservable individual and loc-
ational characteristics. In section 2.6 and in chapter 4, we use a similar strategy,
but we focus on the effect on agglomeration on labour market outcomes through
improvements on road accessibility.
We believe that our research contributes to the existing evidence in three ways.
Firstly, in contrast to many studies mentioned above which use density of roads or
connectivity, we measure the effect of transport policy using an index of accessibility
to employment. This measure has the advantage of capturing small improvements
in the network. It weights the importance of the different locations based on their
economic size and on their position in the road network relative to the rest of the
country. Even if the location was previously connected to the road network, any
improvements in the network can affect the relative “connectivity” of the location,
when the improvements reduced the travel time necessary to reach other points of
the network. As discussed below (section 2.5.2), this measure is more appropriate
in the UK context than other measures used in previous empirical studies.
Secondly, we make use of a careful identification strategy in order to overcome
the endogeneity issues concerning the estimation of the effects of accessibility on
economic outcomes. A large fraction of the papers summarised above rely on the
use of historical, geographical or political instruments to tackle the endogeneity of
transport project placements. In contrast, our strategy is based on the use of indi-
vidual micro-datasets and small spatial scale. We use the variation in accessibility
stemming from road improvements and we compare individuals and wards which
are located very close to the improvements and which vary in the timing and the
intensity of the transport treatment (more details are given in section 2.6).
Finally, we believe that our results are able to shed some light on the channels
through which transport policy is affecting individual economic outcomes. For ex-
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ample, most of the evidence on the effect of market access on workers wages, even
if causal, cannot separate the impacts attributable to changes in the economic size of
the locations and the changes attributable to the “proximity” of these locations. As
explained in detail below, we focus on the variation of accessibility (effective dens-
ity) which stems from road improvements. If there are any potential causal benefits
to firms or workers arising from changes in accessibility, these could be induced
through transport policy. Therefore, our estimates inform us not only on the overall
effect of accessibility on firm and worker economic outcomes but also on the channel
through which policy can potentially impact these outcomes.
2.4 Policy context
Due to rising concerns about the increase in traffic flows and the limited capacity
of existing networks, in 1997 the Labour Government carried out a reform of the
management of major roads. Major roads comprise trunk roads, motorways and
principal roads (A roads). The aim of this reform was to “radically change trans-
port policy” (Department of Transport, 1998a). This reform involved the transfer of
parts of the English Trunk Network to local authorities, while the Department of
Transport kept control of the most strategic roads (those connecting major popula-
tion centers, ports and airports, key cross-border links and the Trans-European Road
Network). The management of these roads was transferred to the Highways Agency
in England (which is part of the Department of Transport), to Transport Scotland and
to the Welsh Assembly Government. This reform also included “a carefully targeted
programme of larger scale improvements”, mostly aimed at improving maintenance
and focused on these strategic roads (Department of Transport, 1998b).
As stated in the white paper that inspired the 1997 reform (Department of Trans-
port, 1998b), the main aim of the changes introduced by the transport policy reform
were to “to create a better, more integrated transport system to tackle the problems
of congestion and pollution”. In this direction, new objectives were set for the High-
ways agency, which aimed “to give higher priority to better maintenance and to
make better use of existing roads” and “to put greater emphasis to environmental
and safety objectives”. As of 2009, the main objectives of the Highways Agency are
improving the quality and the economic efficiency of the service, reducing traffic
congestion, improving road safety and enhancing the environment by mitigating the
potentially adverse impact of the strategic road network (Highways Agency, 2009).
Traditionally the evaluation and appraisal of transport improvements has been car-
ried out using cost-benefit analysis and has focused on the assessment of the direct
impacts on the users of the transport mode (Gibbons & Overman, 2009). In the UK
context, appraisals carried out by the Department of Transport have usually estim-
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ated the social welfare benefits and costs of a project, relative to a scenario in which
the scheme did not exist. In 1998 the New Approach to Appraisal (NATA) was
introduced following the reform of transport policy and the main innovation with
respect to previous evaluation methods was the quantification of environmental im-
pacts. Transport projects are appraised in a sustainable development framework: all
projects must set out their environmental, economic, safety, accessibility and integ-
ration effects. Evaluated welfare effects include journey time savings and reliability,
environmental effects and other factors (Department of Transport, 2005).
The appraisal of trunk road investment suggests that the reduction of transport
congestion benefits the economy through time savings and improvements in reli-
ability (Department of Transport, 1998b). However, there may exist wider benefits
that arise in the presence of imperfectly competitive markets or increasing returns to
scale (Venables & Gasiorek, 1999) and which are not captured by the 1998 changes
to appraisal methodology (NATA). In recent years there have been some attempts
to include the “wider-economic” impacts of transport improvement as part of trans-
port appraisal (Department of Transport, 2005). Wider impacts can be incorporated
into appraisal through the calculation of three components that capture the effect of
agglomeration economies (Graham, 2005, 2006), benefits associated with increasing
output (Gibbons & Overman, 2009) and benefits arising from labour market effects
(Gibbons & Machin, 2006).
The correct identification and measurement of the impact of road improvements
on economic outcomes can provide guidance on the inclusion of wider-benefits into
appraisal. The research carried out in chapters 2 to 4 aims to contribute to this debate
by providing causal evidence on the economic effects of road improvements and by
identifying the channels through which these effects operate.
2.5 Measuring road improvements
2.5.1 The road schemes
We collected information on completed road improvements for the British major
roads network by combining information provided by the Department of Transport
and other data sources12. We collected data on around 75 projects which were com-
pleted between 1998 and 2007.
As explained in section 2.4, the improvements aimed to improve traffic flows and
road security, and indirectly affect the environment and the economy by reducing
traffic congestion13. The nature of these projects is diverse. They cover construction
12Mainly The Highways Agency, the Motorway Archive, Transport Scotland and Wikipedia.
13For example, the objectives of scheme “A6 Clapham Bypass” of table 2.1 were to “improve
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Figure 2.1: Major road network in 2008 and location of road schemes completed between
1998 and 2007
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of new junctions, dualling, widening, upgrades and construction of new roads. We
focus on construction of new roads and keep 31 road schemes, which are listed in
table 2.1. The length of these schemes is also provided in table 2.1.
Opening
Type Road Scheme
Length
year in kms
1998 Type 2 A16 A16 Market Deeping/Deeping St James Bypass 1.6
1998 Type 1 A34 A34 Newbury Bypass 9.3
1998 Type 2 A50 A50/A564 Stoke - Derby Link 5.1
1999 Type 1 A12 A12 Hackney Wick - M11 Contracts I-IV 4.7
1999 Type 2 A35 A30/A35 Puddleton Bypass 9.3
1999 Type 1 M1 M1/M62 Link Roads 16
1999 Type 2 M74 A74(M). Paddy’s Rickle - to St Ann’s (J16) 11.6
2000 Type 1 M60 M66 Denton - Middleton 15.3
2002 Type 1 A27 A27 Polegate Bypass 3.2
2002 Type 2 A43 A43 Silverstone Bypass 14.2
2002 Type 2 A6 A6 Clapham Bypass 14.57
2002 Type 2 A66 A66 Stainburn and Great Clifton Bypass 4.1
2003 Type 2 A41 A41 Aston Clinton Bypass 7.3
2003 Type 2 A5 A5 Nesscliffe Bypass 21.48
2003 Type 2 A500 A500 Basford, Hough, Shavington Bypass 7.7
2003 Type 2 A6 A6 Alvaston Improvement 4.7
2003 Type 2 A6 A6 Great Glen Bypass 6.8
2003 Type 2 A6 A6 Rothwell to Desborough Bypass 8.43
2003 Type 1 A6 A6 Rushden and Higham Ferrers Bypass 5.4
2003 Type 2 A650 A650 Bingley Relief Road 4.4
2003 Type 1 M6(T) M6 Toll. Birmingham Northern Relief Road 29.7
2004 Type 2 A10 A10 Wadesmill to Colliers End Bypass 7
2004 Type 1 A63 A63 Selby Bypass 9.5
2005 Type 1 A1(M) A1(M) Wetherby to Walshford 8.1
2005 Type 2 A21 A21 Lamberhurst Bypass 2.4
2005 Type 2 A47 A47 Thorney Bypass 10.7
2005 Type 1 M77 M77 Replaces A77 from Glasgow Road 18.25
2006 Type 1 A1(M) A1(M) Ferrybridge to Hook Moor 19.2
2006 Type 2 A421 A421 Great Barford Bypass 7.6
2007 Type 2 A2 A2 / A282 Dartford Improvement 4.2
2007 Type 2 A66
A66 Temple Sowerby Bypass
26.2
and Improvements at Winderwath
TOTAL 318.03
Sources: Own authors calculations using information from the Department for Transport, the Highways Agency, the
Motorway Archive, Transport Scotland and Wikipedia.
Table 2.1: Road schemes – 1998-2007
We define two types of projects. Type 2 correspond to roads for which there
was an alternative route before, but the road was a minor road (not existing in the
road safety”, “relieve congestion” and “provide the opportunity for environmental improve-
ment in Clapham by removing through traffic”. See http://www.highways.gov.uk/roads/
projects/6006.aspx for more information and the evaluation report.
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major road network) and an upgrade (which involves improvement and the con-
struction of new lanes) was carried out so the road becomes part of the major road
network. They mainly correspond to bypasses which relieve traffic congestion from
villages and usually flow in parallel to an existing alternative minor road. Type 1
corresponds to “genuinely” new roads, i.e. roads for which we do not have an al-
ternative minor road flowing in parallel. In practice, as detailed in section 2.5.2.3
below, we defined these two types of improvements in order to be able to calculate
travel times given the characteristics of the road network data that we use. They are
not substantially different, both involve road construction, except for the treatment
we give them in them in the calculation of the travel O–D matrices.
Length in kms Percentage
MAJOR ROADS NETWORK IN 2008 50,093.73
All improvements 1998-2007 (type 1 and type 2) 318.03 0.64%
of which:
Type 1 improvements 138.65 43.6%
Type 2 improvements 179.38 56.4%
The right column reports the percentage of total improvements over the whole network (2nd row) and
the percentage of the improvements by type over total improvement length (3rd and 4th rows). Sources:
Own authors calculations using information from the Department for Transport, the Highways Agency,
the Motorway Archive, Transport Scotland and Wikipedia.
Table 2.2: Length of schemes – 1998-2007
Figure 2.1 displays the location of these projects and the major road network at
the end of our period of analysis (2008). Projects are scattered all over Britain. We
focus on new construction because these improvements are the ones we can expect
to have a substantial effect on travel times between wards. Table 2.2 summarises the
length of the improvements by type and displays the percentage of kilometres they
represent with respect to the total network length14. Total improvements represent
0.64% of the network length, and the majority of them (56.4%) correspond to type 2
improvements.
2.5.2 Accessibility measures
2.5.2.1 Definition
Our aim is to estimate the causal effect of road improvements on economic out-
comes. Therefore, the first challenge is to find a measure that captures changes in
the road infrastructure. Some measures that have been used in the literature are con-
nectivity to the network (Faber, 2009), kilometres of roads within a given area (Melo
14The length of this network slightly differs from the information in table B.3 – 50,250 kilometres
–. This is due to the fact that this length corresponds to the GIS network we used in the calculation
of the travel times which is just approximate. More details in section 2.5.2.3.
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et al., 2010; Duranton & Turner, 2011b), distance to closest highway (Baum-Snow,
2007a), number of rays crossing a given area (Baum-Snow, 2007a, 2010), presence
of highways in a given location in a particular year (Chandra & Thompson, 2000;
Michaels, 2008), “lowest-cost route effective distance” (Donaldson, 2010) or even
amount of public expenditure on road infrastructure (Fernald, 1999).
The current road network in Great Britain is very dense. At the beginning of our
period of analysis, 1997, the length of the major road network is of almost 50,000
kilometres (table B.3) and during the period of analysis (1998-2008) the network
length increased around 0.65% up to 50,250 kilometres in 2008. For this reason the
measures used in the papers mentioned above would not be appropriate for our
context. Instead, we use a measure of accessibility to employment “through the
road network” (or effective-density) from each location at every point in time.
Accessibility to employment measures the amount of employment which is reach-
able using the road network from a given location, inversely weighed by the travel
time to reach these other locations. One advantage of using this measure is that
it is not constrained to artificial geographical boundaries like some of the alternat-
ive measures. Moreover, it allows us to use variation due to road improvements
which affect optimal travel times, even if the location was previously connected to
the network. Additionally, it captures the effects of transport improvements over
the whole geography. This measure is, thus, appropriate in our setting where road
density was already high at the beginning of our period of study.
Formally, accessibility to employment Art from a given location r at time t is
defined as:
Art =∑Rj 6=r
[
a
(
crjt
) ∗ econ sizejt] (2.1)
where a (.) is the transport cost function, crjt are the transport costs between loca-
tions r and j at time t and econ sizejt measures the economic size of the location at
time t. In our analysis t corresponds to years 1998 to 2008.
This index is a measure of the economic mass accessible to a firm or a worker
in a particular location, given the local transport network. At a given origin loc-
ation r at time t, employment accessibility Art is a weighted sum of employment
in all destinations j that can be reached from origin r by incurring a transport cost
crjt along some specified route between r and j (for example straight line distance
or minimum cost route along a transport network – measured in travel time or in
distance). The function a (.) determines how the weights enter in the calculation of
Art (more details below).
Our definition of accessibility is different from other measures of accessibility
used in the literature. Other authors, for example Ihlanfeldt & Sjoquist (1990);
Raphael (1998); Ihlanfeldt (2002); De´tang-Dessendre & Gaigne´ (2009) or Gobillon
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et al. (2011) have used indices of accessibility based on mean commuting time of em-
ployed workers within some given area, number of available jobs within a given dis-
tance band or similar weighted measures to Art but using different costs functions
or distance decays, calculating skill-specific indices, or using employment growth
as the measure of economic size of locations.
Instead, we measure the economic size of locations using total employment in a
ward and we use travel time between wards as a measure of transport costs (more
details on this below). Assuming inverse cost weights15 and a cost decay equal to
one16, the final expression of accessibility to employment becomes:
Art =∑Rj 6=r
[(
1/travel timerjt
) ∗ employmentjt] (2.2)
The accessibility index as defined in (2.2) is identical in structure to market po-
tential measures used in economic geography (e.g. Harris, 1954; Krugman, 1991b),
and to the accessibility indices used more generally in the transport literature (e.g.
Vickerman et al., 1999; El-Geneidy & Levinson, 2006). This measure is similar to
those usually used in empirical tests of the spatial mismatch hypothesis (for ex-
ample Rogers, 1997) and closely related to the market-access measure used in tests
of the effect of agglomeration economies on wages (Mion & Naticchioni, 2009; Her-
ing & Poncet, 2010) or on productivity (Ciccone & Hall, 1996; Martin et al., 2011).
Apart from its comparability to these papers, we believe the measure captures most
of the theoretical channels explained in section 2.2.
We use 1998 electoral wards (10,500 units) as our geographical unit. The cal-
culation of equation (2.2) requires the construction of an origin–destination (O–D)
matrix whose components are travel times between the locations. When computing
the O–D matrix we apply a limit of 75 minutes drive time (1.25 hours). This limit
facilitates O–D matrix computation but hardly affects the value of the accessibility
index because wards beyond 75 minutes have negligible weights in the calculation
of Art. Moreover, as shown in table B.4, more than 99% of commutes in the Great
Britain are below 90 minutes.
Accessibility Art changes in a given origin r are driven both by changes in travel
times between wards (stemming from road improvements) and by changes in the
15In the definition of Art the value of the weight a (.) attached to any destination r is a decreas-
ing function of the cost of reaching destination j from origin r. α is the cost decay. Potential
weighting schemes include: “cumulative opportunities” weights a
(
crjt
)
= 1 if j is within a spe-
cified distance of r, zero otherwise; “exponential weights” a
(
crjt
)
= exp
(
αcrjt
)
; “logistic weights”
a
(
crjt
)
= [1 + exp
(−αcrjt)]−1 or “inverse cost weights” a (crjt) = c−αrjt . See Graham et al. (2009) for
further discussion of these indices.
16Graham et al. (2009), using the inverse cost weighting scheme, estimate the parameter of distance
decay functions for several sectors using similar British data to ours and find values between 1.8 and
1, depending on the sector. In chapters 3 and 4 we check the robustness of our results to different
distance decays.
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employment of origin ward r and in the different wards j around r. This may lead
to endogeneity problems in the estimation of the effect of accessibility, if the em-
ployment changes near the origin are causally linked with changes in the economic
outcomes in the origin or driven by the same unobserved factors. Moreover, as our
focus is on the effect of road improvements, the examination of Art would be lim-
ited as we are not able to differentiate between the changes driven by employment
relocation and the changes driven by changes in travel time between locations. It is
then useful to construct an alternative accessibility measure Aˆrt that focuses on the
changes in accessibility that stem only from transport improvements:
Aˆrt =∑Rj 6=r
[(
1/travel timerjt
) ∗ employmentjt0] (2.3)
where t0 is some fixed period of time, before our period of analysis starts17.
Fixing employment to its t0 level ensures that changes in the accessibility index
(2.3) over time occur only as a result of changes in the costs crjt (e.g. travel time)
and not as a results of changes in wards employment. In the empirical work in
the next chapters, we instrument Art with Aˆrt in order to only use the variation in
accessibility which stems from the road improvements.
In the calculation of Art the travel time within location r is given the value 0.5
times the minimum travel time to any other ward within the 75 minutes radius.
Alternatively, we could exclude location r from the calculation of the accessibility
measures to lessen the potential reverse causality problem. This problem arises be-
cause our dependent variables include several economic outcomes of the wards or
of the individuals located in the ward (firms and workers) and it is likely that these
outcomes and the economic size of a given location are be jointly determined. As
explained above (and in more detail in section 2.6 and in the following chapters), we
use an instrument to address this issue, so the inclusion of the own economic-size in
the calculation of Art should not be an issue. In fact, the qualitative interpretations
of the results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of own economic size.
2.5.2.2 Economic size of the locations
In the calculation of the accessibility indices (2.2) and (2.3) we use total employment
in the ward as measure of economic size of the locations. The employment figures
at the ward level were obtained using data from the Business Structure Database
(BSD). The BSD is a yearly snapshot of the Inter-Departmental Business Register
(IDBR), which is accessible to researchers through the Secure Data Service (SDS)
delivered by the UK Data Archive (UKDA). We use data from 1997 to 2008.
17Due to data availability, t0 corresponds to 1997 for the results in chapter 3 and to 2001 for the
results in chapter 4.
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This dataset is maintained by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) and contains
a yearly updated register of the universe of businesses in the United Kingdom. It
is drawn from administrative registers. It covers about 98% of business activity (by
turnover) in Great Britain.
The smallest unit of observation is the establishment or plant (”local unit”), but
there is also information on the firm to which the plant belongs (”reporting unit”)
and the enterprise and enterprise group of the firm. The dataset provides detailed
information on the location (postcode), the sector of production (up to 5 digits) and
employment of the plant. This level of detail allows us to calculate employment at
any geographical level aggregating up from postcodes. However, individual estab-
lishment identifiers are not stable over long periods of time, which makes calcula-
tions of entry and exit of plants problematic.
Alternatively we can define indices (2.2) and (2.3) using different measures of
economic size. Specifically, we use number of residential addresses in the ward18,
obtained from the National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) and the number of
establishments at the ward level (local unit counts), calculated using the BSD. We
use these alternative indices in the robustness checks carried out in chapter 4.
2.5.2.3 The calculation of travel times
The accessibility indices Art and Aˆrt are calculated using the ward employment
data from BSD and the ward-to-ward travel times in years 1998-2008 using the ex-
pressions (2.2) and (2.3). The second component in the accessibility index is then
an origin-destination (O–D) matrix containing the costs crjt (journey time) between
each origin and destination (the ward centroid). This matrix is required for all the
years of our sample. To calculate travel times we construct GIS-networks for every
year between 1998 and 2008. We do this by combining the dataset on road schemes
described in section 2.5.1 and two GIS-networks (for years 2003 and 2008) for Great
Britain provided by the Department of Transport (DfT).
The 2008 GIS-network contains all the major road links existing at the beginning
of 2008. It includes all major roads that, according to the DfT, cover roughly 65%
of vehicle kilometres. The network includes information on several characteristics
of the road links: the count point code (CP) of each road section (which helps is
to identify the links and refers to the point where the traffic is counted), the grid
reference for the traffic count point, a unique reference for the local and national
transport authorities which manage the link, the road to which the link belongs to
(number and type), the maximum permitted speed, the total length of network road
link in kilometres and the traffic total flows19. Total flow is defined as the “Annual
18This is due to the lack of available data on population at the ward level on an annual basis.
19More information in http://www.dft.gov.uk/matrix/estimates.aspx.
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Average Daily Flow” (AADF) and it is measured in terms of number of vehicles. It
corresponds to the average over a full year of the number of vehicles passing a point
in the road network each day.
We use road construction as the source of variation in travel times over time.
We geo-locate all the road links belonging to each of the 31 schemes listed in table
2.1 and we match them to the 2008 road network based on their CP code. Starting
from the 2008 network, in every year we remove the new links opened in that year
in order to reconstruct the network as it was in years prior to 2008. We construct a
network at the beginning of each year of the period 1998-2008. The road network
consists of roughly 17,000 road links annually. These networks contain the links
existing every year. In order to construct Art and Aˆrt we need to calculate the cost
of crossing those links crjt, which we define based on travel times.
In order to calculate travel times, we use data on traffic speeds from the 2003 gen-
eralised primary road GIS-network provided by DfT. Traffic speeds are modeled
from traffic flow census data using the Road Capacity and Costs Model (FORGE)
component of the National Transport Model (NTM). The National Transport Model
provides “a means of comparing the national consequences of alternative national
transport policies or widely-applied local transport policies, against a range of back-
ground scenarios which take into account the major factors affecting future patterns
of travel”. It is used to produce forecasts on traffic flows in order to design trans-
port policies20. The Road Capacity and Costs Model is one of the three sub-models
included in the NTM and it corresponds to the highway supply module.
The Road Capacity and Costs Model (FORGE) is used to show the impact of
road schemes and other road-based policies21. As explained in the documentation22:
”The inputs to the Road Capacity and Costs Model are car traffic growth (based on
growth in car driver trips) and growth in vehicle-miles from other vehicle types.
This traffic growth is applied to a database of base year traffic levels to give future
“demand” traffic flows. These are compared to the capacity on each link, and res-
ulting traffic speeds are calculated from speed/flow relationships (which link traffic
volumes, road capacity and speed) for each of 19 time periods through a typical
week”. One of the outputs of FORGE is therefore vehicle speeds by road type, and
this is what we use in the calculation of travel times between wards.
We use journey times, obtained from FORGE, in the non-busy direction aver-
aged over all time periods between Monday-Friday 08:00 and 18:00. We focus on
non-busy travel directions because the busy travel directions are, in principle, more
sensitive to changes in congestion induced by new travel links. In practice, there
20See http://www2.dft.gov.uk/pgr/economics/ntm/ for more information.
21See http://www.rudi.net/files/FORGE.pdf for more information.
22See http://www2.dft.gov.uk/pgr/economics/ntm/pdfntmoverview.pdf for more
information
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are only minor differences between the modeled journey times in the busy and non-
busy directions, or between averages over the working day and full 24-hour periods
(see Gibbons et al., 2011, for more details). Due to data limitations, we use journey
times in 2003 for the whole period 1998-2008. These speeds are based on traffic flows
for 2003, and we keep these constant for all years in the sample.
For links opened after 2003 we use estimated journey times from a regression
model using a dataset of over 17,000 links in the 2003 network. We regressed link
speeds from the 2003 FORGE network on speed limit dummies, traffic flows, traffic
flows squared, road category dummies (six categories) and local authority dum-
mies23. The regression predicts speeds from the FORGE reasonably well (R-squared
= 0.76). We then used the results to predict travel times for links opened after 2003
for which no FORGE speed is available. To obtain these predictions we use the link
characteristics and traffic flows.
We are interested in using the variation in accessibility which stems from road
construction, which is how we capture changes transport investments. Therefore
in the calculation of predicted traffic speeds we need to avoid using endogenous
changes in traffic flows that could be induced by road construction. For the links
existing in 2003 we use the FORGE modeled speeds provided by the Department of
Transport, which are calculated using 2003 traffic flows. For the links after 2003 we
use 2008 flows. These are available for all the links constructed after 2003 because
they were provided in the 2008 GIS-network. Alternatively we could use annual
traffic flows on the year of opening on the link24. However, in order to avoid en-
dogenous traffic flow changes, we prefer to use traffic flows for the same year in all
the new links, and the only year in which this is possible is 2008. For some of the
links, the prediction exceeded travel time implied by the speed limit. We replaced
predicted speed with the speed limit for these links.
Some of the road schemes in the Highways Agency data are bypasses around
villages and small towns (type 2 improvements in table 2.1). Typically, before the
bypass was opened there was a primary road through the village or town but after
the introduction of the bypass the old road was downgraded. The downgrading of
the old road implies that it is not present in our 2008 primary road network. Hence,
using the method of deleting links based on their opening years would create an
artificial break in the primary road network, when it comes to bypasses. Therefore,
we keep the bypasses in the network in the pre-opening years and assume that travel
time on the bypass before opening year was twice the post opening travel time.
Scheme evaluation reports available to us support the assumption of significantly
longer travel time through the village/town before the bypass is opened.
23The results of this regression are available on request.
24which are available in http://www.dft.gov.uk/matrix/Search.aspx.
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After constructing the generalised traffic networks of each year, we use the net-
work analysis algorithms in ESRI ArcGIS R© to compute least-cost (minimum journey
time) routes between each origin ward j and destination ward k in years 1998-2008.
When computing the O-D matrix we apply a limit of 75 minute drive time. This
limit facilitates O-D matrix computation but does not affect the value of accessibil-
ity index because wards beyond 75 minutes would have negligible weights in the
calculation of Art.
Table 2.3 contains summary statistics for the travel times between wards for year
1998-2008. The number of O–D crossings is over 9,000,000 in every year. Over the
period, the average travel time between two wards decreased 0.55%.
Year Number of Mean Standard 1
st 10th 90th 99th
observations deviation percentile percentile percentile percentile
1998 9,170,886 49.826 17.534 6.685 24.148 70.958 74.605
1999 9,170,886 49.809 17.524 6.684 24.145 70.922 74.600
2000 9,170,886 49.788 17.518 6.684 24.139 70.905 74.598
2001 9,170,886 49.745 17.515 6.681 24.104 70.872 74.593
2002 9,170,886 49.745 17.515 6.681 24.104 70.872 74.593
2003 9,170,886 49.735 17.512 6.679 24.099 70.859 74.591
2004 9,170,886 49.613 17.476 6.674 24.049 70.724 74.573
2005 9,170,886 49.597 17.471 6.672 24.044 70.704 74.571
2006 9,170,886 49.591 17.469 6.672 24.043 70.696 74.569
2007 9,170,886 49.575 17.463 6.672 24.037 70.675 74.566
2008 9,170,886 49.554 17.457 6.669 24.025 70.645 74.560
Growth 1998-2008 -0.55% -0.44% -0.23% -0.51% -0.44% -0.06%
Times in minutes. Min=0 and Max=75 mins. Times measured at the beginning of the year. Sources: Department of Transport
and own authors’ calculation.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics O–D matrices of travel times – 1998-2008
It should be noted that the network is highly generalised. Journeys via the
minor road network are not modeled. Forbidden turns and one way systems are
not modeled. All link intersections are treated as junctions. The changes in access-
ibility must therefore be regarded as approximate. This might have implications in
the estimation of the effect of accessibility on economic outcomes if it induces meas-
urement error in the accessibility indices calculation. Hence, our estimates could be
too small due to attenuation bias. In this case, we should interpret any effect as a
lower bound of the “real” effect.
2.5.2.4 Accessibility changes arising from transport improvements
Accessibility indices Art and Aˆrt can be applied to study the economic effects arising
from changing accessibility by road when the costs crjt in (2.2) and (2.3) are calcu-
lated using routing along the transport network. This works because transport im-
provements change the structure of costs crjt along the transport network and the
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structure of costs along routes from r to potential destinations j. This in turn changes
the accessibility index.
For example, consider a transport improvement that involves a journey time re-
duction on a road link between two nodes p and q. This scheme has a first order
effect on the costs of the least-cost route between r and j if:
(a) the least-cost route between r and j passes along the link p–q in both the pre and
post-improvement periods, such that the transport improvement reduces the
cost of the journey along p–q and brings employment at destination j “closer”
to origin r in cost terms.
(b) the least-cost route between r and j bypasses link p–q in the pre-improvement
period, but switches to use the link p–q in the post-improvement period because
of the reduction in costs; again this brings employment at destination j “closer”
to origin r in cost terms.
There are also “second order” effects arising when:
(c) the least cost route between r and j bypasses link p–q in the pre-improvement
and in the post-improvement periods. However, journeys between other origin
and destination pairs have switched to using the link p–q, which reduces con-
gestion on the alternative links in the network used by the routing between r
and j; again this brings employment at destination j “closer” to origin r in cost
terms.
In the empirical work of chapters 3 and 4 below we rely only on the first order
effects of type (a) and (b) arising from new transport infrastructure. We have to
ignore second order effects of type (c) because, as explained in the previous section,
our road transport network data does not allow us to observe changes in travel time
induced by changes in congestion occurring as a result of transport improvements
(we have no information on traffic flows observed prior to the improvements).
Changes in cost of all these types imply changes in the accessibility indices (i.e.
a change in effective density). The amount of change in the accessibility index at a
location j depends on the likelihood that a route between r and j uses the improved
link p–q, and on economic mass in j. Our methodology uses the changes in the
accessibility index at each location r to estimate the extent to which wards and indi-
viduals in location r are “potentially” affected. In this sense, our measure (changes
in accessibility) captures the “intention-to-treat”.
2.5.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.4 summarises the changes in the log of accessibility between 1998 and 2008.
In the upper panel the accessibility measure is calculated fixing employment at 1997
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levels (Aˆrt), so that all the variation in accessibility comes from changes in the road
network. In the lower panel we calculate the accessibility allowing both employ-
ment and road infrastructure to vary (Art). The middle panel fixes travel times at
the beginning of the period (1998) so the variation in accessibility comes from relo-
cation of employment across space. This measure is similar to the standard “market-
access” measures calculated using geodesic distance. The table shows the growth
in three types of accessibility indices for all the wards (10,540) and for wards which
are situated within 10, 20 and 30 kilometres of the road schemes carried out during
the period of analysis.
Wards Mean
Standard 90th Maximum Proportion
deviation percentile value of zeroes
1997 employment and time-varying travel times
All 10,540 0.470% 1.920% 0.940% 51.110% 31.870%
10 kms 1,389 2.110% 4.520% 5.370% 51.110% 5.030%
20 kms 3,350 1.230% 3.240% 2.800% 51.110% 5.820%
30 kms 4,853 0.950% 2.750% 1.960% 51.110% 5.680%
Time-varying employment and 1998 travel times
All 10,540 7.170% 7.870% 13.500% 137.070% 0.000%
10 kms 1,389 5.280% 5.150% 10.350% 52.060% 0.000%
20 kms 3,350 5.480% 5.080% 10.470% 67.040% 0.000%
30 kms 4,853 5.690% 5.020% 10.810% 67.040% 0.000%
Time-varying employment and time-varying travel times
All 10,540 7.640% 8.150% 14.080% 137.070% 0.000%
10 kms 1,389 7.410% 7.570% 14.450% 62.960% 0.070%
20 kms 3,350 6.720% 6.530% 12.540% 67.090% 0.030%
30 kms 4,853 6.650% 6.090% 12.390% 67.090% 0.020%
Sources: Department of Transport, BSD and own authors’ calculations
Table 2.4: Summary statistics change log of accessibility between 1998 and 2008
The upper panel of table 2.4 shows that employment accessibility induced by
road improvements was on average small, only 0.5% (which is very similar to the
decrease in travel times observed in table 2.3 above). However, average accessibility
change increases significantly when we focus on wards closer to improvements. For
example, within the 10-kilometre distance band the mean change is 2.11% and the
90th percentile is 5.37%. As we expand the sample away from the schemes changes
in accessibility tend to fall. Within 20 kilometres, mean accessibility change is 1.23%
and the 90th percentile is 2.8%. Within 30 kilometres of the schemes mean access-
ibility change is 0.95% and the 90th percentile is 1.96%. It is worth noting that the
standard variation of the changes is relatively large.
The lower panel of table 2.4 shows that accessibility employment dynamics are
a more important driver of variation in effective density than road improvements.
This is confirmed if we observe the changes in the middle panel, which focus on the
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variation on accessibility driven by employment relocation. Nevertheless, variation
due to road improvements is non-negligible relative to overall changes.
Wards Mean
Standard 90th Maximum Proportion
deviation percentile value of zeroes
2001 employment and time-varying travel times
All 10,540 0.300% 1.630% 0.570% 52.370% 42.880%
10 kms 862 2.440% 5.140% 5.930% 52.370% 9.860%
20 kms 2,453 1.120% 3.230% 2.400% 52.370% 11.290%
30 kms 3,888 0.790% 2.620% 1.650% 52.370% 10.650%
Time-varying employment and 2002 travel times
All 10,540 13.430% 5.270% 18.330% 80.230% 0.000%
10 kms 862 12.370% 3.800% 15.610% 32.180% 0.000%
20 kms 2,453 12.570% 4.090% 15.940% 56.830% 0.000%
30 kms 3,888 12.570% 3.810% 16.000% 56.830% 0.000%
Time-varying employment and time-varying travel times
All 10,540 13.740% 5.470% 18.700% 80.230% 0.000%
10 kms 862 0.420% 6.450% 19.850% 72.910% 0.000%
20 kms 2,453 13.710% 5.220% 17.590% 72.910% 0.000%
30 kms 3,888 13.370% 4.630% 17.120% 72.910% 0.000%
Sources: Department of Transport, BSD and own authors’ calculations
Table 2.5: Summary statistics change log of accessibility between 2002 and 2008
Due to limitations in the availability of some of the variables of the survey used
in the obtention of the empirical results of chapter 4 we exploit data from 2002 to
2008. For this reason, we also computed indices (2.2) and (2.3) using 2001 as the
base year for the calculation of Aˆrt. The summary statistics for the change in log
of accessibility between 2002 and 2008 are displayed in table 2.5. They are very
similar to those of table 2.4: overall change in accessibility stemming from road
improvements (top panel) is relatively small (0.3%), but it increases substantially
when we restrict our sample to wards which are located close to improvements
carried out between 2002 and 2008. As before, most of the variation in changes in
overall accessibility (bottom panel) stems from employment changes across wards.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the magnitude of the changes in accessibility. In fact,
we use annual variation in accessibility in the estimation of the empirical results in
the following chapters. Tables B.5 to B.8 in the appendix provide summary stat-
istics on the level of log accessibility and on the average within-ward variation in
log accessibility for 1998-2008 and the sub-period 2002-2008. Tables B.7 and B.8 are
specially useful because they show the variation that we exploit in the fixed-effects
regression analysis undertaken in the following chapters.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrates the spatial relationship between road schemes and
resulting accessibility increases. Figure 2.2 shows the changes in log accessibility
between 1998 and 2008 using annual employment Art, while figure 2.3 shows the
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Figure 2.2: Changes in log accessibility (annual employment) – 1998-2008
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Figure 2.3: Changes in log accessibility (1997 employment) – 1998-2008
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changes in log accessibility which stem only from road improvements (Aˆrt). The
biggest changes in accessibility are around the schemes plotted in figure 2.1, but
there is substantial spatial variation across the country.
The amount of spatial variation is more evident in figure 2.4. It focuses on the
Manchester-Leeds area and allows us to illustrate the identification strategy (which
is explained below). The thin light white lines show the primary road network in
2008. New links and significant improvements between 1998 and 2007 are indicated
by bold lines, with the year of opening and the name of the road labeled. The dark
grey lines are ward boundaries. The map illustrates that the effects of road improve-
ments on accessibility vary considerably across wards in the vicinity of the same im-
provement. We argue that these differences in accessibility changes across wards are
coincidental and can be treated as exogenous, especially when controlling for differ-
ential time trends near different schemes25. This relates to the identification strategy
used to tackle the endogeneity of transport investment placements explained below.
2.6 Endogeneity issues and identification
In the following two chapters we estimate the impact of accessibility on several
ward-level and individual economic outcomes. As our aim is to be able to estim-
ate causal relationships, a correct identification of the estimated parameters of the
accessibility effects is crucial. In this section we illustrate the general identification
strategy followed in chapters 3 and 4.
For example for the aggregate economic outcomes we estimate the specification:
yrt = βArt + µr + τt + εrt (2.4)
where yrt is the economic outcome of ward r at time t, Art is the log of the ac-
cessibility to employment of ward r at time t, τt capture common shocks affecting
accessibility and the economic outcome of study of all wards in a given year and εrt
is the idiosyncratic error term.
For the correct identification of parameter β, there are three endogeneity con-
cerns which may challenge the validity of the estimates. Firstly, cross-sectional es-
timates of the effect of accessibility on economic outcomes could be biased if the
model does not capture underlying factors (such as place specific productive ad-
vantages) that affect both effective density and economic outcomes. We use a fixed-
effects estimation method to address this problem (by including µr in the aggreg-
ate outcomes estimations, and individual firm or worker fixed-effect in the indi-
25For completeness, the same maps but using the changes between 2002 and 2008 are provided in
the appendix (figures B.1, B.2 and B.3)
103
!!
!
200
61999
2000
200
5
2004
2003 M1
M60
A63
A1(
M)
A650 LeedsBradford
Manchester
0 10 20 30 405 Kms
Ü
Changes 1998-2008
0.00% - 0.05%
0.051% - 0.50%
0.501% - 5.00%
5.001% - 51.11%
Figure 2.4: Changes in log accessibility (1997 employment) – 1998-2008
104
vidual outcomes estimations). When we use fixed-effects we exploit the within
ward/individual variation over time. However, in the fixed effects framework,
changes in accessibility can arise because of road improvements and because em-
ployment relocates.
The second endogeneity issue is that accessibility changes due to relocation of
employment may be partly driven by the outcome variable studied or be correlated
with the same unobserved shocks. As discussed above, to address this source of
bias, we construct an instrument which uses accessibility changes stemming only
from the transport improvements. In practice, we instrument Art with Aˆrt.
Finally, in order to reduce the possible bias caused by the endogeneity of the
placement of the transport investments, we focus on observations which are located
in wards within 10, 20 or 30 kilometres of road schemes. This way, we compare
firms and locations which are close to the improvements and we exploit the fact
that the impact of the improvements varies considerably even within the distance
band. As illustrated by figures 2.4 and B.3 and explained above, there is a substan-
tial amount of variation in the changes of accessibility around the improvements. It
is quite unlikely that the improvements are aimed at specific individuals or wards
within those narrowly defined distance bands, specially after controlling for differ-
ent growth trends around the schemes.
2.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have set out the reasons why there is a need to provide causal
estimates of the effects of roads on economic outcomes in the UK context. Transport
infrastructure projects require large amounts of funding so the correct identification
of their impacts is key. Traditional evaluation of transport projects does not fully
account for the potential economic benefits of improvements. Moreover, given that
the theoretical predictions of the impacts of transport on economic outcomes are am-
biguous, robust empirical evidence is necessary to learn about the channels through
which transport affects workers and firms.
We focus on road improvements and use a measure of accessibility to employ-
ment to capture the effects that road construction has on economic outcomes. In this
chapter we have explained in detail why we consider this measure appropriate for
the UK context and have provided details of its construction. The use of micro-data
and small geography allows us to implement a careful identification strategy which
helps overcome a number of endogeneity issues. In the following chapter we estim-
ate the effect that changes in accessibility has on aggregate economic outcomes (at
ward level) and on individual outcomes, both for firms (chapter 3) and for workers
(chapter 4).
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Chapter 3
Economic Impacts of Transport Policy:
Aggregate and firm outcomes
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present and analyse the results of the impact of accessibility on ag-
gregate outcomes and on firms. As explained in chapter 2, transport improvements
can affect aggregate and firm outcomes through several channels. A reduction of
transport costs due to road improvements can affect the demand for inputs and out-
puts that firms face, and, depending on the price response, the input mix and output
might be affected.
If workers bargain down their wages due to the increased competition in the
labour markets, firms might take advantage of the improved accessibility by em-
ploying more workers. If firms benefit from economies of scale, if the amount of
inputs firms employ changes, labour productivity might be affected as output re-
sponds. Alternatively, firms could experience positive externalities from increased
accessibility in the form of agglomeration economies, which could have an impact
on total factor productivity (Gibbons & Overman, 2009).
At the aggregate level, ward employment could be affected if firms change the
amount of labour they employ or if the number of plants in the ward changes. Trans-
port improvements can affect the local number of plants in two ways. Better con-
nectivity can improve firms productivity allowing the plants to survive when in
other conditions they would have existed the market. Conversely, if spatial compet-
ition increases some firms might exit the market. If the firms that stay in the market
are the ones which have higher productivity (Melitz, 2003), aggregate productivity
might increase.
In this chapter we test these predictions using individual firm micro-data and ag-
gregate data at a very small geographical scale (wards). We use British data during
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the period 1998-2008. We capture the effect of road improvements using a measure
of accessibility to employment (effective density), as explained in detail in the pre-
vious chapter. Our main approach is to estimate aggregate effects of accessibility
for small spatial units (wards) taking into account firm exit, entry and geograph-
ical relocation. In addition, we estimate firm level effects for existing firms exposed
to different changes in accessibility. We take advantage of the rich datasets and the
small geographical scale to tackle the endogeneity issues which challenge the causal
interpretation of our results.
In section 3.2 we describe the data used in the empirical exercises. In section
3.3 we discuss the results for the local economic outcomes. We present results on
ward employment and number of plants (section 3.3.2) and for ward productivity
(section 3.3.3). In section 3.4 we present the results on the individual firms outcomes,
focusing on employment (section 3.4.2) and productivity (section 3.4.3). Finally, in
section 3.5 we conclude.
3.2 Data
To calculate aggregate employment and the number of establishments within each
ward we use the Business Structure Database (BSD) for the period of analysis. These
aggregates are used as dependent variables in the estimation of the ward-level em-
ployment effects discussed in 3.3.1, and aggregated employment is used to calculate
the accessibility measures as described in the previous chapter. Details on this data-
set are also given in the previous chapter.
For the productivity regressions, we use the Annual Respondents Database (ARD).
The ARD holds responses to the Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). The ABI is a strati-
fied random sample, extracted from the BSD. The ABI is a comprehensive business
survey covering balance-sheet information like gross value added, gross output,
wages, intermediate inputs, employment, industry, and investment. We use this in-
formation and the EU KLEMS Deflators (base 1995) to express the firm balance-sheet
data in real terms. Although the ARD only contains a sample of small businesses,
being a census of large businesses it contains information on firms which cover a
large fraction of employment (for example 90% of UK manufacturing employment).
We combine the balance-sheet data from ARD with capital stock data in order
to study firm-level productivity effects. The capital stock variable is built from the
gross investment flows using a perpetual inventory method and allowing for differ-
ential depreciation rates across the three main asset classes (equipment, structures
and vehicles), available at the ONS-Business Data Linkage laboratory and construc-
ted by the Centre for Research into Business Activity (CeRIBA). Capital stock is
available only until 2004, which limits the sample period in the productivity regres-
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sions to 1998–2004. For the plant level employment regressions we do not need data
on capital and use a longer panel of the ARD which also covers more plants. We use
data of plant employment between 1998 and 2008.
As noted by Criscuolo et al. (2003), a number of issues arise when deciding the
level of aggregation at which to work. ARD reports information for both “local
units” (LU) and “reporting units” (RU). Balanced-sheet data is available at the RU
level, while location and employment is available at the LU level. Questions related
to employment can be investigated at LU level, since reporting units with several
plants report on several local units that may be located in different wards.
The correct aggregation unit for productivity analysis is more difficult. Pro-
ductivity and technology of production might vary across local units, across re-
porting units or indeed within local or reporting units. Hence, strong assumptions
would be needed in order to calculate TFP at the plant level (we would need to
apportion the RU balance-sheet information across the LU which belong to it, for
example based on their share of employment). This may be problematic, and hence,
our main regressions use a sample of single plant firms for which the firm-level and
the plant-level coincide. We test the robustness of the findings to the inclusion of
multi-plant firms in the sample.
To construct the ward level background characteristics used as control variables
we use information from the Census 2001 provided by CASWEB1. We calculate the
share of population aged 15-64 with higher education, mean age of population,
share of population living on social housing and the rate of unemployment. We
also use straight line distance to the nearest improvement (undertaken at any point
in time during our period of study) calculated using GIS and the dataset of transport
improvements described in chapter 2.
3.3 Effects on aggregate outcomes
We use regression analyses to estimate the average effect of accessibility by road on
the scale of economic activity and productivity at the ward level. We have detailed
geographical information on the location of the plants (postcodes). A UK postcode
unit corresponds to a limited number of addresses (around 14) or a single large
delivery point.
We aggregate the data up to electoral ward level, which leaves us with around
10,500 geographical units. A ward in the Great Britain is an electoral district at sub-
national level and it is the primary unit of British administrative and electoral geo-
graphy. In England, the London boroughs, the metropolitan boroughs and the non-
1CASWEB is provided by the Census Dissemination Unit (CDU), which is based within MIMAS at
the University of Manchester. See http://cdu.mimas.ac.uk/index.htm for more information.
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metropolitan districts (including most unitary authorities) are divided into wards
for local elections. The same applies to Welsh communities and to Scotland. Wards
include roughly the same number of electors. We use the ward as defined in 1998,
the first year of our study.
This unit is small, especially in dense areas. For example, the City of London
(which is a single local authority) contains approximately 25 wards. The advantage
of using wards as the geographical units is that they are very small spatial units,
which allows us to identify phenomena that would be unobservable at a higher
geographical level. The detailed spatial scale is also crucial for our identification
strategy that uses spatial variation in the accessibility increases in the vicinity of
road schemes.
For most of the results we use data for 11 years, 1998 to 2008. For these years we
have the relevant firm data and can construct the accessibility measures. For total
factor productivity regressions we use 7 years of data (1998–2004) due to the lack of
data on capital stock in later years.
3.3.1 Empirical specification and identification strategy
We estimate the effect of accessibility to employment on three aggregated outcomes:
ward employment, ward number of plants and ward total factor productivity. For
the two first outcome variables we use a standard panel data fixed effects approach.
For total factor productivity we use a two-step approach in which we first estimate
yearly ward level productivity shifters and then regress them on accessibility in the
second step. This is discussed in details in this section.
3.3.1.1 Employment and number of plants
Initially, the empirical model for employment and the number of plants is:
yrt = βArt + τt + εrt (3.1)
where yrt is the economic outcome of ward r at time t (log of ward employment or
log of number of plants), Art is the log of the accessibility to employment along the
road network (as defined in the previous chapter) of ward r at time t. Year fixed
effects τt capture general changes that influence all locations in the study area in a
given year (e.g. macro shocks). Finally, εirt is the idiosyncratic error term.
We are interested in the correct estimation of parameter β, which is the elasticity
of employment/number of plants with respect to accessibility. We use OLS as our
first specification. Traditional estimates of the effects of accessibility are often based
on ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of models like (3.1).
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The OLS estimates are biased if unobserved area effects are correlated with ac-
cessibility – if for example, and as seems likely, better transport connections and
higher employment density have evolved in places with productive advantages. To
account for this we include ward fixed effects µr in specification (3.1), which capture
the time-invariant heterogeneity of wards:
yrt = βArt + µr + τt + εrt (3.2)
A first step to eliminating these biases is to eliminate fixed-over-time ward effects
µr by time-demeaning the data within wards (so called within transformation). The
within transformation is obtained by first averaging the equation (3.2) over time and
then subtracting the ward averages from equation (3.2):
(yrt − y¯r.) = β (Art − A¯r.) + τt + ξrt (3.3)
where y¯r. and A¯r. are ward averages of the outcome and of log accessibility over
the time period (1998-2008), τt are year dummies which capture shocks affecting the
variation over the ward means and ξrt = (εrt − ε¯r.). This way the ward fixed effects
disappear and the estimates are robust to time-invariant ward heterogeneity that can
be arbitrarily correlated with accessibility. This formulation is a starting point for
evaluating the effects of transport policy on firms, because transport improvements
generate changes in Art over time.
We prefer the within transformation to first differencing because first differen-
cing assumes instantaneous responses to accessibility changes while within estima-
tion allows for a more flexible time pattern for the effect. For example, if we have
ten years of data and accessibility in a ward changes in the fifth year, the within
estimator will be based on the comparison of the value of y in years 1-5 to year 6-10
whereas the first differenced estimator compares changes between years 5 and 6 to
changes in other years. If the response to the accessibility change take longer than a
year, the first differenced estimates will be biased downwards. The within estimator
is better suited for capturing slow and gradual changes.
In general, the variation in accessibility over time within wards (Art− A¯r.) could
come through changes in the spatial distribution of employment, or because of
changes in the transport network. Changes in accessibility due to the relocation
of employment across space may be directly affected by the outcome variable or
correlated with unobserved shocks in the error term of (3.3), which may lead to bias
in the estimation.
To address the issue of endogenous determination of accessibility, we instru-
ment accessibility index Art (that varies within wards due to changes in both em-
ployment and transport network) with the measure, denoted by Aˆrt, which only
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picks up changes in the transport network. We calculate the accessibility based on
the pre-improvement spatial distribution of employment (year 1997). Details on the
construction of these measures are given in chapter 2. We estimate (3.3) by two-stage
least squares using this as an instrument for actual changes in accessibility.
The instrumental variable (IV) estimates from (3.3) could produce biased estim-
ates of the aggregate effects of transport improvements, if areas with increasing
or declining employment trends are those that experience the greatest accessibility
changes due to road improvements. This implies that ξrt in equation (3.3) is correl-
ated with the instrument. The usual reason to suspect this kind of problem is the
possibility that transport policy is endogenous to the employment and productivity
trends in the targeted locations, i.e. the decision to improve the transport network
might be partly driven by productivity trends.
We address this potential source of bias by focusing the empirical analysis on
places and firms that are close to the transport improvement sites. In the results
section below we present estimates for samples within 20 kilometres of the sites
of improvement (10 kilometres and 30 kilometres used in robustness checks). In
this way we are comparing closely neighbouring places that differ incrementally
in terms of the changes in accessibility they experience as a result of the road net-
work improvements. We assume that these differences in changes in accessibility
close to transport schemes are an incidental by-product of the scheme rather than
its intended outcome. The main changes in mean travel times and employment ac-
cessibility occur close to the end points of new road schemes, although they are typ-
ically intended to improve the flow of traffic between cities or areas further away
from the improvement. There are also often long delays between commissioning
and opening of road schemes, which would weaken any link between pre-existing
local employment or productivity trends and the decisions over where to site these
projects.
In order to ensure that the instrument is uncorrelated with the underlying trends,
we further control for differential trends in the vicinity of road schemes in our final
specification. This is done by including a set of scheme dummies (31 schemes) in-
teracted with year in equation (3.3). Lastly, we test for the robustness of the results
to the inclusion of salient ward characteristics (straight line distance to closest road
scheme, employment rate, average age, proportion of population aged 16-74 with
higher education and proportion of population living on social housing). The area
characteristics are measured in one year and do not change over time in our data
but we interact them with time, which implies that the trend is allowed to differ by
ward characteristics. We acknowledge that this robustness check is very demanding
and may pick up some of the effect of road improvements, especially if the impact
of road schemes is gradual in nature.
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Note, that this estimation strategy ignores whether or not the specific firms or
their employees or customers in fact make any use of the road network that has been
put in place. The effects that are estimated are thus analogous to “intention to treat”
estimates in the programme evaluation literature, and are the expected productivity
changes for firms or areas exposed to the treatment (change in employment access-
ibility by road).
3.3.1.2 Aggregate productivity
The above strategy is used for employment and number of plants. When estimating
the effect of accessibility on total factor productivity at the ward level we use a two-
step procedure. The first step uses firm level micro data to estimate a production
function model of the form:
yirt = αKit + δLit + ρMit + γrt + νirt (3.4)
The dependent variable yirt is the log of gross output of plant i in ward t in year
t, Kit denotes the log of the capital stock of the plant, Lit is the log employment of the
plant, Mit is the log of intermediate inputs used, γrt are ward-by-year fixed effects
to be estimated and νirt is the error term2.
In the second step, we regress the estimated ward-by-year effects (averaged over
all firms in a given ward in a given year) on the accessibility variable. Again, our
first specification is a simple OLS regression. We estimate the equation:
γˆrt = βArt + τt + εrt (3.5)
where γˆrt are the estimated ward-by-year TFP residual, Art is accessibility of ward
r at time t, τt are year dummies and εrt is the error term.
As before, we add ward fixed-effects µr to control for unobservable time-invariant
characteristics correlated with accessibility and ward productivity. Equation 3.5 be-
comes:
γˆrt = βArt + µr + τt + εrt (3.6)
Next, we use time demeaning to eliminate fixed-over-time area effects as in (3.3), i.e.
2The estimation of production functions like (3.4) can be affected by simultaneity bias. This prob-
lem would arise if the firm choice of inputs depends on unobserved productivity shocks, which are
correlated with the inputs and the output at the same time. This would cause the input quantit-
ies Kit, Lit and Mit to be correlated with the error term νirt. Authors like Olley & Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) have proposed methodologies to deal with this issue. We experimented
with these methods, but the estimated α, δ and ρ changed very little so the results in the second step
remained unchanged. Moreover, different methods tend to produce results where the correlation of
TFP estimated by different methods is usually high (see ?).
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we estimate:
(γˆrt − ¯ˆγ.t) = β (Art − A¯r.) + τt + ξrt (3.7)
using a panel of wards between 1998 and 2008.
In order to address the potential endogeneity of effective density in (3.7), we use
the IV strategy outlined above. Targeting of transport improvements is addressed
by limiting the estimating sample to wards located within 20 kilometres of road
schemes and controlling for differential trends around schemes.
The advantage of the two-step procedure compared with a regression with ward
level aggregates is that, in the two-step method, the ward-year fixed effects γrt con-
trol for a wide range of time-varying ward specific factors and the coefficients on
capital, labour and intermediate inputs will be less biased than in a ward level ag-
gregate regression. As a result, also the coefficient on accessibility will be more
reliable in the two-step method.
3.3.2 Results: employment and number of plants
The first regression results, presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2, are estimates of the ef-
fect of log accessibility to employment on ward log of employment and log of the
number of plants. For these regressions we use the BSD data. Standard errors are
clustered at the ward level to allow for arbitrary correlation across time.
The tables display the results using data on wards within 20 kilometres of road
schemes and contain four different model specifications. The tables show the coef-
ficient on employment accessibility, its standard error, the number of observations
used, and the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat (first stage) for the IV specifications. Table B.9
shows descriptive statistics of the main variables used within the 10-20-30 kilometre
distance bands (descriptives for the accessibility indices and for ward employment
and number of plants).
In table 3.1, the first panel uses total employment (all sectors combined) and
lower panels show results by five broad sectors (manufacturing, construction, con-
sumer services, producer services and other)3. The first specification is a simple
OLS regression which neglects all endogeneity issues. The OLS coefficients are pos-
itive and significant across the board indicating that wards with higher employment
tend to have better accessibility. In the second column, we add ward fixed effects
3We use the 1992 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) at 2 digits to define the 5 wide
industrial categories. Manufacturing includes sector codes 15 to 37; construction includes sec-
tor codes 40, 41 and 45; consumer services includes sector codes 50 to 59; producer services
includes sector codes 65 to 74. Other includes the rest, including primary activity, public sec-
tor, transport and other sectors. More information can be found in http://www.ons.gov.
uk/ons/guide-method/classifications/archived-standard-classifications/
uk-standard-industrial-classification-1992--sic92-/index.html.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.426*** 0.260*** 0.155 0.195*
Std. error 0.021 0.06 0.106 0.106
No. observations 36740 36740 36740 36740
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8732 13260
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.247*** 0.635*** 0.791*** 0.473
Std. error 0.036 0.185 0.292 0.306
No. observations 36136 36136 36135 36135
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 9004 14387
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.217*** 0.297* 0.541** 0.518**
Std. error 0.023 0.173 0.243 0.235
No. observations 36684 36684 36684 36684
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8789 13277
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.435*** 0.149* 0.217 0.076
Std. error 0.024 0.087 0.178 0.185
No. observations 36739 36739 36739 36739
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8732 13260
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.734*** 0.586*** 0.979*** 0.618**
Std. error 0.028 0.124 0.265 0.259
No. observations 36719 36719 36719 36719
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8729 13251
OTHER
Coefficient 0.347*** 0.126 0.065 0.13
Std. error 0.02 0.089 0.14 0.142
No. observations 36740 36740 36740 36740
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8732 13260
Distance band 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Ward FE YES YES YES
IV YES YES
Scheme trends YES
Sources: BSD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at ward level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
Table 3.1: Ward level employment results
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.338*** 0.105*** 0.190*** 0.135***
Std. error 0.016 0.03 0.055 0.05
No. observations 36762 36762 36762 36762
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8733 13256
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.323*** 0.323*** 0.522*** 0.185
Std. error 0.02 0.101 0.161 0.169
No. observations 36167 36167 36166 36166
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 9003 14381
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.151*** 0.220*** 0.344*** 0.226*
Std. error 0.017 0.074 0.119 0.117
No. observations 36709 36709 36709 36709
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8788 13271
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.375*** 0.099** 0.104 -0.012
Std. error 0.018 0.049 0.084 0.078
No. observations 36761 36761 36761 36761
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8733 13256
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.582*** 0.269*** 0.732*** 0.406***
Std. error 0.02 0.08 0.149 0.141
No. observations 36742 36742 36742 36742
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8730 13247
OTHER
Coefficient 0.156*** 0.034 0.059 0.147*
Std. error 0.016 0.042 0.077 0.075
No. observations 36762 36762 36762 36762
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 8733 13256
Distance band 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Ward FE YES YES YES
IV YES YES
Scheme trends YES
Sources: BSD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at ward level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
Table 3.2: Ward level number of plants results
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to control for time-invariant ward specific factors. All the coefficients remain sig-
nificant and positive except the one for other sectors. However, the coefficients for
construction and consumer services become significant only at the 10% significance
level. The coefficients for total employment, construction, consumer and producer
services are reduced with respect to the OLS estimates, while for manufacturing the
coefficient more than doubles in size.
The third column uses the instrumental variable strategy. Accessibility index
Aˆrt, which keeps ward employment fixed at the 1997 level and only varies due to
road improvements, is used as an instrument for actual accessibility Art. The first
stage F statistics indicate that the instrument is very strong. Accessibility is now
positive and significant for manufacturing, construction and producer services, but
insignificant for total employment. The estimated coefficients are larger than those
in column 2. This would suggest that the fixed-effect estimates of column 2 are
downward biased and the instrument is correcting for this. The downward bias
could be due to accessibility growing faster in wards experiencing negative shocks
to employment. If schemes are aimed at wards with particular employment growth
trends, this could be biasing our results. For this reason, in column 4, we control for
differences in trends near different schemes. The results show a positive and signi-
ficant employment effect for total employment and employment in the construction
and producer services sectors. The coefficients imply that a one percent increase
in the accessibility index leads to a 0.6 percent increase in employment in producer
services and 0.5 in construction. For total employment the effect is less significant
and the elasticity is lower (0.2).
The results on the number of plants in table 3.2 are qualitatively similar to the
employment regressions in table 3.1. The main difference is that the effect of ac-
cessibility on total number of plants is consistently positive and highly significant
in all specifications, even in the most demanding one. The OLS regressions show a
positive relationship between the number of plants and accessibility. Adding fixed
effects decreases most of the coefficients and the “other” sector becomes insignific-
ant. Instrumenting accessibility index Art with Aˆrt also makes consumer services
coefficient insignificant, but the overall effect and three out of five sector effects are
positive and highly significant. After controlling for scheme trends in the fourth
column, the coefficient is positive and highly significant when all sectors are com-
bined (elasticity 0.14), and positive and significant in producer service (elasticity
0.4). In addition, accessibility is positive and significant at the 10% level for con-
struction and the “other” sector. The results suggest that the positive employment
effect found in table 3.1 is to some extent due to new plants entering the ward at-
tracted by greater accessibility.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 test the robustness of the results to different distance bands
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.02 0.191* 0.126 0.04 0.012
Std. error 0.118 0.104 0.108 0.065 0.066
No. observations 15191 53273 36740 15191 15191
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12675 15197 10856 3415 4582
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.407 0.483 0.239 0.534*** 0.214
Std. error 0.344 0.294 0.315 0.189 0.196
No. observations 14942 52418 36135 14942 14942
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12724 15967 11414 3384 4506
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.611** 0.422* 0.557** 0.383** 0.316*
Std. error 0.279 0.231 0.242 0.156 0.162
No. observations 15149 53176 36684 15149 15149
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12717 15185 10959 3435 4587
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.01 0.043 -0.026 0.059 -0.013
Std. error 0.218 0.181 0.19 0.106 0.122
No. observations 15191 53272 36739 15191 15191
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12675 15196 10856 3415 4582
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.409 0.590** 0.575** 0.349** 0.2
Std. error 0.296 0.257 0.256 0.167 0.166
No. observations 15183 53229 36719 15183 15183
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12676 15189 10855 3415 4582
OTHER
Coefficient -0.163 0.126 0.103 -0.081 -0.095
Std. error 0.164 0.139 0.144 0.084 0.089
No. observations 15191 53273 36740 15191 15191
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12675 15197 10856 3415 4582
Distance band 10 kms 30 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Ward FE YES YES YES YES YES
IV YES YES YES YES YES
Scheme trends YES YES YES YES
Controls YES
Decay -1.5 YES YES
Sources: BSD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at ward level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.3: Robustness results ward employment
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(10 kilometres and 30 kilometres) in columns 1 and 2, to introducing further control
variables interacted with the trend (straight line distance to closest road scheme,
employment rate, average age, proportion of population aged 16-74 with higher
education and proportion of population living on social housing) in column 3 and
to a different distance decay in columns 4 and 5.
In both tables, limiting the sample to the 10-kilometre band from road schemes
reduces sample sizes and increases standard errors and some of the coefficients that
are significant with 20-kilometre band become insignificant. The 30-kilometre dis-
tance band results are very similar to the 20-kilometre band: we find similar estim-
ates for the effect on total employment and total number of plants, and positive and
significant effects of accessibility on construction and producer services. Overall,
the positive employment and number of plants effects for construction and produ-
cer services seem fairly robust to changes in the distance band and most estimates
remain unchanged even after the inclusion of the very stringent set of additional
controls.
Adding further controls (ward level 2001 characteristics interacted with a time
trend) reduces the coefficient of accessibility for the number of plants when all sec-
tors are pooled (row 1 in column 3) and it is only significant at the 10% level. How-
ever, the sector specific estimates for construction and producer services stay pos-
itive and significant indicating that the spatial distribution of plants is affected by
accessibility changes induced by road improvements. The effect of accessibility on
total ward employment becomes insignificant when we add census controls, but
they remain significant for construction and producer services.
In columns 4 and 5 of tables 3.3 and 3.4 we use the accessibility measure with
the same cost function but a higher distance decay. Column 5 includes scheme
trends while column 4 displays the results for the IV fixed-effect estimates. As ex-
plained in the previous chapter, we calculate the accessibility index using a cost
function defined as the inverse distance function with distance decay equal to one,
i.e. a
(
cjrt
)
= c−αjrt with α = 1. If α increases to 1.5 this implies that in the calcula-
tion of Art the weights we allocate to wards which are further away from r decrease
faster, so we give more importance to wards which are closer to r. In the case of
the effect on the number of plants, the coefficients change very little. But in the case
of the ward employment, the coefficients become almost all insignificant, specially
when we include scheme trends (in column 5). This suggests that the effects on total
employment we found in table 3.1 are partially driven by the employment in wards
which are further away from r, and when the weight to these is reduced the effect
disappears.
Tables 3.1 to 3.4 suggest that increased accessibility leads to increased employ-
ment and number of plants, overall and for some sectors. Overall, the elasticities of
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.079 0.135*** 0.090* 0.094*** 0.064**
Std. error 0.053 0.05 0.049 0.031 0.029
No. observations 15202 53284 36762 36762 36762
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12681 15196 10856 3697 3777
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.096 0.254 0.14 0.235** 0.061
Std. error 0.189 0.162 0.169 0.099 0.097
No. observations 14958 52440 36166 36166 36166
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12736 15964 11412 3682 3840
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.221 0.229** 0.244** 0.210*** 0.149**
Std. error 0.136 0.115 0.123 0.075 0.076
No. observations 15162 53190 36709 36709 36709
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12731 15184 10957 3707 3778
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient -0.036 -0.019 -0.069 0.063 -0.001
Std. error 0.084 0.077 0.082 0.048 0.045
No. observations 15202 53283 36761 36761 36761
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12681 15195 10857 3698 3777
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.359** 0.399*** 0.347** 0.378*** 0.217**
Std. error 0.157 0.142 0.139 0.098 0.087
No. observations 15194 53242 36742 36742 36742
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12683 15187 10855 3697 3779
OTHER
Coefficient 0.065 0.137* 0.134* 0.012 0.058
Std. error 0.085 0.075 0.074 0.046 0.045
No. observations 15202 53284 36762 36762 36762
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 12681 15196 10856 3697 3777
Distance band 10 kms 30 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Ward FE YES YES YES YES YES
IV YES YES YES YES YES
Scheme trends YES YES YES YES
Controls YES
Decay -1.5 YES YES
Sources: BSD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at ward level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.4: Robustness results ward number of plants
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employment were somewhat higher than the elasticities of the number of plants.
Taken at face value, and disregarding the wide confidence intervals, the higher
elasticity of employment could arise if existing plants increase their employment
or entering plants are on average larger than old ones. In section 3.4.2 we shed
some light on the former channel by studying employment responses at plant level
with the ARD plant data.
3.3.3 Results: productivity
In this section we report results on the effect of accessibility on productivity at the
ward level. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the results for the two-step methodology ex-
plained in section 3.3.1.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep variable: ALL
MANUFACT. CONSTRUCT. CONSUMER PRODUCER OTHERlog of gross output SECTORS SERVICES SERVICES
Log of employment 0.348*** 0.370*** 0.365*** 0.231*** 0.397*** 0.363***
0.004 0.006 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.009
Log of capital 0.065*** 0.084*** 0.092*** 0.032*** 0.135*** 0.088***
0.002 0.004 0.012 0.002 0.008 0.007
Log of intermediates 0.585*** 0.547*** 0.523*** 0.743*** 0.449*** 0.544***
0.003 0.007 0.014 0.006 0.009 0.01
No. observations 227377 51210 22491 72470 43453 37753
R2 0.939 0.967 0.95 0.959 0.879 0.922
Ward*year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
2 digit sector FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sources: BSD and ARD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at firm level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.5: Local unit production function estimates
We first estimate ward productivity shifters for every year using all single-plant
firms within 20 kilometres of the road schemes. The results for the first step are in
Table 3.5. The dependent variable is log of gross output and we control for inputs
(log of labour, capital and intermediate inputs). We predict the ward-by-year fixed
effects and average them up to each ward in every year. In the second step, we then
regress these estimated productivity effects on the accessibility variable.
Table 3.6 shows the results of the second step. The coefficient on accessibility is
positive and significant using OLS, but turns negative and insignificant when we
add ward fixed effects, apart from consumer services where the coefficient is pos-
itive and insignificant. Columns 3-4 show the IV results. Even if the instrument is
very string, the IV estimates are imprecise and none of the IV estimates is statistic-
ally significant. These results seem to suggest that there is no effect of accessibility
on ward aggregate productivity, although the coefficients are too imprecise to draw
strong conclusions.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.059*** -0.103 -0.136 -0.311
Std. error 0.005 0.106 0.208 0.225
No. observations 19667 19609 19609 19609
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 3771 8491
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.039*** -0.076 -0.242 -0.364
Std. error 0.006 0.133 0.277 0.299
No. observations 9145 8572 8572 8572
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1784 3086
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.051*** -0.161 0.339 0.423
Std. error 0.008 0.235 0.423 0.453
No. observations 6197 5319 5319 5319
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 890 1683
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.042*** 0.057 0.13 0.047
Std. error 0.006 0.169 0.25 0.274
No. observations 13012 12632 12632 12632
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 2191 4500
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.104*** -0.058 -0.163 -0.631
Std. error 0.01 0.285 0.85 0.918
No. observations 9169 8499 8499 8499
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 889 1309
OTHER
Coefficient 0.108*** -0.086 -0.141 -0.258
Std. error 0.015 0.356 0.68 0.734
No. observations 3561 3285 3285 3285
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1140 1262
Distance band 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Ward FE YES YES YES
IV YES YES
Scheme trends YES
Sources: BSD and ARD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at firm level. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.6: Ward level productivity results
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3.4 Effects on firm outcomes
3.4.1 Empirical specification and identification strategy
For the estimation of employment and productivity effects at the firm level we use
the Annual Respondent Database (ARD) data. Employment regressions use all
plants in the sample, including multi-plant firms. To obtain these results we are
able to use a larger version of the ARD for years 1998 to 20084. For the productivity
regressions we use a smaller sample for three reasons. Firstly, the capital data from
CeRIBA is only available for the period 1998-2004. Secondly, we need to use more
information from the balance-sheet data (namely gross output and intermediates)
and given the number of missing values, this reduces considerably the number of
observations we can use in the regressions. Finally, as discussed above, there is no
good way to apportion value added and capital stock of a multi-plant firm to its
plants so we only use the single-plant firms for which we have all the necessary
information.
Given the structure of the data used, if a plant changes its location (ward) it is
labeled as a different plant. Therefore plant identifier is location-specific. The firm
level regressions (with fixed effects) essentially compare firms that remain in situ in
the same location over time and experience larger or smaller accessibility changes.
Thus, the plant level analysis differs conceptually from the ward level regressions
that estimate aggregate effects allowing for entry and exit.
The underlying model is identical to (3.2) with the exception that the units of
observation are plants instead of wards r. Starting from an OLS model we estimate
the following relationship:
yirt = βArt + τt + εirt (3.8)
where Art is the accessibility of ward r in which the plant is located at time t. In
the plant employment regressions yirt is log of employment of plant i located in
r at time t. In the single-plant firm productivity regressions yirt is log real gross
output and the model further includes input variables (log of employment, capital
and intermediate inputs). Year fixed effects τt capture general changes that influence
all firms and locations in the study area in a given year (e.g. macro shocks).
In order to control for unobservable time-invariant plant/ward characteristics
correlated with accessibility and our outcome variables, we include plant fixed ef-
fects µi. The plant fixed effects µi are ward-specific and, thus, include unobserved
time invariant productivity advantages for all firms located in ward r. Specification
4We use the balance-sheet employment data in ARD (which is slightly different from the BSD
figures) because it is more reliable as it is based in a survey.
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(3.8) becomes:
yirt = βArt + µi + τt + εirt (3.9)
Again, we use time-demeaning to control for time-invariant plant (and ward)
heterogeneity that can be correlated with accessibility.
(yirt − y¯i.) = β (Art − A¯r.) + τt + ξirt (3.10)
where ξirt = where y¯i. and A¯r. are ward averages of the firm outcome and of log
ward accessibility over the time period (1998-2008), τt are year dummies which cap-
ture shocks affecting the variation over the firm means and ξrt = (εirt − ε¯ir.).
In our dataset when plants relocate they receive a new identifier, so we only
use the variation over time for plants that remain in the same location. Therefore,
variation of accessibility around the ward mean is not driven by mobility of plant
i because plant fixed effects are ward-specific and accessibility is measured at the
ward level. All the variation in accessibility is due to restructuring of employment
(in other firms) and transport improvements. To address the issue of endogenous
determination of accessibility, we once again instrument accessibility index Art with
accessibility index Aˆrt, which only picks up changes in the transport network.
Estimation of (3.10) using within-plant changes in a panel of plants is only feas-
ible using plants that exist, and appear in the data, both before and after the opening
of the transport schemes that are used as the source of identifying variation in ac-
cessibility. This introduces sample selection issues. Firstly, firms that stay in the
location of the transport scheme are likely to be those that can benefit most from
it. Secondly, the method does not capture changes in employment or productivity
associated with the opening of new plants. In addition, there are sampling-related
reasons why some firms appear in our data in multiple years whilst others do not.
These caveats aside, the IV estimation of β from the changes within plants over time
provides guidance on the micro-level impacts of transport improvements for firms,
which is one of the components of the aggregate ward level effects, and it is inter-
esting in its own right.
3.4.2 Results: employment
Table 3.7 reports the results from the plant level regressions which essentially com-
pare firms that stay in the same location over time and experience larger or smaller
accessibility changes. The structure of the table is similar to tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The first column showing the simple OLS results indicates that more accessible
places have smaller plants, apart from producer services where the relationship
between accessibility and plant size is positive. In the second column we intro-
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient -0.028*** 0.026 0.02 -0.059
Std. error 0.004 0.028 0.071 0.072
No. observations 862302 862302 861811 861811
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 112322 180275
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient -0.164*** 0.149*** 0.141* 0.161**
Std. error 0.002 0.031 0.079 0.081
No. observations 735500 735500 734342 734342
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 122229 193050
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient -0.017*** 0.094*** 0.064 -0.022
Std. error 0.002 0.031 0.069 0.071
No. observations 777390 777390 774945 774945
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 148547 233255
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient -0.022*** 0.038** -0.019 -0.038
Std. error 0.001 0.018 0.046 0.048
No. observations 1808808 1808808 1807020 1807020
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 214606 359424
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.023*** 0.072*** 0.034 -0.081
Std. error 0.001 0.021 0.057 0.06
No. observations 1702561 1702561 1699223 1699223
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 136929 191720
OTHER
Coefficient -0.084*** 0.042* 0.037 -0.039
Std. error 0.002 0.024 0.062 0.065
No. observations 1196191 1196191 1189212 1189212
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 136776 204641
Distance band 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Ward FE YES YES YES
IV YES YES
Scheme trends YES
Sources: BSD and ARD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at firm level. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.7: Local unit employment results
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duce plant fixed effects and, interestingly, the coefficients become positive and sig-
nificant in all of the five sectors. This suggests that an increase in effective density
is associated with increasing plant employment. However, addressing endogen-
eity concerns through the IV method increases standard errors substantially and
decreases the size of the coefficients which become mostly insignificant. However,
for manufacturing, the coefficient on accessibility stays positive and significant even
in column 4.
These results suggest that the aggregate effects on ward employment found in
table 3.1 might be mostly driven by increasing number of plants at the ward level5,
as individual plant employment does not seem to be responding to changes in ac-
cessibility. Thus, the employment growth at the ward level could be due to newly
created plants in the ward or to plants moving into the ward from other locations.
This result relates to the theoretical channels highlighted in chapter 2. Increased
effective density could make locations more desirable as consumers and producers
become more accessible, driving plants to locate in these areas. Also, increased ac-
cessibility might reduce the fixed-cost of creating a new plant, as prospective bene-
fits might be higher due to better access to consumers and producers, so the number
of plants created in the ward might increase. Additionally, multi-plant firms might
be relocating plants from other locations to the wards in which higher accessibility
changes are taking place to take advantage of the better connectivity. Finally, this
finding is consistent with previous evidence found on the effect of transport infra-
structure on the creation of new plants, provided for example by Holl (2004c) and
Melo et al. (2010).
3.4.3 Results: productivity
Results from the firm level production function regressions are reported in Table 9.
All models control for capital, labour and intermediate inputs. As explained above,
the sample is based on a panel of single plant firms for years 1998 to 2004. The
dependent variable is log of gross output. Because the regressions control for inputs,
the coefficients correspond to the effect of accessibility on Total Factor Productivity
(TFP).
OLS results show elasticities of 0.03 – 0.19. Adding firm fixed effects increases
standard errors and the estimates become insignificant. Turning to the IV estimates
in columns 3 and 4, construction sector has a positive and significant coefficient in
column 3, but it becomes insignificant in column 4 where scheme trends are con-
5We experimented with the BSD data in order to investigate if the ward employment effects came
from increased employment from existing plants or from employment growth due to entry of new
plants. However, BSD individual plant identifiers are quite noisy over time making this analysis
difficult to undertake.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.092*** -0.036 0.058 0.074
Std. error 0.005 0.066 0.134 0.149
No. observations 39800 34364 34364 34364
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 4189 7746
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.025*** 0.000 -0.227 -0.279*
Std. error 0.007 0.083 0.158 0.16
No. observations 15419 13894 13894 13894
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 2385 5425
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.080*** 0.347 0.715** 0.507
Std. error 0.017 0.24 0.292 0.321
No. observations 2213 1886 1886 1886
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 472 790
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.081*** 0.101 0.361 0.493*
Std. error 0.008 0.123 0.253 0.284
No. observations 9743 8042 8042 8042
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 610 1410
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.188*** -0.263 -0.709 -1.042
Std. error 0.014 0.161 0.532 0.883
No. observations 6622 5548 5548 5548
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 426 233
OTHER
Coefficient 0.114*** -0.127 0.667 0.689
Std. error 0.013 0.228 0.463 0.447
No. observations 5803 4994 4994 4994
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 393 748
Distance band 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Labour, capital & intermediates YES YES YES YES
Sector-Year FE YES YES YES YES
Ward FE YES YES YES
IV YES YES
Scheme trends YES
Sources: BSD and ARD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at firm level. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3.8: Firm productivity results
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trolled for. However, in columns 3 and 4, we have some indication of a negative
effect for manufacturing and positive affect for construction.
The lack of effects at the plant level is consistent with the lack of effects at the
aggregate level found in section 3.3.3. Firms might be adjusting other outcomes
(studied below) but our results suggest that increased accessibility is not acting as a
productivity shifter neither at the aggregate (ward) not the individual level (plant).
3.4.4 Results: other firm outcomes
Due to the lack of evidence and the imprecision of the estimates in table 3.8, in tables
B.10 to B.12 we experiment with alternative outcome variables at the firm level. We
estimate similar specifications to 3.9 but changing the outcome variable yirt. For
these regression we use sample of both single and multi-plants but restrict it to the
1998-2004 period for comparability with the plant TFP estimates.
In table B.10 we use gross output per worker as the dependent variable, in table
B.11 we use the average wage per worker (firm wage bill over the firm employment)
and in table B.12 we test the effect of accessibility on firm gross output.
For all three outcome variables the results are very similar: using OLS we find
positive relationships between accessibility and the economic outcome, but these
become insignificant once we add fixed effects and imprecise when we instrument
and add scheme dummies.
These results suggest that plants are not adjusting their output, and given the
lack of response of plant employment found in section 3.4.2, the lack of effect on
labour productivity (output per worker) is consistent with what we would expect.
Also, the absence of TFP and employment effects at the plant level is consistent
with the lack of effect of accessibility on average wage per worker, because neither
productivity nor demand for workers is changing at the plant level. However, the
estimates are quite imprecise as in the case of the TFP results.
3.5 Conclusions
This chapter uses a novel methodology in order to assess the productivity and em-
ployment effects from transport improvements at a very detailed geographic scale.
We construct employment accessibility measures at the ward level using GIS net-
work analysis with data on major road schemes and the register of local business
employment. These accessibility indices are used for the analysis of employment
and productivity at the firm level and ward level. We propose an instrumental vari-
ables strategy addressing the likely endogeneity of agglomeration by relying solely
on transport improvements for identification in a panel data fixed effects setting.
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Furthermore, we address the potential endogeneity of the road construction place-
ment by focusing on wards and firms which are close to schemes. We argue that
methods using cross-sectional variation in effective density, or variation due to spa-
tial restructuring of employment, do not have a causal interpretation.
Overall, when we examine the effect of all major road transport improvements
with firm level data focusing on firms and plants that remain in situ before and after
the opening of new road links, we find insignificant effects on the employment and
productivity of firms. Neither do we find significant productivity effects when we
examine total factor productivity at ward level allowing for start-ups and closures.
However, ward level employment and local unit count regressions give some sup-
port to the idea that increased accessibility caused by a better road network may
lead to increased economic activity. The fact that plant level employment is unaf-
fected, apart from manufacturing, suggests that the positive ward level employment
effect is mainly attributable to increased entry or decreased exit.
The lack of robust evidence at the plant level could be driven by measurement
error in the accessibility indices due to the features of the road network data used, as
we might be failing to capture all the effects of road construction (see chapter 2 for
more details). However, it should be noticed that, to our knowledge, this research is
the first attempt to construct an accessibility index at such a detailed geographical
level for a long period of time (11 years). Even if limited, our measure allows us
to focus on a specific channel, road construction, through which policy can affect
economic performance.
Our results add substantially to the existing evidence on the effects of trans-
port policy on aggregate and firm economic outcomes. Our analysis highlights the
importance of addressing endogeneity issues in a convincing way. We argue that
utilizing small scale spatial variation in the impact of transport improvements on
effective density offers a promising quasi-experimental setting, even though data
requirements are high. We provide evidence both at the aggregate and at the indi-
vidual level, which allows us to investigate the micro channels driving the aggreg-
ate results. Furthermore, we test the effects on a variety of outcomes (employment,
number of plants, total and labour productivity, gross output and wages), which
sheds some light on the impacts of transport on economic outcomes for which the
existing evidence is scarce.
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Chapter 4
Economic Impacts of Transport Policy:
Labour market outcomes
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present and analyse the results of the impact of accessibility on
individual labour market outcomes. We use microdata from two British datasets
for the period 1998-2008 and 2002-2008 and test the effect of changes in accessibility
on several outcomes: nominal wages, hourly earnings, hours worked, employment
status and commuting time.
As discussed in chapter 2, transport policy can affect labour markets mainly
through its impact on reducing commuting costs (measured as travel time to work-
place in our context). Road improvements bring firms and workers closer together
and this could have an impact on the quantity and quality of the interactions in
the labour market (job matches), on the size of the markets (spatial competition for
workers and for jobs) and on the emergence and scope of agglomeration economies
(productivity effects on wages). Additionally, if firms react to road improvements
by changing their demand for workers or by increasing wages, this would have an
effect on worker outcomes. However, results from chapter 3 suggest that the effect
of accessibility on firm employment and wages is nil. Given the lack of employment
and wage effects for individual firms, it becomes of increased interest to study the
potential responses of the labour markets to transport policy.
In order to carefully identify these effects we make use of large worker and firm
microdata datasets, which were provided by the UK Office for National Statistics
(ONS)1. We capture the effect of road improvements using a measure of accessibil-
ity to employment (effective density), as explained in detail in the previous chapters.
We calculate the measure of accessibility to employment at the ward level using data
1Through the “Virtual Microdata Laboratory” service and the “Secure Data Service”.
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from the census of establishments (Business Structure Database) – which provides
information on the universe of British plants reporting their location (postcode),
their sector of activity and their number of employees– and data on road improve-
ments and travel times in Great Britain.
For the individual labour market outcomes analysis we use two additional data-
sets: the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) and the Labour Force Sur-
vey (LFS). The first survey is a panel of employees, and it provides information
on their earnings, labour supply, job characteristics, and the postcode where the
firm they work for is located and where they they live. The second dataset con-
tains quarterly information on a sample of households and includes information
on a wide range of labour market outcomes, as well as a large list of personal and
household characteristics.
We exploit data on a panel of employees to estimate the effect of accessibility
both from home and from work on individual earnings and hours worked. Due to
data restrictions, for these regressions we use data for years 2002 to 2008. In what
we consider our most reliable results, in order to isolate the effect of accessibility
that stems only from transport improvements, we use the variation over time for
individuals for a given ward of work and ward of home location. As before, we also
make use of instrumental variables to reduce the potential endogeneity caused by
employment relocation across the space.
To investigate the effect of accessibility on employment status and travel times
we use repeated cross sections from the LFS for years 1998 to 2008. We control for
a large set of individual and location characteristics as well as age-gender-ethnicity
specific fixed-effects and time and ward dummies.
We believe we contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, we use
very rich worker microdata and a novel dataset on road improvements, which allow
us to study the relationship between transport policy and labour market outcomes at
a very detailed geographical scale and to focus on different groups of individuals.
Secondly, given the quality of our data, we can adopt a careful empirical strategy
that allows us to tackle several identification issues which could undermine the
validity of our results. This makes it possible to examine some under-investigated
channels through which transport could affect labour market outcomes. Finally, we
provide empirical evidence on some strands of the existing theoretical urban labour
economics literature, in particular the spatial mismatch theory or the effects of ag-
glomeration on wages.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 focuses on the results
on individual wages and hours using the ASHE data. We present the specification
and the identification strategy used (section 4.2.1), then we describe data used (sec-
tion 4.2.2), and finally the empirical results (section 4.2.3). Section 4.3 has presents
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the results for the employment status and travel times, obtained using LFS data.
Finally, section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Effects on wages and hours worked
4.2.1 Empirical specification and identification strategy
To obtain results on individual earnings and hours worked we use the Annual Sur-
vey of Hours and Earnings (more details in section 4.2.2.1). We use a panel of work-
ers to estimate the effect of accessibility to employment, both from work and from
home, on individual labour market outcomes. In our main regressions we use a
panel of employees surveyed between years 2002 and 2008. We study three out-
comes: weekly wages, weekly hours worked and hourly earnings. We look both at
basic and at total (which includes overtime) outcomes.
A worker i living in ward h and working in ward w at time t has labour mar-
ket outcome yihwt. Given that accessibility is measured at the ward level, we ignore
changes of home or job within the wards2. At each point in time, workers live and
work in specific wards. Over time, the worker location can change, if he changes
jobs, he changes home or he changes both. Initially, we use the variation in ac-
cessibility and labour market outcomes for an individual which are also driven by
relocations (more on this below). The relationship we estimate is:
yihwt = β0 + β1Aiht + β2Aiwt + β3cihwt + θXit + δZht + λWwt + µi + ξt + εihwt (4.1)
where yihwt is the individual labour market outcome of worker i at time t (wages or
hours), Aiht is accessibility to employment from home ward h at time t, Aiwt is ac-
cessibility to employment from work ward w at time t, cihwt denotes the commuting
costs between home and work at time t, Xit is a vector of personal and job character-
istics, Zht is a matrix of home ward characteristics and Wwt is a matrix of work ward
characteristics. ξt are year fixed effects that control for common shocks affecting all
wards in a given year. εihwt is the idiosyncratic error and β0 is a constant term. Both
the labour market outcomes and the accessibility indices are transformed to natural
logarithms so we can interpret the coefficients as elasticities.
The dataset used does not provide information on travel time or distance to
workplace. We use the road networks between 2002 and 2008 (created as explained
in the methodology chapter) to calculate optimal travel time between ward of home
and ward of work along the road network. We do not have any information on the
2In fact, most of workers change ward of work when they change job (enterprise). In the robust-
ness checks we control for job and home changes within wards and the results remain unchanged.
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travel mode of the workers. It could be the case that they are not commuting by
road or not commuting using the optimal route predicted by ArcGIS R©. However,
using optimal travel time to proxy for commuting costs has the advantage of get-
ting rid of potential measurement error on self-reported travel time3. In practice, we
estimate a reduced-form effect of commuting costs, in which our measure of com-
muting cost is the optimal travel time through the road network. Moreover, as this
travel time measure changes over time due to the road improvements, it does not
drop out when we include individual-home ward-work ward fixed-effects below, as
opposed to straight geodesic distance (used for example by Graham & Melo, 2009,
to approximate commuting costs).
We include this information in the estimated specification (4.1) in order to cap-
ture the effect of commuting costs on labour market outcomes. This way we can
estimate the effect of accessibility from home and work conditional on commuting
costs. This helps to interpret the results given the numerous theoretical channels
through which transport policy can affect labour market outcomes, as discussed
in chapter 2. For example, some of the effects of transport policy on wages could
be due to employers compensating workers for longer commutes and some could
come through increased spatial competition or agglomeration externalities. By con-
trolling for commuting costs in equation (4.1) we can be more certain that the effects
of accessibility are not due to compensation for longer commutes as we are explicitly
controlling for that. Moreover, the interpretation of the coefficient β3 also informs
us about the relationship between commuting costs and labour market outcomes.
We are interested in parameters β1 and β2. We may be worried that there are
(time invariant) unobservable individual characteristics that affect both individual
labour market outcomes and accessibility indices (in levels) at the same time, and
that are not included in Xit. For example, more able individuals may live or work in
areas where accessibility and wages are higher. We include worker fixed effects µi
to control for this (which in practice is equivalent to estimate the demeaned model).
We can additionally control for time-invariant home ward (µh) and work ward (µw)
characteristics, which are potentially correlated with individual wages, accessibility
from home and from work and the individual time-invariant characteristics.
By introducing the individual fixed effects we estimate coefficients β1 and β2 us-
ing the variation of accessibility over time with respect to the average individual
accessibility. At each point in time the worker may hold different jobs in different
locations (w) and live in different places (h). Therefore the accessibility to which the
worker is exposed at home and at work varies over time for three reasons: when
3Which is common, as noted for example by Gutie´rrez-i-Puigarnau & van Ommeren (2010). In-
deed, when tabulating travel times reported in LFS responses are disproportionably cumulated in
values such 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30 minutes, likely due to rounding-up.
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home-work location changes, when employment changes or when transport im-
provements (that change travel times) take place.
If workers are sorting spatially in order to take advantage of the changes in ac-
cessibility we would not be able to identify the separate effects on labour market out-
comes which stem from (endogenous) sorting and those which are due to changes in
accessibility for a given location (externalities or spatial competition). Sorting could
be an outcome of accessibility or could be due to other unobservable reasons correl-
ated with the labour market outcomes. For example, if workers with higher ability
move to areas where accessibility and wages are growing faster, then the correla-
tion between the changes in accessibility and the (demeaned) error term could be
different from zero. The same could occur if more able workers choose jobs in areas
where wages and accessibility are growing pro-cyclically. For these reasons, even
after controlling for unobservable time invariant characteristics of the individuals,
there would still be reasons to think the estimates of β1 and β2 could be biased.
To investigate this issue we define individual-home ward-work ward specific
fixed effects, µihw. Replacing the individual fixed effects in (4.1) with µihw and we
obtain:
yihwt = β0+ β1Aiht + β2Aiwt + β3cihwt + θXit + δZht +λWwt +µihw + ξt + εihwt (4.2)
As we did in chapter 3, we can rewrite equation (4.2) in demeaned terms by sub-
tracting the individual-fixed location means across time (focusing only on the ac-
cessibility measures):
(yihwt − y¯i.) = β1 (Aiht − A¯i.) + β2 (Aiwt − A¯i.) + (εihwt − ε¯i.) (4.3)
By estimating (4.2) we are identifying the effects of accessibility on individual labour
market outcomes exploiting the changes of accessibility over time for an individual
while keeping their home and work locations constant.
To implement this, in our panel, each individual is allocated a different fixed-
effect depending in the pair work-home location. Therefore, we have two types
of individuals: those that never move location pair (at least while observed in the
data) and those that eventually change ward of work, ward of residence or both.
Individuals in this last group may be sorting due to changes in accessibility, so in
contrast to (4.1), (4.2) does not use this variation for the estimation of the effects of
accessibility4. That is, when including µihw, coefficients β1 and β2 are not capturing
the effect of endogenously determined relocations after the changes in accessibility
take place (that could be cause by increased accessibility or other unobserved reas-
4In the robustness checks we obtain the results focusing on the group of non-movers and the
results remain unchanged.
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ons). The comparison of the estimates obtained by estimating (4.1) and (4.2) thus
inform us about the role played by sorting.
However, there are still other possible sources of bias in the estimation of the ef-
fect of accessibility. Even when keeping the home-work location fixed, accessibility
changes around the individual means due to changes in employment (numerator)
and in travel times due to transport improvements (denominator). We have the
same endogeneity sources as in the case of firms and ward outcomes discussed in
chapter 3. If changes in labour outcomes, for example wages, increase accessibil-
ity from home by means of attracting workers to the ward or around the ward in
which the worker lives or works, we could have a reverse causality problem which
would challenge the validity of the estimates. There could also exist unobservable
trends which affect both the location of employment and the labour market out-
comes which could bias the estimates.
To overcome this, as before, we instrument accessibility Art using Aˆiht, the ac-
cessibility measure that keeps employment fixed before the period of analysis. In
the case of the estimations using 2002-2008 ASHE data this year is 20015. By doing
this, we only use the changes in accessibility that come from transport improve-
ments and not from employment growth. The instrument is strong by construc-
tion, because both the instrument and the instrumented variable use the variation
which comes from road improvements. For the instrument to be valid, we need
the instrument to be uncorrelated with unobservable shocks that affect changes in
employment.
This relates to the issue of the potential endogeneity of the placement of trans-
port investments (which affect travel times used in the calculation of Art). It could
be argued that the instrument is not valid if the transport improvements are aimed
at areas which are experiencing unobservable shock which are correlated with in-
dividual labour market outcomes. Transport investments may be taking place in
areas in which workers would have done better anyway. Nevertheless, as explained
in previous chapters, improving economic outcomes is not on of the key objectives
of the transport investments carried out by the Government. Transport projects are
generally aimed at a higher spatial scale and designed to improve safety or reduce
congestion within a wider area.
However it could still be the case that transport improvement placements are en-
dogenous to unobservable trends in labour market outcomes. To correctly identify
the effects we once again define three distance bands which indicate if the ward is at
10, 20 or 30 kilometres from any improvement undertaken during the study period.
Individuals placed within a specific distance band are more likely to be exposed to
5As compared to 1997 employment used in the calculation of Aˆiht in the previous chapter, which
is also used in the estimations using LFS data below.
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similar shocks and improvements are quite unlikely to be aimed at specific individu-
als within these narrowly defined distance bands. Within these bands we compare
workers who are close to improvements at some point in time but that vary in the
intensity and the timing of the treatment. The main results are obtained using the
30 kilometres band from both home and work wards6. These bands could overlap
or not, depending how separated are the locations of work and residence. Given the
size of the sample, we can drop the individuals which are within 1 kilometre of the
improvements without losing a substantial fraction of the observations.
As in the case of the aggregate and firm outcomes, in order to ensure that the
instrument is uncorrelated with the underlying trends, we further control for differ-
ential trends in the vicinity of road schemes in our final specification. As in chapter
3, this is done by including a set of scheme dummies (31 schemes) interacted with
year in equation (4.2). In some specifications we also control for the distance to the
closest improvement within the distance bands (trends and levels).
We also control for differential trends of the wards (home and work) based on
2001 characteristics7. We used CASWEB data to calculate the share of population
aged 15-64 with higher education, mean age of population, share of population liv-
ing on social housing, the rate of unemployment, proportion of workers commuting
using motor vehicles and the average distance traveled to work. We also calculated
a residential density measure, using address counts data in 2001 from the National
Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD) and the area of the wards in square kilometres,
obtained from EDINA-UKBORDERS. We interact these characteristics with a linear
trend. They control for differential growth in labour market outcomes, e.g. wages,
depending on the level of these characteristics in 2001, before our period of analysis
which starts in 2002. In the estimation of (4.1) we also introduce these characteristics
in levels.
We furthermore control for individual personal or job characteristics. Some of
these characteristics, for example full time status or occupation, could be regarded
as “bad controls” because they could be outcomes of the transport policy. To help
address this issue, we define the level of the characteristics at the beginning of the
period (the first time the individual is observed within each of the two panel defin-
itions) and we interact that level with a time-trend. By doing this we control for
differential trends in the evolution of the labour outcome depending on the initial
6The choice of the 30-kilometre distance band for the baseline results in this chapter is different
from the 20-kilometre distance band used in the previous chapter. We choose 30 instead of 20 be-
cause, as shown in section 4.2.3.1, we need a larger sample size in order to obtain a larger set of
significant coefficients. In any case, for the main results which use the individual-home-ward fixed
effects discussed in section 4.2.3.2, the coefficients are very similar and significant across different
distance bands.
7We do this instead of including home-ward and work-ward dummies due to the large number
of fixed-effects to be estimated, which is technically difficult in our data.
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level of the job and personal characteristics. We use occupation trends (9 categor-
ies defined above), age group (10 year groups, from 16 to 65), full-time status and
gender trends. In the estimation of (4.1) we also introduce these characteristics in
levels.
Finally, we implement 2-way clustering of the standard errors to correct for ar-
bitrary within-group correlation of the individual shocks in two distinct non-nested
categories. There are 4 dimensions in our data: individuals, time, ward of home
and ward of work. In the case of the estimation of (4.1) the categories are year and
individual: the resulting standard errors are robust to arbitrary within-panel auto-
correlation (clustering on panel id) and to arbitrary contemporaneous cross-panel
correlation (clustering on time). Ideally we would have clustered at the level of the
“treatment” (accessibility changes), which are the wards of location. But these cat-
egories are nested because individuals change location over time. In the case of the
estimation of (4.2) we can cluster the standard errors at the home-ward and work-
ward level, because now these categories are not-nested across time, i.e. individuals
keep the same home-work pair over time in the panels as defined in (4.2). By do-
ing this, we allow the errors of the workers to be correlated at the treatment level
(wards). In addition, the standard errors are also robust to arbitrary heteroskedasti-
city.
4.2.2 Data
4.2.2.1 The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
The ASHE is an annual survey of the earnings of employees in Great Britain, which
from 2004 replaced the New Earnings Survey (NES). Its primary purpose is to ob-
tain information about the levels, distribution and make-up of earnings, and for the
collective agreements that cover them. It is designed to represent all categories of
employees in businesses of all kinds and sizes. The questionnaire is directed to the
employer, who completes it on the basis of payroll records for the employee. The
earnings, hours of work and other information relate to a specified week in April of
each year.
ASHE is based on a survey of a 1% sample of employees on the Inland Revenue
PAYE register (Pay As You Earn). The information is provided by the employer.
The sample consists of employees whose National Insurance numbers end with two
specific digits. It covers approximately 160,000 individuals a year. The survey is
designed as a panel of workers, in which the same workers are observed for multiple
years. The sample is replenished as workers leave the PAYE system (e.g. to self
employment, retirement, overseas or death) and new workers enter it (e.g. from
school, self-employment, immigration).
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ASHE contains information on the make-up of weekly earnings and hours worked
(basic, total and overtime), occupation (using Standard Occupational Classification
– SOC), industrial sector (using Standard Industry Classification – SIC), collective
agreement status, whether the job is private or public sector, age, gender, postcode
of workplace, and from 2002, postcode of residence. We use the information on
the postcodes to allocate accessibility from home and from work wards using the
National Statistics Postcode Directory (NSPD).
In order to clean the data we drop the 0.5% top and bottom extreme values of the
labour market outcome variables (wages and hours) and of the commuting times.
We define total pay consistently over the whole period 2002-20088. We also removed
observations with negative values of the variables and individuals which show in-
consistency in their age or gender over time. We only keep main jobs for those
individuals that have more than one job in the same year. Finally, we drop the in-
dividuals for which earnings were affected by absence (loss of pay) and those paid
at trainee/junior rates. In the main results, we focus on employees working in the
private sector. We believe that the flexibility of wages and hours would be greater
in the private than in the public sector, because the latter might be more regulated
or constraint to specific types of jobs. That said, in the robustness check we also
include public sector workers and the results remain unchanged.
ASHE provides information on the occupation level of the individuals using
SOC 2000 codes from 2002. We define broader occupation codes using the first di-
git of the code9. We also define five broader industrial categories based on 2-digit
codes from the SIC 2003 classification, and which are the same as the ones used in
the analysis of local and firm outcomes10.
The great advantage of this data is the good quality of the earnings and hours
information and the detailed information on the geographical location of both the
workplace and the place of residence. Furthermore, its panel structure allows us to
control for unobservable time invariant characteristics of the workers which might
be correlated with our variable of interest. However, the survey contains informa-
tion only on workers who are employed, so we are unable to observe unemployment
spells. It also contains no information on household characteristics (for example
housing tenure status, civil status, number of children) which might be relevant
in shaping the response of labour market outcomes to transport policy. For these
8Different stratifications of ASHE define gross pay differently. We use the most recent definition:
total (gross) pay=basic pay + incentive pay + shift and premium payments + overtime pay + other pay.
9They correspond to: 1 Managers and Senior Officials; 2 Professional Occupations; 3 Associate
Professional and Technical Occupations; 4 Administrative and Secretarial Occupations; 5 Skilled
Trades Occupations; 6 Personal Service Occupations; 7 Sales and Customer Service Occupations;
8 Process, Plant and Machine Operatives; 9 Elementary Occupations.
10They correspond to: 1 Manufacturing, 2 Construction, 3 Consumer services, 4 Producer services
and 5 Other sectors.
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reasons, in section 4.3 we use an alternative dataset, the LFS, to study other labour
market outcomes for which information is not provided in ASHE.
4.2.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 4.1 displays the number of observations by year and gender. We restrict the
sample to those individuals for which the home-ward and the work-ward are situ-
ated within 30 kilometres of any improvement undertaken during the period 2002-
2008. We exclude those which are located too close to the improvements (1 km).
We have around 240,000 observations, even after restricting the sample to locations
close to the road improvements. As expected, we have more male workers than
female workers. Table B.13 displays the number of observations by year and indus-
trial sector. We observe that most of the workers are concentrated in the service sec-
tors and a large fraction in the manufacturing sector. Between 2002 and 2008 there
is a decrease on the importance of the manufacturing sector while the proportion of
workers employed in the producer services sector increases over time.
YEAR Males Female Total
2002 17,756 13,457 31,213
2003 19,451 15,355 34,806
2004 19,248 15,687 34,935
2005 20,100 17,012 37,112
2006 20,111 17,178 37,289
2007 16,846 14,945 31,791
2008 16,732 14,658 31,390
Total 130,244 108,292 238,536
Source: ONS. Observations within 30 kms of home
and work wards.
Table 4.1: Number of observations by year and gender
Table B.14 displays the number of individuals we have in each of the panel defin-
itions. If individuals are allowed to change location over time, µi, they appear an
average of 3 times over the 7-year panel, and there are almost 80,000 individuals.
When we define the fixed-effects as an individual-home-work combination, µihw,
we have over 114,000 fixed-effects, which appear an average of 2.09 times in the
panel.
Tables B.15 and B.16 display the summary statistics of the variables used in the
analysis. The tables show the mean and the standard deviation overall and within
and between the two panels. Average basic weekly earnings are £373, while the
average number of basic hours worked a week is slightly below 34. Total pay and
hours are slightly over the basic figures, around £25 a week are earned based on
incentive or overtime pay, and around 1.5 hours a week is devoted to overtime.
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Average total hourly earnings are almost 50 pence higher than basic hourly earnings,
which suggest that overtime and incentive pay per hours is higher than hourly basic
pay, as we would expect. Table B.15 displays the within variation of accessibility in
the two panels. When we only use the variation over time for individuals while
they remain in a given work-home location the within variation is reduced notably.
However, as we see in section 4.2.3.2 this variation is still sufficient to identify the
parameters, at least for accessibility from workplace.
4.2.3 Results
4.2.3.1 Individual fixed effects
In this section we present the results for the estimates of equation (4.1). The main res-
ults of the tables (columns 1-7) are obtained using the 30 kilometre band both from
work-ward and home-ward. Columns 8 and 9 replicate the results of column 7 for
the 20 and 10 kilometre distance bands. All the specifications include sic-year dum-
mies (5 wide sector definition explained above) to control for year-specific shocks in
each sector. These dummies also control for nation-wide changes in economic con-
ditions, for example CPI levels. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the individual and year levels.
We report results for basic outcomes (table 4.2) and total outcomes (table 4.3).
The difference between basic and total outcomes are incentive and overtime pay
(in the case of wages) and over time (in the case of hours worked). The results
are presented for weekly nominal wages, weekly hours worked and weekly hourly
earnings. The relationship between the three outcomes is as follows:
wageihwt =
wageihwt
hoursihwt
∗ hoursihwt = hourly wageihwt ∗ hoursihwt (4.4)
In both tables PANEL A displays the results for log weekly wages, PANEL B the results
for log hourly earnings and PANEL C the results for log hours worked. Given the log-
log specification, the parameters can be interpreted as elasticities. The rows at the
bottom of the tables provide details on the estimated model.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 have the same structure. Only the coefficients on log accessib-
ility from work, log accessibility from home, log of travel time between home and
work and the log of firms size are displayed. The coefficients on the dummies and
controls are not provided in order to improve the clarity in the exposition of the
results.
In column 1 we present the results obtained by OLS, where we only include
sic-by-year dummies. The coefficients are estimated precisely due to the large num-
ber of observations (above 200,000). In all cases we find a positive and signific-
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.233*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.066*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.014 0.015
from work ward [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.013] [0.033]
Log of accessibility -0.087*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.005 -0.031
from home ward [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.037]
Log of travel time 0.111*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.019***
between work and home [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005]
Log of firms -0.002 -0.002 0.000
employment [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Observations 245,883 221,066 221,066 221,066 221,066 221,066 216,324 123,468 30,392
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 184,524 280,260 282,681 221,022 231,113 94,225 18,883
Individual no of clusters 81,330 56,513 56,513 56,513 56,513 56,513 55,723 32,086 8,077
Year no of clusters 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
PANEL B: Log of basic hourly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.212*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.013 0.011
from work ward [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.012] [0.016]
Log of accessibility -0.073*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.011 0.022*
from home ward [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.012]
Log of travel time 0.072*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.006**
between work and home [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Log of firm’s 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.003**
employment [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 244,166 219,347 219,347 219,347 219,347 219,347 214,628 122,513 30,132
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 178,198 278,318 283,270 223,385 234,337 91,067 18,564
Individual no of clusters 80,984 56,165 56,165 56,165 56,165 56,165 55,378 31,889 8,023
Year no of clusters 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
PANEL C: Log of basic weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.019** 0.013* -0.001 0.005
from work ward [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.032]
Log of accessibility -0.014*** 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.007 0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.048
from home ward [0.003] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.010] [0.031]
Log of travel time 0.040*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012***
between work and home [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Log of firms -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.004*
employment [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Observations 245,774 220,932 220,932 220,932 220,932 220,932 216,181 122,903 30,194
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 173,610 275,394 281,027 221,303 232,776 92,211 18,604
Individual no of clusters 81,363 56,521 56,521 56,521 56,521 56,521 55,729 31,973 8,037
Year no of clusters 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Distance band 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 20 kms 10 kms
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Instrumented YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Scheme dummies and
trends
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to improvement
dummies and trends
YES YES YES YES YES
Ward 2001 characteristic
and trends
YES YES YES YES
Personal and job charac-
teristic and trends
YES YES YES
2-way clustering (individual and years) All specifications include sector-year dummies. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors
own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.2: Individual fixed effects results, basic outcomes – 2002-2008
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PANEL A: Log of total (gross) weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.223*** 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.016 -0.001
from work ward [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.032]
Log of accessibility -0.084*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.025** 0.019** 0.003 -0.041
from home ward [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.026]
Log of travel time 0.112*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.016***
between work and home [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005]
Log of firms 0.003*** 0.002 0.003
employment [0.001] [0.001] [0.004]
Observations 245,968 221,171 221,171 221,171 221,171 221,171 216,427 123,482 30,404
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 182,145 278,097 280,805 219,965 230,144 94,319 18,815
Individual no of clusters 81,350 56,553 56,553 56,553 56,553 56,553 55,764 32,096 8,083
Year no of clusters 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
PANEL B: Log of total hourly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.206*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 0.023** 0.022* 0.029 -0.025
from work ward [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.027] [0.026]
Log of accessibility -0.071*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.061** 0.092* 0.000
from home ward [0.005] [0.017] [0.018] [0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.025] [0.047] [0.027]
Log of travel time 0.072*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008** 0.006 0.003
between work and home [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Log of firms 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007***
employment [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Observations 244,642 219,842 219,842 219,842 219,842 219,842 215,112 122,770 30,206
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 181,165 276,945 281,034 218,998 230,035 92,354 18,674
Individual no of clusters 81,084 56,284 56,284 56,284 56,284 56,284 55,495 31,954 8,042
Year no of clusters 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
PANEL C: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.019 0.014 -0.009 0.042
from work ward [0.003] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.030] [0.036]
Log of accessibility -0.015*** -0.021 -0.022 -0.04 -0.04 -0.048 -0.053* -0.088* -0.04
from home ward [0.004] [0.022] [0.022] [0.028] [0.028] [0.031] [0.030] [0.047] [0.025]
Log of travel time 0.041*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.014***
between work and home [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
Log of firms -0.006*** -0.004** -0.005
employment [0.001] [0.002] [0.004]
Observations 246,234 221,388 221,388 221,388 221,388 221,388 216,629 123,183 30,267
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 179,590 277,381 281,622 218,453 229,866 93,280 18,741
Individual no of clusters 81,466 56,620 56,620 56,620 56,620 56,620 55,826 32,039 8,054
Year no of clusters 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Distance band 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 20 kms 10 kms
Individual fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Instrumented YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Scheme dummies and
trends
YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to improvement
dummies and trends
YES YES YES YES YES
Ward 2001 characteristic
and trends
YES YES YES YES
Personal and job charac-
teristic and trends
YES YES YES
2-way clustering (individual and years) All specifications include sector-year dummies. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors
own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.3: Individual fixed effects results, total outcomes – 2002-2008
141
ant relationship between accessibility from work and outcomes, negative relation-
ships between the outcomes and accessibility from home and positive coefficients
on travel time. The positive effect of accessibility from work on wages and hours
could be due to agglomeration externalities or to the fact that professionals, who
earn more and work full time, are concentrated in work locations where accessib-
ility is higher. At the same time, workers in low paid jobs such as basic services
could also be living in these locations and this could explain the negative coefficient
of accessibility from home on earnings and hours. Finally, these results suggest
that longer commutes are capitalised into higher wages and that workers who work
longer hours are those who also commute longer. This explanation is in line with
Manning (2003), who suggests that part-time workers do not find it worthwhile to
commute for long as the relative time spent in commuting versus working is smaller
than for full-time workers.
In column 2 we add individual fixed effects. We control for unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of workers which might be correlated with labour market
outcomes and accessibility. The coefficient for accessibility from workplace is re-
duced substantially, and that of accessibility from home becomes positive. This
suggest that individuals which have unobservable characteristics correlated neg-
atively with wages and hours are located in wards in which accessibility from home
is higher. This is in line with the previous argument that less skilled workers live
in denser areas in which they can access more jobs easily, as predicted for example
by the spatial mismatch theory. When we introduce the fixed effects, the coefficient
of accessibility from home on hours worked becomes very small and insignificant,
both for basic and total hours (PANEL C of both tables).
Column 3 shows the results when we instrument Art using Aˆiht. The instrument
is very strong and the results remain very similar to those of column 2. In column
4 we add scheme dummies and trends, both from work and home. In column 5
we control for the distance to the closest improvement from both home and work,
both in levels and in trends. In column 6 we add work-ward and home-ward 2001
characteristics and trends. The results remain very similar across specifications. As
an aside, we find some evidence that workers in bigger firms earn more and work
fewer hours.
In column 7 we present results from the most demanding specification. It in-
cludes fixed effects and all the controls, including personal and job characteristics
both in levels and in trends (defined as initial characteristics, as explained above).
For weekly and hourly earning we find positive and significant elasticities, both for
basic and total outcomes. We find a weak effect of accessibility from work on basic
hours worked and no effect on total hours. We find a marginally significant negative
effect of accessibility from home on total hours worked. The estimates of the effect
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of accessibility from work are similar in magnitude to the estimates of the effect of
market potential on wages provided for example by Combes et al. (2008a) or Mion
& Naticchioni (2009).
In columns 8 and 9 we reduce the sample to the 20 and 10 kilometres bands
around the wards of workplace and residence. Most of the effects of accessibility
become insignificant, but the positive effect of commuting time on wages and hours
remains significant. In fact, when we cluster the errors only at the individual level
(results available on request) the coefficients of accessibility from work are signi-
ficant, so the lack of significance could be due to the arbitrary contemporaneous
cross-panel correlation, which inflates the standard errors.
As discussed above, these results could be driven by endogenous relocation of
the individuals if they are spatially sorting in order to benefit from the accessibility
changes or in order to reduce their commuting time. In the next section we in-
vestigate if using the variation of accessibility for individuals while they keep their
location fixed has any impact on the estimates of the effects.
4.2.3.2 Individual-work-home fixed effects
In this section we present the results of the estimation of equation (4.2), i.e. including
individual-work-home fixed effects µihw. The results are displayed in table 4.4 for
the basic outcomes and in table 4.5 for the total outcomes. As before, we report
the results for weekly pay (PANEL A), hourly earnings (PANEL B) and hours worked
(PANEL C). The specifications are the same as in section 4.2.3.1. The rows at the
bottom of the tables provide details on the estimated model, from OLS to the model
with all the controls.
Column 1 displays the results obtained by OLS which reproduce those of column
1 of tables 4.2 and 4.3. In column 2 we include the individual-work-home fixed-
effects, so we only use the variation in accessibility and travel time for individuals
across time, for a given location pair. The standard errors are bigger than those of the
previous section, as we would expect due to the smaller amount of variation within
the panels observed in tables B.15 and B.16. After introducing the fixed-effects, the
coefficient of log accessibility from home becomes insignificant and quite impre-
cisely estimated. The coefficient of log accessibility from work remains positive and
significant for basic weekly wages and basic hourly earnings, but becomes insigni-
ficant in the rest of the panels. The coefficient of log travel time is only significantly
different from zero in PANEL B of table 4.4, and remains significant across specifica-
tions.
In column 3 we instrument the accessibility indices with the measures which
only use the variation stemming from road improvements. The coefficient of the
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.233*** 0.069* 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.342*** 0.317*** 0.328*** 0.317*** 0.151
from work ward [0.013] [0.037] [0.116] [0.112] [0.112] [0.113] [0.116] [0.122] [0.152]
Log of accessibility -0.087*** -0.007 -0.108 -0.107 -0.107 -0.076 -0.025 -0.064 0.09
from home ward [0.013] [0.032] [0.091] [0.094] [0.097] [0.095] [0.092] [0.095] [0.136]
Log of travel time 0.111*** 0.032 0.042 0.041 0.039 0.034 0.051 0.057* 0.079**
between work and home [0.003] [0.044] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.033] [0.033] [0.035]
Log of firms 0.001 -0.002 0.003
employment [0.002] [0.003] [0.005]
Observations 245,883 183,091 183,091 183,091 183,091 183,091 180,105 105,168 26,935
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,028 984 1,230 1,100 1,042 1,513 1,683
Work-ward no of clusters 3,794 3,557 3,557 3,557 3,557 3,557 3,551 2,226 755
Home-ward no of clusters 3,877 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,824 2,417 835
PANEL B: Log of basic hourly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.212*** 0.049* 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.244*** 0.224*** 0.228*** 0.232*** 0.164**
from work ward [0.012] [0.030] [0.059] [0.058] [0.058] [0.060] [0.056] [0.058] [0.073]
Log of accessibility -0.073*** 0.000 -0.058 -0.058 -0.065 -0.052 -0.02 -0.038 0.049
from home ward [0.011] [0.023] [0.064] [0.064] [0.065] [0.064] [0.063] [0.065] [0.080]
Log of travel time 0.072*** 0.040* 0.049** 0.049** 0.049** 0.049** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.067***
between work and home [0.002] [0.021] [0.023] [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.019] [0.019] [0.016]
Log of firm’s 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.004
employment [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Observations 244,166 181,664 181,664 181,664 181,664 181,664 178,691 104,364 26,713
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,035 988 1,236 1,104 1,047 1,526 1,745
Work-ward no of clusters 3,794 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,548 2,223 752
Home-ward no of clusters 3,877 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,554 3,823 2,417 835
PANEL C: Log of basic weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.023*** 0.02 0.099 0.098 0.114* 0.111 0.121* 0.104 0.013
from work ward [0.004] [0.029] [0.070] [0.068] [0.068] [0.067] [0.065] [0.069] [0.080]
Log of accessibility -0.014*** 0.01 -0.013 -0.012 -0.005 0.015 0.034 0.014 0.083
from home ward [0.005] [0.027] [0.052] [0.052] [0.054] [0.053] [0.050] [0.051] [0.077]
Log of travel time 0.040*** -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012 -0.008 -0.003 0.014
between work and home [0.001] [0.032] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.027] [0.027] [0.032]
Log of firms -0.003* -0.005** 0.000
employment [0.002] [0.002] [0.004]
Observations 245,774 183,020 183,020 183,020 183,020 183,020 180,030 104,716 26,768
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,023 979 1,223 1,092 1,035 1,527 1,749
Work-ward no of clusters 3,795 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,548 2,223 752
Home-ward no of clusters 3,878 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,826 2,417 835
Distance band 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 20 kms 10 kms
Individual-work-home
fixed effects
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Instrumented YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Scheme trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to improvement
trends
YES YES YES YES YES
Ward 2001 characteristic
trends
YES YES YES YES
Personal and job charac-
teristic trends
YES YES YES
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and
authors own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.4: Individual-home-work fixed effects results, total outcomes – 2002-2008
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PANEL A: Log of total (gross) weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.223*** 0.061 0.240** 0.263** 0.285*** 0.264** 0.302*** 0.300** 0.124
from work ward [0.013] [0.039] [0.110] [0.105] [0.103] [0.106] [0.111] [0.120] [0.144]
Log of accessibility -0.084*** -0.035 -0.085 -0.059 -0.049 -0.025 -0.007 -0.047 0.054
from home ward [0.013] [0.035] [0.082] [0.085] [0.090] [0.087] [0.086] [0.090] [0.117]
Log of travel time 0.112*** 0.021 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.023 0.023 0.025 0.035
between work and home [0.003] [0.036] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.034]
Log of firms 0.004** 0.006 0.001
employment [0.002] [0.005] [0.003]
Observations 245,968 183,188 183,188 183,188 183,188 183,188 180,200 105,199 26,947
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,031 985 1,229 1,099 1,041 1,513 1,681
Work-ward no of clusters 3,794 3,557 3,557 3,557 3,557 3,557 3,551 2,226 755
Home-ward no of clusters 3,877 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,825 2,417 835
PANEL B: Log of total hourly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.206*** 0.018 -0.021 -0.016 -0.014 -0.043 -0.037 -0.062 -0.252
from work ward [0.012] [0.047] [0.139] [0.137] [0.138] [0.139] [0.143] [0.153] [0.214]
Log of accessibility -0.071*** -0.009 0.154 0.157 0.171 0.19 0.215 0.239 0.445
from home ward [0.011] [0.047] [0.191] [0.191] [0.192] [0.192] [0.198] [0.209] [0.310]
Log of travel time 0.072*** -0.025 -0.009 -0.012 -0.013 -0.015 -0.012 -0.006 0.061***
between work and home [0.003] [0.057] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055] [0.056] [0.056] [0.023]
Log of firms 0.005** 0.005 0.001
employment [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Observations 244,642 182,082 182,082 182,082 182,082 182,082 179,101 104,593 26,775
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,041 991 1,237 1,105 1,046 1,523 1,732
Work-ward no of clusters 3,794 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,548 2,223 752
Home-ward no of clusters 3,877 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,825 3,824 2,417 835
PANEL C: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.019*** 0.043 0.281* 0.314** 0.341** 0.338** 0.375** 0.388** 0.423*
from work ward [0.005] [0.054] [0.148] [0.147] [0.147] [0.149] [0.156] [0.166] [0.242]
Log of accessibility -0.015*** -0.056 -0.223 -0.194 -0.201 -0.195 -0.204 -0.256 -0.385
from home ward [0.005] [0.063] [0.217] [0.217] [0.218] [0.218] [0.224] [0.234] [0.361]
Log of travel time 0.041*** 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.028 0.023 -0.04
between work and home [0.002] [0.070] [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.061] [0.036]
Log of firms -0.001 0.003 -0.001
employment [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
Observations 246,234 183,388 183,388 183,388 183,388 183,388 180,392 104,946 26,828
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,028 982 1,225 1,094 1,036 1,525 1,739
Work-ward no of clusters 3,795 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,554 3,548 2,223 752
Home-ward no of clusters 3,878 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,827 3,826 2,417 835
Distance band 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 20 kms 10 kms
Individual-work-home
fixed effects
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Instrumented YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Scheme trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
Distance to improvement
trends
YES YES YES YES YES
Ward 2001 characteristic
trends
YES YES YES YES
Personal and job charac-
teristic trends
YES YES YES
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and
authors own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.5: Individual-home-work fixed effects results, total outcomes – 2002-2008
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effect of log accessibility from work on wages and on hourly earnings increases
substantially as compared to those of column 2. For accessibility from home the
coefficients remain insignificant as in the rest of the specifications.
The difference in size of the coefficients obtained in column 2 and those obtained
in column 3 is quite substantial. Specifically, the IV estimates of column 3 are one
order of magnitude larger than the FE ones. It is possible that part of the difference
is due to attenuation bias caused by measurement error in the accessibility indices.
As explained in chapter 2, the calculation of travel times used in the computation of
Art is approximate. This could be introducing some measurement error causing an
attenuation bias that the instrument could be helping to reduce. It is nevertheless
more likely that most of the difference in the size of both coefficients is due to the
existence of unobservable trends which are correlated both with that accessibility
from work and labour market outcomes. If employment is concentrating in areas
in which wages are growing slower, which would be sensible because is cheaper to
hire employees, the fixed-effects estimator would be downward biased.
Even after adding all the trends and controls in column 7, we find positive and
highly significant effects of accessibility from work on basic weekly wages. In con-
trast, we find very weak effects on basic hours worked; column 7 of PANEL C of table
4.4 displays a positive coefficient of the effect of accessibility from work on hours,
but it is only significant at 10%. We find positive and significant effects of access-
ibility from work on basic hourly pay. Given that basic hourly wages are defined
as weekly basic pay over weekly basic hours and basic hours worked seem not to
be affected by changes in accessibility, the results on basic hourly earnings could be
driven by increases in the “numerator” of the ratio. These results is robust when we
restrict the sample to individuals located in the 20-kilometre distance bands, and
the coefficient remains significant only for basic hourly earnings when we narrow
the sample to the 10-kilometre band. Note however that the number of observations
used in column 9 is drastically reduced.
In the case of total labour market outcomes, reported in table 4.5, the picture
is slightly different. We find positive and significant effects of accessibility from
work on weekly total wage. The coefficients are similar to those of PANEL A of table
4.4. This would suggest that most of the effect on total pay can be attributable to
the effect on basic pay. However, for total hours worked (PANEL C) we also find
significant and positive effects of accessibility from work, while we did not find
any effects on basic hours worked. This would suggest that the hours adjustment
is working through overtime or through changes from part time to full time status.
The estimates are very robust to the inclusion of controls and to the narrowing of the
distance bands. As both wages and hours are adjusting, we do not find any effect
on hourly earnings (PANEL B).
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4.2.3.3 Interpretation of the results
Table 4.6 summarises our main results to facilitate the discussion of the interpret-
ation of the size and sign of the coefficients. It reproduces some of the results of
tables 4.2–4.3 and tables 4.4–4.5. For the 30-kilometre distance band table 4.6 dis-
plays the coefficients obtained using OLS and using the two sorts of fixed-effects
(individual and individual-work-home), with and without controls. Specification in
column 7 shows our main findings, the robustness of which is discussed below in
section 4.2.3.4.
PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of accessibility 0.233*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.037*** 0.069* 0.314*** 0.328***
from work ward [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.037] [0.116] [0.116]
Log of accessibility -0.087*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.021*** -0.007 -0.108 -0.025
from home ward [0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.032] [0.091] [0.092]
Observations 245,883 221,066 221,066 216,324 183,091 183,091 180,105
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 184,524 231,113 1,028 1,042
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of accessibility 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.014 0.043 0.281* 0.375**
from work ward [0.003] [0.009] [0.009] [0.015] [0.054] [0.148] [0.156]
Log of accessibility -0.015*** -0.021 -0.022 -0.053* -0.056 -0.223 -0.204
from home ward [0.004] [0.022] [0.022] [0.030] [0.063] [0.217] [0.224]
Observations 246,234 221,388 221,388 216,629 183,388 183,388 180,392
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 179,590 229,866 1,028 1,036
Distance band 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms 30 kms
Fixed effects Indiv Indiv Indiv Ind-w-h Ind-w-h Ind-w-h
Instrumented YES YES YES YES
All controls and trends YES YES
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies. Source: ONS,
DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.6: Summary of main results – weekly basic wages and total hours worked
We can draw two main conclusions from the results of sections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.2.
The first one is that labour market outcomes are affected by accessibility from work,
but only the outcomes which are flexible, i.e. wages and overtime, while basic
hours do not adjust. If accessibility from work is capitalising into higher wages, for
example because of agglomeration externalities, conditional on commuting costs,
workers could find it more worthwhile to work more hours11. If the number of ba-
sic work hours per week is fixed by contract, one way they can benefit from this
wage increase is by working overtime. Another possible explanation is that work-
ers are switching from part time to full time jobs, but we do not directly test this in
our data.
The second one is that, for the correct identification and interpretation of the
11Unless they have a strong preference for leisure, which our results do not suggest.
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effects, it is key to account for workers spatial sorting. Comparison of the coeffi-
cients obtained in tables 4.2–4.3 and tables 4.4–4.5 informs us about the effect that
controlling for sorting has on the estimates.
In tables 4.2–4.3, when we use the variation of accessibility which stems from
workers relocating across wards, we find positive effects of accessibility both from
work and from home. However, once we control for sorting, the results of tables 4.4–
4.5 suggest that that improving access to jobs from home does not have any impact
on labour market outcomes of employed workers whereas accessibility from work
has substantial effects on wages and hours. To obtain these results we exploit the
variation in accessibility over time for workers who remain in the same work-ward
and live in the same home-ward. This finding suggests that the effects of accessibil-
ity from home on workers are partially driven by residential sorting. Workers might
be moving into places in which accessibility is growing, because better connections
makes these residential locations more desirable or because they can afford better
housing in places that are further away from job centres and that are now more
accessible.
Once individuals have chosen their residential location, access to more jobs from
home does not seem to have an effect on their wages or hours, conditional on com-
muting time. The theoretical channel through which better accessibility from home
would have an effect on wages and hours once we are controlling for sorting is un-
clear. The spatial mismatch theory predicts positive effects of better access to jobs
from home on labour market outcomes, especially on the probability of becoming
employed or on the length of the unemployment spells. However, from the results
obtained using our sample, in which all the individuals are already working, we do
not find any evidence in favour of the spatial mismatch hypothesis. This could be
due to households having already optimised their residential location in order to
have access to better jobs and shorter commutes so further increases in accessibility
from home do not have any impact on their wages or hours worked.
The positive effect of accessibility from work on wages and hours, given that
in tables 4.4–4.5 we are controlling for commuting travel time, could be working
through spatial competition or agglomeration externalities. If firms in which the
workers are employed can access a larger pool of workers, then employees might
behave more competitively and work harder (specially high skilled workers, as sug-
gested by Rosenthal & Strange, 2008). Also, workers could become more productive
in these denser and better connected areas, as has been suggested and empirically
verified in the agglomeration economies literature (see Duranton & Puga, 2004, for
a review) or in the new economic geography literature (Krugman & Venables, 1995;
Redding & Venables, 2004, for example).
In the context of our results, within the different mechanisms which affect in-
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dustrial concentration and agglomeration12, labour market pooling is possibly the
most relevant channel through which agglomeration could be impacting wages and
hours (for example Rosenthal & Strange, 2001, find that this mechanism is the most
relevant in determining industrial concentration). Even if we do not explicitly use
a standard measure of labour market pooling which captures “the use of similar
workers within an industry” (see Rosenthal & Strange, 2001; Overman & Puga, 2010;
Jofre´-Monseny et al., 2011, for examples), better accessibility to employment could
potentially be improving the quality of job-workers matching (see Andersson et al.,
2007, for some empirical evidence) or the search behaviour of the individuals (as
suggested by Di Addario, 2011).
Concerning the size of our coefficients, our coefficient of the effect of accessib-
ility from work on weekly wages (column 7 of PANEL A–table 4.6) is larger (0.328)
than previous estimates of the effect of Harris-type “market potential” measures
on nominal wages. For example, the elasticities provided by Mion & Naticchioni
(2005); Fingleton (2006); Combes et al. (2008a); Amiti & Cameron (2007) and Gra-
ham & Melo (2009) are between 0.02 and 0.2.13
First of all, our measure of accessibility is not directly comparable to standard
“market access” measures used in the literature. The papers mentioned above use
a general market potential definition (Harris, 1954), which is similar in structure to
ours but uses geodesic time invariant distance as the measure of proximity between
locations. In their case, the identified effect of market access on wages stems from
changes in the spatial distribution of employment/income over time, because dis-
tances between locations are kept fixed. Instead, we focus on a different channel of
variation in the accessibility indices, which is road construction. In the main res-
ults of table 4.6, we instrument Art with Aˆrt. In this way, we use a different source
of variation for identification for the effects of accessibility from the authors above.
Proximity between wards changes due to changes in optimal travel times between
locations induced by road construction.
Spatial sorting could be explaining part of the difference in size between our es-
timates and the coefficients found in previous evidence. The identification strategy
we follow substantially helps to reduce the bias caused by the spatial sorting of
workers. As explained above, we control for sorting at the individual level (both
residential and job sorting) by using the individual-home-work fixed effects. This
way, for the identification of the effects we exploit the changes in accessibility over
12Although the different mechanisms are empirically hard to distinguish due to the “Marshallian
equivalence”, as noted by Duranton & Puga (2004) and Overman & Puga (2010).
13Other authors, like Redding & Venables (2004); H. Hanson (2005); Head & Mayer (2006) or Her-
ing & Poncet (2010) have used a measure of market access derived from a NEG model. Their estim-
ates of the elasticity of nominal wages/GDP per capita with respect of market access are between
0.1–0.3.
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time for an individual while staying a given location combination. Moreover, as
outlined above, we believe the instrumental variables strategy helps to eliminate the
bias induced by spatial relocation of workers across space which might be driven by
the changes in accessibility. In other words, we tackle the sorting of workers at the
ward level14.
In fact in our results, the estimates that overlook sorting at the individual level
and the endogenous spatial relocation of ward employment (columns 2 and 5 in
table 4.6), are similar in magnitude to previous estimates of the literature. Thus,
the estimated elasticities of the effect of accessibility from work on weekly basic
and total wages in PANEL A of tables 4.2–4.3 are 0.037 and 0.032 (in column 7, our
preferred specification). Furthermore, even after controlling for individual sorting,
when we do not control for spatial relocation of employment, e.g. in column 5 of
table 4.6, the estimated elasticity is 0.069, which is again in the same order of mag-
nitude than previous findings.
If we compare the coefficients in column 5 to those in columns 6 and 7 of table 4.6,
once controlling for individuals sorting, when we instrument for spatial relocation
of employment the estimated coefficients increase substantially. As explained above
in section 4.2.3.2, the downward bias in the fixed-effect estimates of column 5 could
be due to employment concentrating around areas in which wages are growing
slower. Conditional on other wards characteristics, firms would prefer to employ
workers in wards in which the price of labour is growing slower. The instrument
could also be reducing attenuation bias caused by measurement error in accessib-
ility15. Compared to column 3, attenuation bias could be amplified in column 5 as
the number individual-work-home fixed effects is much larger than before (see table
B.14). Besides, the precision of the estimates of columns 6 and 7 is lower because the
amount of variation in accessibility for individuals that keep their location pair fixed
is quite small (see table B.15). Compared to columns 3 and 5, when we control for
individual sorting and instrument in columns 6 and 7, the standard errors increase
substantially, and it does so the confidence interval of the estimates. As a matter of
fact, the confidence intervals of the coefficients of column 5 and 6 overlap and are
not statistically different at 5% confidence level.
14In their investigation of the determinants of individual wages using a large sample of French
workers, Combes et al. (2008a) find that differences in the skill composition of the labour force ac-
count for 40 to 50% of aggregate spatial wage disparities. They conclude that workers with better
labour market characteristics tend to agglomerate in the larger, denser and more skilled local labour
market. The intuition is that sorting of workers across space has an effect on individual wages be-
cause more skilled workers sort in specific areas. Our approach is different as we explicitly control
for the residential and job sorting of the individuals. Furthermore, we focus on accessibility changes
stemming from transport improvements and do not use the variation coming from spatial changes
in employment. This should help to reduce sorting issues in the same line as these authors.
15Which is possible as annual changes in ward employment calculated using the BSD are likely to
be slightly noisy.
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Finally, in table 4.7 we provide some interpretation of the size of the estimates
within the context of our analysis. We report the mean change of log accessibility Aˆrt
between 2002 and 2008 (growth rate). We focus on Aˆrt because our analysis focuses
on changes in accessibility stemming from road construction. In the top panel we
display the growth in accessibility for wards situated within 10-20-30 kilometres of
any road improvements (All projects), and in wards within the same distance bands
from three specific projects undertaken in 2000, 2003 and 2006, the length of which
is provided too. In the first place, from this table we see that the changes in access-
ibility around an improvement undertaken before our period of analysis (2000) is
very small but not zero. This illustrates the fact that changes in accessibility, even
when using only the variation due to road construction, affect the whole geography.
A change in the network impacts travel times between wards depending on the re-
lative position of the wards within the network and with respect to the rest of the
road improvements. For the schemes carried out in 2003 and 2006 the changes in
accessibility are more substantial.
DISTANCE BAND
PANEL A: Change in log accessibility Aˆrt between 2002-2008 10 kms 20 kms 30 kms
All projects 2.440% 1.120% 0.790%
2000 - M66 Denton - Middleton (15.3 kms) 0.011% 0.011% 0.030%
2003 - A5 Nesscliffe Bypass (21.48 kms) 3.622% 2.026% 1.292%
2006 - A1(M) Ferrybridge to Hook Moor (19.2 kms) 3.131% 2.108% 1.272%
PANEL B: Effect on basic weekly wages (coefficient=0.328) 10 kms 20 kms 30 kms
All projects 0.800% 0.367% 0.259%
2000 - M66 Denton - Middleton (15.3 kms) 0.004% 0.003% 0.010%
2003 - A5 Nesscliffe Bypass (21.48 kms) 1.188% 0.665% 0.424%
2006 - A1(M) Ferrybridge to Hook Moor (19.2 kms) 1.027% 0.691% 0.417%
PANEL C: Effect on total weekly hours (coefficient=0.375) 10 kms 20 kms 30 kms
All projects 0.915% 0.420% 0.296%
2000 - M66 Denton - Middleton (15.3 kms) 0.004% 0.004% 0.011%
2003 - A5 Nesscliffe Bypass (21.48 kms) 1.358% 0.760% 0.484%
2006 - A1(M) Ferrybridge to Hook Moor (19.2 kms) 1.174% 0.791% 0.477%
Sources: ONS, DfT and authors own calculations.
Table 4.7: Effect of accessibility growth on wages and hours – 2002-2008
Additionally, this table helps us to evaluate the size of the coefficients taking
into account the average growth in accessibility within the context of our empirical
exercise. We focus on the results obtained for basic weekly pay (which are very
similar to the results for gross pay) and total weekly hours worked. Our benchmark
estimated elasticities are 0.328 for basic weekly pay and 0.375 for total hours, as
presented in column 7 of table 4.6. The average growth in accessibility for Great
Britain between 2002 and 2008 (approximated by the change in logs), as displayed
in table 2.5 of chapter 2, is 0.3%. The product of the elasticity and the growth in
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accessibility informs us of the relative growth in weekly wages and hours which
can be attributed to the changes in accessibility (due to road construction). For the
whole Great Britain, our estimates predict a growth in weekly wages between 2002-
2008 due to changes in accessibility of 0.098% , and in total hours worked of 0.113%.
When we focus in wards closer to the improvements we find larger impacts, as
the growth in accessibility is bigger. In the bottom panels of table 4.7 we provide
the predicted effects on the 10-20-30 kilometres distance bands. For wards within 30
kilometres of improvements, approximately 0.26% of the growth of weekly nominal
wages and almost 0.3% of the growth in hours worked in Great Britain during the
period can be attributed to the changes in accessibility that stem from road improve-
ments (right column). These impacts increase the closer we get to the improvements
(10 and 20 kilometres distance bands). Around specific improvements these effects
are larger. For example in within 10 kilometres of the “A5 Nesscliffe Bypass” project,
1.2% of the growth in wages and 1.36% of the growth in total hours are attributable
to changes in accessibility.
4.2.3.4 Robustness
In this section we test the robustness of the previous findings. We use the model
of column 7 of tables 4.4 and 4.5, which is the most demanding specification. We
focus on the results on basic weekly wages (which are very similar to those for total
weekly wages) and on total hours worked.
In columns 1 to 3 of table 4.8 we use different measures of the economic size of
the wards in the definition of accessibility indices. Column 1 replicates baseline res-
ults. Column 2 uses address counts as the measure of economic size16 and column
3 uses number of plants (local unit counts). The instruments were calculated using
2001 employment, address counts and local unit counts respectively. The results are
very similar to those of section 4.2.3.2. In columns 4 to 6 we compute accessibility
using employment as economic mass but we use different instruments. Column
4 calculates Aˆiht using 1997 employment, and columns 5 and 6 use 2001 address
counts and local unit counts as economic mass. The instruments of columns 4 and 5
are weaker than that of column 1, but again, the results are very robust.
In table 4.9 we define the accessibility measure using alternative cost functions.
Columns 1 and 4 and 2 and 5 use the “inverse cost weights” function (a
(
crjt
)
= c−αrjt )
but with distance decays α = 0.5 (flatter) and α = 1.5 (steeper). Columns 3 and 6 use
the “exponential weights” function (a
(
crjt
)
= exp
(
αcrjt
)
) with distance decay α =
0.2. The elasticities are larger than before but still positive and largely significant.
16Ideally we would have used population, but data on population at the ward level on a yearly
basis is not available.
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of accessibility 0.328*** 0.298*** 0.312*** 0.325*** 0.321*** 0.324***
from work ward [0.116] [0.112] [0.116] [0.116] [0.119] [0.118]
Log of accessibility -0.025 -0.051 -0.048 -0.028 -0.031 -0.033
from home ward [0.092] [0.090] [0.093] [0.092] [0.093] [0.093]
Log of travel time 0.051 0.043 0.046 0.05 0.049 0.049
between work and home [0.033] [0.034] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
Observations 180,105 180,105 180,105 180,105 180,105 180,105
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,042 1,290 3,428 1,037 814 690
Work-ward no of clusters 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,551
Home-ward no of clusters 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,824
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of accessibility 0.375** 0.364** 0.386** 0.372** 0.380** 0.396**
from work ward [0.156] [0.162] [0.162] [0.154] [0.163] [0.163]
Log of accessibility -0.204 -0.232 -0.243 -0.204 -0.22 -0.23
from home ward [0.224] [0.231] [0.240] [0.221] [0.239] [0.240]
Log of travel time 0.028 0.025 0.024 0.028 0.027 0.027
between work and home [0.062] [0.063] [0.061] [0.062] [0.061] [0.061]
Observations 180,392 180,392 180,392 180,392 180,392 180,392
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,036 1,301 3,401 1,032 809 684
Work-ward no of clusters 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,548
Home-ward no of clusters 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,826
Accessibility Empl Addrct LUsct Empl Empl Empl
Instrument Empl01 Addrct01 LUsct01 Empl97 Addrct01 LUsct01
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-effects,
instrument and all the controls and trends. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.8: Robustness: different economic sizes and different instruments – 2002-2008
PANEL A:Log of PANEL B:Log of total
basic weekly pay weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of accessibility 0.723*** 0.874** 0.874** 0.874** 0.167** 1.685**
from work ward [0.260] [0.355] [0.355] [0.355] [0.067] [0.668]
Log of accessibility -0.044 -0.433 -0.433 -0.433 -0.01 0.12
from home ward [0.197] [0.470] [0.470] [0.470] [0.049] [0.437]
Log of travel time 0.052 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.02 0.034
between work and home [0.032] [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.030] [0.030]
Observations 180,105 180,392 180,392 180,392 180,200 180,200
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 366 362 362 362 1,920 58
Work-ward no of clusters 3,551 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,551 3,551
Home-ward no of clusters 3,824 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,825 3,825
Cost function Inverse Inverse Exponent Inverse Inverse Exponent
Decay 0.5 1.5 0.2 0.5 1.5 0.2
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-effects,
instrument and all the controls and trends. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.9: Robustness: different costs functions and distance decays – 2002-2008
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In table 4.10 we test the robustness of the results to the inclusion or exclusion
of some variables. In column 1 we drop commuting time and in column 2 we in-
troduce travel time in levels instead of in logs. The results remain very similar, the
only different is that travel time is now significant and positive in column 2 con-
trary to insignificant in column 7 of table 4.4. In column 3 we add a dummy which
indicates if the individual is changing jobs (that we identify using the enterprise
reference number) within the ward of work. The estimated elasticities remain vir-
tually unchanged. This is also the case in column 4 when we introduce a dummy
if the worker changes home (identified using the postcode) within the home-ward.
Finally, in column 5 we drop those individuals who live and work in the same ward.
Once more, we obtain very similar coefficients to those of section 4.2.3.2.
In table 4.11 we test the robustness of the results to the inclusion or exclusion
of some specific individual groups. In column 1 we exclude all individuals whose
wage setting is subject to collective agreement. The number of observations de-
creases substantially and the estimates become imprecise, and only weekly signific-
ant for total hours worked. In column 2 we include workers from the public sector,
which are excluded in the main results. The results are very similar to before but
the elasticity of accessibility from work is slightly larger. In column 3, when we ob-
tain the results only using individuals working in the public sector, the coefficient of
accessibility from work on wages and hours are both significant (but weaker) and
positive, and the size is bigger than in our baseline results.
In columns 4 to 6 we test the robustness of the results to the exclusion of Lon-
don. In column 4 we exclude individuals working or living in London (inner and
outer), in column 5 only those living in London and in column 6 only working in
the capital. The results are very similar to the main estimates. Finally, in column
7 we restrict the estimation to those individuals which do not change home-ward
location while observed in the panel, i.e. those for which µi is equal to µihw. The
coefficient of the effect of accessibility from work on wages is very similar to the
baseline, but the effect on hours is larger. These individuals might not be moving
work or home for some unobserved reasons, for example they are home owners or
social renters, they have restricted mobility due to family reasons, etc. Therefore,
if they cannot relocate to take advantage of the changes in accessibility, they might
adjust by working longer hours or switching to full time employment. This could
explain the larger estimated effect on hours worked.
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of accessibility 0.286*** 0.316*** 0.327*** 0.328*** 0.326***
from work ward [0.110] [0.116] [0.116] [0.116] [0.119]
Log of accessibility -0.04 -0.011 -0.024 -0.026 -0.019
from home ward [0.097] [0.094] [0.092] [0.092] [0.093]
Log of travel time 0.05 0.051 0.076**
between work and home [0.033] [0.032] [0.033]
Travel time 0.236**
between work and home [0.102]
Individual changes 0.002
job within work ward [0.003]
Individual changes 0.006*
house within home ward [0.003]
Observations 185,818 180,105 180,105 180,105 158,609
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,104 1,076 1,042 1,042 787
Work-ward no of clusters 3,556 3,551 3,551 3,551 3,353
Home-ward no of clusters 3,830 3,824 3,824 3,824 3,785
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of accessibility 0.355** 0.373** 0.375** 0.375** 0.350**
from work ward [0.140] [0.153] [0.156] [0.156] [0.147]
Log of accessibility -0.209 -0.167 -0.204 -0.203 -0.21
from home ward [0.229] [0.228] [0.224] [0.224] [0.233]
Log of travel time 0.028 0.028 0.072
between work and home [0.062] [0.062] [0.064]
Travel time 0.284
between work and home [0.230]
Individual changes -0.001
job within work-ward [0.005]
Individual changes -0.001
house within home-ward [0.006]
Observations 186,209 180,392 180,392 180,392 158,998
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,099 1,070 1,036 1,035 778
Work-ward no of clusters 3,553 3,548 3,548 3,548 3,351
Home-ward no of clusters 3,834 3,826 3,826 3,826 3,790
Specification No ltrvt Level trvt Chg jobs Chg houses Diff HW
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-effects,
instrument and all the controls and trends. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.10: Robustness: changes in the specification – 2002-2008
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of accessibility 0.256 0.337*** 0.501* 0.301*** 0.306*** 0.308*** 0.341***
from work ward [0.211] [0.110] [0.297] [0.108] [0.108] [0.108] [0.117]
Log of accessibility 0.034 -0.051 -0.135 -0.059 -0.06 -0.058 0.068
from home ward [0.143] [0.083] [0.150] [0.082] [0.082] [0.081] [0.105]
Log of travel time 0.111* 0.022 -0.042 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.035
between work and home [0.058] [0.021] [0.028] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.031]
Observations 96,119 254,294 73,488 205,991 208,091 213,822 114,919
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,132 952 352 1,259 1,253 1,271 987
Work-ward no of clusters 3,315 3,710 2,703 3,192 3,194 3,549 3,350
Home-ward no of clusters 3,745 3,847 3,511 3,333 3,629 3,337 3,724
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of accessibility 0.261* 0.407*** 0.645** 0.387*** 0.389*** 0.385*** 0.698***
from work ward [0.142] [0.136] [0.254] [0.135] [0.135] [0.136] [0.218]
Log of accessibility 0.064 -0.17 -0.029 -0.177 -0.177 -0.181 -0.237
from home ward [0.119] [0.179] [0.138] [0.177] [0.177] [0.176] [0.282]
Log of travel time 0.019 0.008 -0.038 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.033
between work and home [0.049] [0.046] [0.041] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.074]
Observations 96,485 254,619 73,537 205,655 207,768 213,739 115,172
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,123 949 348 1,259 1,254 1,272 990
Work-ward no of clusters 3,310 3,707 2,696 3,190 3,192 3,546 3,346
Home-ward no of clusters 3,748 3,848 3,510 3,332 3,627 3,336 3,728
Specification No coll Priv-Publ Public No London No hLond No wLond No move
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-effects, instrument
and all the controls and trends. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.11: Robustness: different groups– 2002-2008
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4.2.3.5 Heterogeneous effects
In this section we estimate the effects of accessibility from work and home for dif-
ferent sub-groups to both check the robustness of the results for specific groups of
workers and also to be able to identify any heterogeneous treatment effects17.
PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of accessibility 0.419*** 0.385*** 0.266 0.387** 0.286***
from work ward [0.106] [0.112] [0.169] [0.162] [0.109]
Log of accessibility 0.015 0.015 -0.11 0.007 -0.082
from home ward [0.116] [0.081] [0.197] [0.160] [0.096]
Log of travel time 0.054 0.089*** -0.004 0.111** 0.025
between work and home [0.034] [0.026] [0.052] [0.048] [0.039]
Observations 130,511 99,509 80,596 64,520 112,729
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 747 853 1,033 1,491 533
Work-ward no of clusters 3,382 3,169 3,107 3,220 2,884
Home-ward no of clusters 3,759 3,710 3,645 3,618 3,701
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of accessibility 0.289** 0.378 0.355*** 0.253 0.524**
from work ward [0.134] [0.249] [0.123] [0.172] [0.235]
Log of accessibility -0.041 -0.218 -0.166 -0.042 -0.298
from home ward [0.107] [0.340] [0.150] [0.140] [0.365]
Log of travel time 0.045 0.103 -0.054 0.136 -0.009
between work and home [0.083] [0.106] [0.047] [0.134] [0.042]
Observations 130,730 99,897 80,495 64,389 113,129
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 744 836 1,043 1,505 527
Work-ward no of clusters 3,382 3,163 3,104 3,216 2,884
Home-ward no of clusters 3,762 3,717 3,644 3,622 3,709
Group Aged 20-50 Males Females Firms0-150 Firms+150
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-
effects, instrument and all the controls and trends. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calcula-
tions. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.12: Robustness: by age, gender and firm size– 2002-2008
In table 4.12 we estimate the effects by age, by gender and by firm size. When
we focus on the “primary working-age” workers, i.e. those aged 20 to 50, we find
stronger effects of accessibility from work on wages and very similar effects on total
hours worked. In columns 2 and 3 we split the results by gender. These results
suggest that the effects of accessibility on wages is only applicable to men, while
women are responding to increases in accessibility from workplace by increasing
the number of hours worked (maybe switching from part time to full time jobs).
In columns 4 and 5 of table 4.12 we run the regressions for individuals working
in firms with 150 employees or fewer and firms with more than 150 employees. The
employment figure corresponds to the firm in which the worker is employed, not
to the specific plant in which he is located. The effect of accessibility from work
on weekly wages remains significant for both groups, and it is slightly higher for
17The results in this section are preliminary and need further work.
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smaller firms. In bigger plants we also see an adjustment via hours worked, and the
coefficient is larger than the baseline results. This could be due to bigger firms being
more flexible with respect to working hours or workers being able to switch to full
time jobs by remaining in the same firm in bigger enterprises.
PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of accessibility 0.269* 0.350** 0.308* 0.238 0.103 0.411***
from work ward [0.138] [0.156] [0.168] [0.203] [0.598] [0.116]
Log of accessibility 0.048 -0.056 -0.061 0.158 -0.333 -0.007
from home ward [0.133] [0.111] [0.192] [0.122] [0.344] [0.098]
Log of travel time 0.026 0.093** 0.007 0.022 -0.03 0.133***
between work and home [0.049] [0.043] [0.061] [0.040] [0.130] [0.045]
Observations 101,473 78,632 57,139 44,334 23,457 55,175
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,103 656 1,216 697 317 692
Work-ward no of clusters 3,273 2,994 2,907 2,533 1,995 2,696
Home-ward no of clusters 3,673 3,614 3,458 3,188 2,721 3,437
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of accessibility 0.227* 0.527* 0.303** 0.121 0.579** 0.488
from work ward [0.124] [0.300] [0.138] [0.204] [0.249] [0.374]
Log of accessibility 0.01 -0.36 -0.157 0.199 -0.268 -0.365
from home ward [0.124] [0.418] [0.163] [0.238] [0.319] [0.488]
Log of travel time -0.066 0.199 -0.073 -0.092* 0.008 0.256
between work and home [0.043] [0.133] [0.052] [0.050] [0.097] [0.167]
Observations 100,992 79,400 57,072 43,920 23,423 55,977
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,105 646 1,224 692 317 676
Work-ward no of clusters 3,267 2,997 2,904 2,521 1,989 2,698
Home-ward no of clusters 3,671 3,621 3,457 3,178 2,715 3,452
Skill/gender H Skills L Skills HS female HS male LS female LS male
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-effects,
instrument and all the controls and trends. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.13: Robustness: by skill level (high/low) and gender – 2002-2008
In table 4.13 we divide the workers into two skills groups, high and low, based on
their initial occupation category. This classification is based on the Standard Occu-
pation Classification 2000 manual (Volume 1, page 6)18. Higher levels relate to more
skilled occupations (for example corporate manager or science and technology pro-
fessionals), while lower levels relate to less skilled or more mechanical occupations
(for example, elementary administration and services occupations). Columns 1-2
display the results for high and low skilled workers, and columns 4 to 6 splits the
sample by skills and gender. We find positive and significant effects of accessibility
from work on weekly wages in both groups, but the effect is larger and more sig-
nificant for high skilled workers. We find the same pattern for the effects on hours,
but the coefficients are significant only at the 10% level. By gender, as in table 4.12
18More information can be found in http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
guide-method/classifications/archived-standard-classifications/
standard-occupational-classification-2000/index.html.
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we find that accessibility has an impact on female working hours19.
PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of accessibility 0.325*** 0.302 0.29 0.354*** 0.125 1.495*
from work ward [0.124] [0.320] [0.244] [0.104] [0.316] [0.906]
Log of accessibility -0.023 -0.059 -0.244 0.065 0.169 -2.659**
from home ward [0.079] [0.380] [0.223] [0.061] [0.342] [1.329]
Log of travel time 0.061** 0.034 0.015 0.077*** 0.017 1.061*
between work and home [0.029] [0.081] [0.070] [0.023] [0.074] [0.547]
Observations 142,930 37,175 50,020 92,910 30,576 6,599
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 991 834 835 867 872 153
Work-ward no of clusters 3,357 2,678 2,603 3,081 2,499 1,198
Home-ward no of clusters 3,780 3,269 3,371 3,679 3,082 1,545
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of accessibility 0.101 2.007 0.175 0.066 0.588* 11.707*
from work ward [0.114] [1.241] [0.122] [0.143] [0.338] [6.980]
Log of accessibility 0.035 -1.798 -0.278* 0.153* 0.059 -19.675*
from home ward [0.071] [1.640] [0.144] [0.083] [0.313] [10.395]
Log of travel time 0.000 0.120 0.044 -0.021 -0.077 11.944
between work and home [0.030] [0.200] [0.059] [0.031] [0.061] [8.843]
Observations 143,323 37,069 49,998 93,325 30,497 6,572
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 979 848 838 849 882 153
Work-ward no of clusters 3,351 2,674 2,601 3,074 2,496 1,197
Home-ward no of clusters 3,784 3,269 3,370 3,687 3,081 1,540
Status/gender Full-time Part-time FT female FT male PT female PT male
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-effects,
instrument and all the controls and trends. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 4.14: Robustness: status (full-time/part-time) and gender – 2002-2008
In table 4.14 we split the sample depending on the initial full-time or part-time
status. Columns 1-2 show the results for all genders, and columns 4 to 6 divide
the sample by gender and status. We find that the effect of work accessibility on
wages only remains significant for full-time workers, and the size is similar to the
main results. When splitting by gender, males seem to be driving all the impact of
accessibility on wages. We do not find any specific pattern on the effect on hours.
The appendix reports some extra results. In table B.17 we obtain the results for
the five wide industrial sectors. The number of observations used for each estim-
ation is smaller than before, so the estimates are less precise. We find positive and
significant effects of accessibility from workplace on weekly wages for manufactur-
ing and construction (columns 1 and 2). In these sectors firms could be benefiting
from increased input-output sharing or access to larger markets and capitalising any
19In table B.18 in the appendix we define 4 wide skill categories based on the occupation codes,
defined the first time the individual is observed in the panel. We find similar effects of accessibility
from workplace on wages and total hours for workers in category skill2, which is the one that has
the largest number of observations. We find weak evidence for workers in category skill3. However,
the standard errors in columns 1, 3 and 4 are large so the estimates are quite imprecise.
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productivity increase due to this into higher wages paid to their workers. We do not
find any evidence of effects on accessibility from work on wages for the other three
industrial sector categories (consumer services, producer services or other sectors).
We find no effect on accessibility on hours worked. The estimates are quite impre-
cise because the sample size is substantially reduced when we split the sample by
sector.
Finally, in tables B.19 and B.20 we test the robustness of the results to different
initial characteristics of the ward in which they are located. We divided the ward
in two groups based on the median level of accessibility in 2001, median level of
address density in 2001 (table B.19), median level of unemployment rate in 2001
and median level of proportion of commuters by motor vehicles in 2001 (table B.20).
The effect of accessibility from work on weekly wages is quite robust to the initial
level of accessibility (columns 1 to 4 of table B.19), but the effect on total hours works
only seems to remain positive and significant for ward in which the initial level
of accessibility was high. For initial density, the results are similar for total hours
worked, i.e. accessibility from workplace only has an effect on hours in ward in
which initial residential density was high. For wages, the evidence mixed.
In the case of initial levels of unemployment or motor commuters, the effects of
accessibility from work on weekly wages are very robust across groups, although
the estimates are less precise than in the main results. The coefficients are also very
similar to the baseline estimates. However, accessibility from work only seems to
have an effect on total hours work for individuals living in ward with high unem-
ployment rate and working in ward with low unemployment rate (columns 1 and
4 of table B.20). Effects on hours depending on the proportion of motor commuters
are weaker, and do not seem to follow any specific pattern.
4.3 Effects on employment status and travel times
The results in section 4.2 inform us about the effect of accessibility on labour mar-
ket outcomes of workers which are already employed. But changes in accessibility
from work and home wards could also affect other outcomes. In this section we
provide evidence on the effect of changes in accessibility on the probability of being
employed versus being unemployed or out of work. We also investigate if the ef-
fects of accessibility on labour market outcomes are working through the channel of
reducing commuting costs, measured by travel time to workplace in our data.
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4.3.1 Empirical specification and identification strategy
For the analysis of the effect of accessibility on other labour market outcomes we
use data from the Labour Force Survey (more details in section 4.3.2). Due to the
setup of this data, we use a slightly different identification strategy. We test the
effect of accessibility on two outcomes: on employment status (a dummy variable
which takes the value 1 if the individual is employed and 0 if he is unemployed or
out of work) and on commuting time (which is only available in some quarters).
We have quarterly observations for individuals for which we have information
on their personal characteristics (gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, household
composition, tenancy status, level of education, etc.) and their job characterist-
ics (industrial sector, occupation, full time/part time status, public/private sector,
main/secondary job, hours worked, income, etc.). We have information on the loca-
tion of households at the ward level. However, we have limited information on the
location of jobs. When the individual is working, we know if the individual works
and lives within the same local authority. For these reasons, we can only test the
effect of accessibility from home. We also have information on their travel time to
workplace20.
Even if the individual data has quarterly frequency, the accessibility measures
only change on a yearly basis. Due to the design of the survey, we cannot define
individual fixed effects21. Instead we can define so called “pseudo-fixed effects”
(µ˜i) and estimate a pseudo-panel. This strategy is commonly used in survey data
which has the same structure as the LFS, i.e. repeated cross-sections (see for ex-
ample Nickell et al., 2002; Warunsiri & McNown, 2010; Dearden et al., 2011). We
allocate a different fixed-effect to individuals with a combination of specific set of
characteristics. We exploit the variation of different individuals around the mean of
a “representative” individual, defined by the set of characteristics. Depending on
how many different characteristics we use to define these dummies, the estimation
strategy becomes more demanding22. In our case we define the pseudo fixed effects
using gender, 10-year age group and ethnicity (the base category is white, male,
aged 16-25).
We estimate the following specification:
yiht = β0 + β1Aiht + θXit + δZjt + λWht + µ˜i + ξt + ξq + εiht (4.5)
20And on the transport mode used to go to work, but only for very few observations.
21Even in the best case scenario (if the same individual is surveyed twice in the same address in
quarters 1 and 5) we can only observe the same individual with one year gap.
22We could for example define an individual-home ward pseudo fixed-effect, µ˜ih which would
exploit the variation for the individuals defined by the gender-age-ethnicity within a given location.
For this we need enough observations within each ward for each category defined by the pseudo-
fixed effect. Given the small spatial unit of analysis we are using this is not feasible.
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where yiht is a given labour market outcome for individual i, living in ward h at
time t; Aiht is accessibility to employment from home, Xit is a matrix of individual
characteristics (not included in the pseudo fixed-effects), Zjt is a matrix of job charac-
teristics (when employed), Wht is a matrix of home-ward characteristics, µ˜i denotes
the pseudo fixed-effects as defined above, ξt and ξq are year and quarter dummies
which control for common annual shocks and quarter seasonality and finally εiht
denotes the idiosyncratic error term.
As for the results on wages and hours worked, we address the identification
of coefficient β by estimating a reduced-form specification which uses Aˆiht (1997
employment). To tackle the endogeneity of the transport improvements we only use
information on individuals living within 20 kilometres from a improvement opened
between 1998 and 200723.
4.3.2 Data
We use data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is a quarterly sample survey
of households living at private addresses in Great Britain. Its purpose is to provide
information on the UK labour market that can then be used to develop, manage,
evaluate and report on labour market policies. The survey seeks information on re-
spondents’ personal circumstances and their labour market status during a specific
reference period, normally a period of one week or four weeks (depending on the
question) immediately prior to the interview. Data is available quarterly from 1992.
The survey is based on household residing at a given address, not on specific indi-
viduals. It contains interviews of all members of the household in five consecutive
quarters. The same address can host different individuals across the five quarters
of interviews. Each quarter a new wave enters the survey and an old wave leaves.
Table 4.15 displays the number of observations by year and quarter.
The smallest geographical unit available for the location of the household is ward
(as defined in 1998). The location of workplace is only reported at the regional level
(for around 20 regions). However the LFS indicates if the worker works and lives in
the same Local Authority District (of which there are 354 in Great Britain). The sur-
vey provides information on personal and household characteristics, level of edu-
cation, sector, occupation, hours worked, travel to work and employment status,
although information on earnings is not as good and reliable as that contained in
ASHE24. From this LFS we can then recover information on unemployment or in-
activity status. It also has information on the household composition and detailed
23The sample size of the LFS is sufficiently large to be able to focus on the 20-kilometre distance
band, as we did in chapter 3.
24The response rate for the earning and hours questions is quite low and the data on earnings and
hours is self-reported, and thus less reliable than employer provided data.
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YEAR
QUARTER
1 2 3 4 Total
1998 32,042 31,974 31,520 31,375 126,911
1999 30,851 31,762 31,344 31,449 125,406
2000 31,225 31,010 30,415 30,235 122,885
2001 30,124 29,762 29,894 28,966 118,746
2002 27,362 25,280 22,153 19,504 94,299
2003 22,233 23,609 25,123 24,288 95,253
2004 22,071 21,283 20,465 18,568 82,387
2005 23,314 26,330 26,254 26,159 102,057
2006 26,300 26,385 26,244 26,153 105,082
2007 26,406 26,403 26,489 26,403 105,701
2008 26,453 26,049 25,520 26,062 104,084
Total 298,381 299,847 295,421 289,162 1,182,811
Table 4.15: LFS number of observations
information on personal characteristics. The main disadvantage of the survey is that
it is not a panel. However, as discussed above, we can construct a panel of repeated
cross sections for a given quarter and use the abundant individual information to
construct a pseudo-panel and to control for characteristics like age and gender, oc-
cupation group, industry, etc.
4.3.3 Results
4.3.3.1 Travel time to workplace
Table 4.16 shows the results for the effect of log accessibility from home on travel
time to workplace. We use data between 1998 and 2008. In columns 1 to 8 we
estimate a reduced-form specification in which we use Aˆiht and in column 9 we use
Aiht. The number of observations is much smaller than later because the information
on travel to work is only available in the LFS 4th quarter (Autumn).
We estimate the results on a pool of individuals and include year, monthly dum-
mies and pseudo-fixed effects. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the ward level. In column 1 we use OLS. We find a positive asso-
ciation between travel time and accessibility. This could be just because in denser
areas, where accessibility is higher, workers travel longer for jobs because of traffic
congestion. In column 2 we introduce personal characteristics: student status, skill
level, housing tenure, marital status, household composition, number of children
(table B.21 shows the details of the coefficients of the personal and job character-
istics)25. In column 3 we add the job characteristics: occupation (1 digit), full time
dummy, second job dummy, work from home dummy, public sector worker dummy
25The baseline category is 1st quarter 1998, white-male-16-25, without qualifications, household
owns the house, single or living with other people, 1 adult with no children, managers and senior
officials, working in sector 01:agriculture,hunting,etc.
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and industrial sector dummies (2 digits). Columns 2 and 3 also show positive and
significant effects of accessibility on travel time. However in these specifications we
do not take into account that individuals might be changing jobs when accessibility
from home is increased because in relative terms it becomes worthwhile traveling
further.
Log of travel time to workplace
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility 0.0585*** 0.053*** 0.0115* -0.016*** -0.004 -0.0125** 0.122 0.0845
(1997 employment) 0.0066 0.0060 0.0046 0.0039 0.0039 0.0040 0.1223 0.1261
Log of accessibility -0.057
(annual employment) 0.041
Live & work in the -0.677*** -0.722*** -0.721*** -0.723*** -0.747*** -0.747*** -0.747***
same Local Authority 0.0092 0.0083 0.0082 0.0083 0.0087 0.0087 0.0087
Observations 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.057 0.269 0.295 0.297 0.299 0.272 0.272 0.272
Personal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Job characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District dummies YES YES YES
Ward attributes/trends YES YES YES YES
Scheme dummies/trends YES YES YES
Ward fixed-effects YES YES YES
Clustered (ward) s.e. All specifications include year, monthly dummies & pseudo-fe (age, gender, white). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***
p<0.001. Distance band 20 kms. Personal characteristics include student status, skill level, housing tenure, marital status, household
composition, number of children. Job characteristics include occupation (1 digit), full time dummy, second job dummy, work from
home dummy, public sector worker dummy and industrial sector dummies (2 digits). Ward attributes include distance to closest
transport improvement, mean age of the population, proportion of household living in social housing, proportion of household with
higher qualifications, average distance traveled to place of work, proportion of households with cars or vans, proportion of employees
going to work by motor vehicles, area. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations.
Table 4.16: Travel time to workplace results
In column 4 we control unobservables at the district level and the coefficient be-
comes negative and significant. Districts correspond to Local Authorities and there
are around 350 in Great Britain. The district dummies control by time-invariant
unobservable characteristics of the districts which might be correlated with access-
ibility and travel time at the same time. These could include aspects related to road
infrastructure like the district initial endowment of roads, its quality or its level of
congestion. In column 5 and 6 we add ward 2001 attributes (in levels and in trends)
and scheme dummies and trends. Column 6 controls for district fixed-effects, ward
attributes and scheme dummies: it provides evidence of a negative relationship
between accessibility and commuting time. In columns 7 and 8, when we intro-
duce the ward fixed-effects, the estimates become very imprecise, possibly due to
the lack of variation across pseudo-fixed effects within each ward. In column 9 we
use the accessibility measure with time-varying employment, but the estimates are
still insignificant.
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4.3.3.2 Employment status
In this sub-section we provide the estimates of the effect of accessibility on the prob-
ability of being employed versus being out of work (table 4.16) and versus being
unemployed (table 4.17). As before, columns 1 to 7 estimate a reduced-form spe-
cification and column 8 uses the measure of accessibility with time-varying employ-
ment. We estimate a linear probability model (LPM). Alternatively we could have
estimated a Probit model, but given the large number of fixed-effects it becomes
technically complex. Moreover, we believe the LPM estimates provide a sensible
baseline.
PANEL A: Employment status (1 employed, 0 out of work)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of accessibility -0.012*** -0.0008 0.0026* 0.0007 0.0001 0.023 0.019
(1997 employment) 0.0018 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0342 0.037
Log of accessibility 0.006
(annual employment) 0.0118
Observations 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.234 0.237 0.238 0.239 0.205 0.206 0.206
PANEL B: Employment status (1 employed, 0 unemployed)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of accessibility -0.0046*** -0.0002 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 -0.018 -0.003
(1997 employment) 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0163 0.0181
Log of accessibility -0.01
(annual employment) 0.0067
Observations 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.085 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.070 0.070 0.070
Personal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District dummies YES YES YES
Ward attributes/trends YES YES YES YES
Scheme dummies/trends YES YES YES
Ward fixed-effects YES YES YES
Clustered (ward) s.e. All specifications include year, monthly dummies & pseudo-fe (age, gender, white). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001. Distance band 20 kms. Personal characteristics include student status, skill level, housing tenure, marital status,
household composition, number of children. Ward attributes include distance to closest transport improvement, mean age of
the population, proportion of household living in social housing, proportion of household with higher qualifications, average
distance traveled to place of work, proportion of households with cars or vans, proportion of employees going to work by motor
vehicles, area. Source: ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations.
Table 4.17: Employment status results
Column 1 shows a negative significant association between accessibility and the
probability of being employed. This could be because individuals with specific char-
acteristics which make them “less employable” locate in places where accessibility
is higher. In column 2 we control for personal characteristics. The effect becomes
weaker and insignificant. In column 3 we add district dummies. The coefficient of
accessibility in the top panel (for employment status when 0 is out of work) becomes
positive but it is only weakly significant. In column 4 we add ward attributes which
are obtained from the 2001 census26. In column 5 we add scheme trends and the
26It does not exist time-varying data for the period of analysis available at such small spatial scale.
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coefficients decrease and become insignificant again. From column 6 we add ward
fixed-effects to control for unobservable factors at the ward level which might be
correlated with employment and accessibility. The coefficient becomes very impre-
cise and the standard errors increase considerably.
In column 7 we add scheme trends and ward attributes trends, and the coeffi-
cients become even less precise. As for the results of the effect on travel time, it is
very likely that the big standard errors of columns 6 and 7 are due to the lack of vari-
ation of the data once we only exploit the within ward variation, because there are
not sufficient observations in each ward in each year and in each pseudo-fixed effect
category to be able to identify the parameters. In column 8 we use the accessibility
measure with time-varying yearly employment Aiht. The results are more precise
than in column 7 as expected, because accessibility changes much more from year
to year when we use yearly employment. Nevertheless the coefficient of accessibil-
ity is still quite imprecise and in all cases insignificant.
To summarise, the results in sections 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2 provide some evidence
that accessibility to employment from home reduces travel time to workplace but it
does not have any effect on the probability of being employed. For these results we
we are ignoring any effect that accessibility might have on relocation because we do
not observe individuals over time. These results are consistent with those found is
section 4.2, in which we found that accessibility from home does not have an effect
on labour market outcomes once we only use the variation for a given location.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have investigated the effect of changes in accessibility, induced
by road construction, on individual labour market outcomes. We make use of rich
individual datasets and small geographical scale to be able to infer causality on the
estimates.
We provide evidence of the effect of accessibility both from workplace and res-
idence on individual wages and hours worked. Controlling for commuting time
allows us to learn about the potential theoretical channels through which access-
ibility might be impacting on labour market outcomes. After controlling for sort-
ing, we find positive effects of accessibility from work on earnings and total hours.
These results could be driven by agglomeration externalities which are capitalised
into higher nominal wages and by increased spatial competition which might make
employees work longer hours. Workers could also be responding to higher nom-
inal wages by increasing overtime or switching from part time to full time jobs.
These results are very robust to different specifications and across different groups
of workers.
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Two main conclusion can be drawn from these results. First, changes in access-
ibility impact workers by affecting “flexible” outcomes, i.e. wages and overtime.
These results are consistent with what we would expect if basic hours are fixed by
contract. If higher accessibility from workplace is capitalised into higher wages,
workers could be increasing the number of hours work to benefit from the wage in-
crease, but the margin in which they can adjust this is through over time. Secondly,
our identification strategy allows us to separate the effect of spatial sorting from
other channels through which accessibility might be impacting labour market out-
comes. As discussed in the text, once we focus on the variation of accessibility for a
given work-home location combination, there is no effect of accessibility from home
on hours or wages. But the effect of accessibility from workplace is significant even
once we control for sorting, and the size of the coefficient increases substantially.
This result stresses the importance of accounting for sorting to be able to correctly
attribute the changes in earnings and hours to changes in accessibility.
We also investigate the effect that changes in accessibility might have on em-
ployment status and travel times. We find no effect of accessibility from home on
the probability of being employed. We find some negative correlations between
accessibility from home and travel time to workplace, but these become imprecise
when we become more demanding in terms of the identification.
The findings in chapter 4 provide new evidence on the effect of agglomeration
externalities and proximity to markets on wages and hours worked using a novel
strategy that carefully tackles multiple endogeneity issues. We use transport im-
provements stemming from road construction as the source of changes in market
access. Transport policy is a substantial part of economic policy and the estimates
of chapters 3 and 4 help to shed light on the economic impacts that transport infra-
structure investments can have on workers and firms.
The results for the effect of accessibility on labour market outcomes complement
the results provided in the previous chapter. The fact that in chapter 3 we did not
find effects of accessibility of wages paid by firms can be somehow puzzling. How-
ever, measure used to approximate firm average wage per worker is very crude
(ARD firm wage bill over the firm employment) and only available for a subset of
firms. Therefore, the results on wages obtained using ASHE data are likely to be
much more reliable.
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Appendix A
Spatial impacts of immigration:
evidence from the Spanish housing
market
A.1 Further issues regarding the interpretation of β
There are still some other issues we would need to take into account in order to
interpret β correctly. As native and immigrants are not perfect substitutes in the
labour market (Peri & Sparber, 2009), it is possible that the consumption of housing
services is also different for foreign-born and natives. Immigrants are likely to con-
sume less housing services than natives (Borjas, 2002), in terms of density (they live
in more crowded houses) and in terms of participation in the formal housing mar-
kets. Data analysis from the National Immigration Survey (2007) reveals that a sig-
nificant fraction of immigrants (around 20%) live with relatives/friends or in other
informal situations, especially shortly after their arrival. It could be the case that
there exist higher credit restrictions for immigrants (Dı´az-Serrano & Raya, 2011),
that immigrants select into different type of housing than natives or that they live in
denser properties (Martori et al., 2006). The β parameter captures the average effect
of immigration on house prices, but it does not allow us to say anything about the
existence of these phenomena.
This paper studies the impact of immigrants on two types of prices of housing
services: the purchase price (generally referred a house price) and the rental price
(rents). These two prices are related and influence each other. Immigrants, if rent-
ing, would affect rents directly, and purchase prices indirectly. Natives, or other
immigrants, would find it profitable to invest in a property in order to rent out it
to immigrants, therefore pushing up demand of housing and prices. Depending on
the relative price of renting versus buying, immigrants would favour one type of
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housing tenancy over the other.
In fact, data from the National Immigration Survey (2007) shows that immig-
rants mainly rent properties. Of the immigrants residing in Spain at the beginning
of 2007, that had arrived after 1997, only 21% own the property where they reside,
while around 60% rent. In fact, the housing tenancy choices vary a lot between
nationality groups. According to National Immigration Survey (2007) immigrants
from EU15 countries tend to own the property they reside in (around 70% do), while
immigrants from South America, East Europe and Sub-Saharan African predomin-
antly rent (between 70 and 85% do). During the period 1998-2010, the composition
of the foreign-born population stocks and inflows has change substantially. Ana-
lysis of table A.3 reveals that the weight, both in terms of stocks and of inflows, of
foreign-born from the EU15 countries has decreased considerably during the period,
the share over the total of immigrants coming from the enlargement countries (espe-
cially Romania) and from Latin America has increase largely while the importance
of other large immigration groups, like Sub-saharan, has remained relatively stable.
Moreover, most immigrants from East European, Latin American and Sub-Saharan
nationalities migrate to Spain ”in order to find a/improve job”, according to the Na-
tional Immigration Survey (2007). We would expect most immigrants to favour
rental tenancy, as the nature of their migration movement could be considered, at
least initially, temporary. If natives invest in properties expecting to get a rent from
immigrants, then immigrants would affect purchase prices directly (by purchasing)
and indirectly (by motivating others to purchase them). Given that most immig-
rants rent, the effect on purchase prices would mainly be through the indirect chan-
nel, plus any induced effect on purchases from re-located natives. We could expect
the effect on purchase prices to be higher than the direct effect on rents, because it
would be the sum of the ”direct” purchases by immigrants and the purchases by
natives in order to rent the properties. Additionally, the estimated effect would de-
pend on the relative demands from both population groups, in case immigrants and
natives have different preferences over housing tenure. However, my methodology
does not allow me to disentangle the direct and the indirect effects or to control for
different preferences, so I can only estimate the average effect.
A final potential concern for the interpretation of β is the choice of the spatial
unit of analysis. When immigrants locate in different areas they affect equilibrium
prices within ”housing markets”, which may not necessarily correspond to an ad-
ministratively defined region. To capture more accurately housing markets, ideally
we would use travel-to-work or metropolitan areas, which can be constructed from
municipality data using commuter flows. Yet, there exist data limitations and there
is no consensus on which is the appropriate definition of a housing market to use1. I
1Royuela & Vargas (2007) define the housing markets for Catalonia using commuting and migra-
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use province (NUTS3) because of data limitations, which, given their size, I consider
would capture relatively well the housing markets.
A.2 Further details on the construction of the instru-
ment
A.2.1 Gravity estimations
In order to predict total inflows by nationality in a given year, I use a gravity-type
model that only contains push-factors from origin to predict the total inflow from
nationality n to Spain in a given year t. The estimated equation is:
ln
(
FBin f low f rom n to Spain,t
)
= ρ′ ln (ECONn,t−1) +ω′ ln (GEOn) + γg + λt + ξn,t
(A.1)
where ECONn,t−1 is a matrix of time-varying economic conditions of the sending
country (gross domestic output in real terms, total population, percentage of urban
population, percentage of internet users, an index of globalisation and dummy of
belonging to the EU27). GEOn is a matrix of time-invariant geographic character-
istics of the sending country like (log of) distance to Spain, (log of) area, number of
cities, latitude and longitude and dummies for common language, common border
and common colonial past with Spain. I include year dummies λt and country-
group dummies γg (the groups appearing in table A.4). I can alternatively include
country dummies, which drops the time-invariant variables. I also estimate a sim-
ilar model using foreign-born stocks on the left hand side (the economic variables
are lagged two terms because population is measure on the 1st of January). Data
is available for 109 of the 119 countries of table A.4, which represent more than
99% of the inflows into Spain for the period. Results for different specifications are
showed in table A.5 for the total national inflows and in table A.6 for the national
foreign-born stocks. The specifications include country and country-group dum-
mies alternatively, and the two first columns include year dummies while the last
two do not include them. All the models have high predictive power.
From the results in tables A.5 and A.6 I recover the predicted inflows to and
predicted stocks of foreign-born in Spain from nationality n in a for every year 2001-
2010. I use the prediction from estimates from column (1) for the construction of
the instrument, and I use the rest of the specifications estimates for the robustness
check. These are combined it with the share by province in base year in a similar
tion flows. On the other hand, Boix & Veneri (2009) define the ”metropolitan areas” in Spain. There
also exists a definition of ”urban areas” done by the Department of Housing. More information can
be found in ”Atlas Estadstico de las reas Urbanas (2006)”.
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manner as in (1.5). The imputed predicted foreign-born inflow for each nationality
becomes:
imp pred FBin f lowni,t−1 = share
n
i,base ∗
(
∑Jj 6=i pred FBin f lownj,t−1
)
(A.2)
The total imputed predicted inflow to each province i at time t is therefore defined
as the sum of (A.2) across nationalities:
imp pred FBin f lowi,t−1 =∑Nn
(
imp pred FBin f lowni,t−1
)
(A.3)
Data from the World Bank World Development Indicators (for the economic
variables) and from the Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales -
CEPII (for the geographical variables) is used for the estimation of the gravity model
of equation (A.1).
A.2.2 Prediction for native location
I use past census data to predict the numbers of natives residing in province i in year
t. Total natives in a province are the sum of those born and residing there and those
who were born somewhere else in Spain and have moved there. A person born
in a given province b (similar to nationalities in the foreign-born case) can either
stay where she was born (stayers) or to move and reside in a different province i
(movers). R is the total number of provinces in Spain in which natives can locate.
For consistence, I use native location patterns from census 1991 as base year (results
with 1981 and 2001 censuses are very similar and are used in the robustness checks).
For a given period in the past (base year), we define the share of stayers in
province r as the proportion of natives born and staying in a province over all the
natives born in the province:
sharebb,base =
nativesbb,base
∑Ri natives
b
r,base
(A.4)
And the share of movers as the proportion of natives born in b but residing in r over
all the natives born in b but residing somewhere else:
sharebr,base =
nativesbr,base
∑Ri 6=b nativesbr,base
(A.5)
Share (A.4) is multiplied by the total natives born and staying in the same province
in year t to predict the number of stayers in a given year. Share (A.5) is multiplied
by the total number of natives living outside the province they were born in year
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t (subtracting the natives living in the province for which we want to calculate the
prediction, similarly to the case of the foreign-born prediction) to predict the num-
ber of natives born in b living in province i at the different points in time. We sum
these prediction for each province i across each province of residence r to obtain
imp nativesi,t−1.
The correlation between the prediction and the actual number is very high (over
0.90 in all cases), probably because mobility in Spain is low (Decressin & Fatas, 1995)
so most natives stay in the province they were born and this is persistent over time.
The results are very similar to using actual native numbers in the imp populationi,t−1
in instrument (1.8).
A.3 Instrumental variables estimation comments
The first issue to address in the instrumental variables estimation is that, given that
the standard errors are clustered at the province level (50 clusters), when region or
province dummies are included the number of clusters is smaller than the number
of exogenous regressors plus excluded instruments. This would cause the covari-
ance matrix of orthogonality conditions not to be of full-rank, so we cannot invert
it in order to calculate the standard errors. To solve this problem we can partial-out
some exogenous regressors (for example the time and region or province dummies)
in order to allow the covariance matrix of orthogonality conditions to be invert-
ible. According to the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) theorem (Frisch & Waugh, 1933),
the coefficients estimated for a regression in which some exogenous regressors are
partialled out from the dependent variable, the endogenous regressors, the other
exogenous regressors and the excluded instruments are be the same as the coeffi-
cients estimated for the original model for certain estimators (see Baum et al., 2007,
pg. 484-5).
Secondly, we can be worried about the loss of precision if our instrument is
weak (excluded instruments only weakly correlated with included endogenous re-
gressors). The general ”rule-of-thumb” is that the F-statistic of the included instru-
ment in the 1st stage must be greater than 10. This is true in all our specifications.
The tables which present results obtained using instrumental variables display sev-
eral diagnosis tests which allow us to critically evaluate the strength of instruments.
We can construct a Lagrange Multipliers-LM statistic to test whether the ex-
cluded instruments are ”relevant”, meaning correlated with the endogenous re-
gressors (under-identification tests). The test is essentially the test of the rank of a
matrix: under the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified, the matrix of
reduced form coefficients on the excluded instruments has rank is K1-1, where K1 is
number of endogenous regressors. Under the null, the statistic is distributed as chi-
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squared with degrees of freedom (L1-K1+1). A rejection of the null indicates that the
matrix is full column rank, i.e., the model is identified (Baum et al., 2010). Kleiber-
gen & Paap (2006) develop a robust version of a test for the rank of a matrix (test for
under-identification) which allows to compute the statistic under non-i.i.d errors
(cluster-robust in our case). The tables show the value of the ”LM test statistic of
under-identification (Kleibergen-Paap)” and of the ”p-value of under-identification
LM statistic”. If the p-value is below a given significance level, for example 5%, we
can reject the null, the model is be identified, and we can be quite certain that our
instruments are relevant. The advantage of using this test is that it can be used with
non i.i.d. errors and does not require the computation of additional critical values
(Baum et al., 2007).
Cragg-Donald F statistic is a Wald test which also tests for under-identification
(which in the case of one endogenous variable is equivalent to the F statistic of in-
cluded instruments in the first-stage regression). It is also reported in the tables
(F-stat weak identification (Cragg-Donald)). Stock & Yogo (2002) compiled critical
values for the Cragg-Donald F statistic. Their null hypothesis is that the estimator is
weakly identified in the sense that it is subject to bias that is unacceptably large. The
compute different critical values depending what we consider ”too large”. Never-
theless, if the errors are not i.i.d., the Cragg-Donald statistics are not valid anymore.
A robust version of this test, developed by Kleibergen-Paap, is also displayed in
the tables, but comparison with the Stock-Yogo values should be done with caution,
as the critical values are not adjusted for the specific type of cluster-robust variance-
covariance matrix. In any case, if anything the F-statistic of the included instruments
of the first stage goes significatively down when clustering the standard errors (be-
cause these increase substantially, so the t-statistic of the first stage regression of
instrument on the endogenous regressor goes down) and we can be quite certain
that if the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is above the critical Stock-Yogo values our in-
strument would be sufficiently strong. In all cases the values of the Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistic is above the 10% maximal IV size Stock-Yogo weak identification test crit-
ical value. This fact, jointly to the low p-values of the LM under-identification test,
suggests that our instruments are sufficiently strong.
A.4 Additional robustness checks
Tables A.15 to A.18 show the results changing the different components of the in-
strument (1.9). There are two components in the construction of the predicted foreign-
born stock by province in each year: the base year, which is used to locate spatially
the immigrants based on past location patterns by nationality, the national inflow,
which is used to have time-variation in the instrument. The instrument also changes
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depending on how we defined the population of the denominator (if we use predic-
tions for foreign-born, for native or for both). In the main results the instrument is
constructed using as 1991 as the base year for the immigration and native location
patterns; using the national inflows and stocks by nationality predicted from the
gravity estimates of column 1 of tables A.5 and A.6 -which includes country and
year dummies-; and using the predicted stocks of immigration and natives to con-
struct the denominator of the instrument. I test the robustness of the results to dif-
ferent definitions of the denominator, different base years for the location patterns
and different predictions of the gravity modes.
Table A.15 changes the denominator of instrument (1.9). The table displays the
results for rental (top) and purchase prices (bottom). Columns 1 to 4 use actual
population in the denominator, as for example in Gonzalez & Ortega (2009) or Saiz
(2007). Columns 5 to 8 use the prediction of foreign-born but the actual native stock
(as in the definition of the instrument 1.8). Columns 9 to 12 use both the foreign-
born and the native stock predictions (instrument 1.9), but using 1981 as the base
year. We can expect the results from columns 1 to 4 to be failing to control for the
endogenous location of foreign-born. This seems to be the case: for rental prices
the coefficients in columns are smaller than those of the main specifications and for
purchase prices they are larger compared to the main instrumental variable results.
This would suggest that immigrants are locating in provinces where rents are grow-
ing faster and purchase prices are growing slower, so it is important to instrument
for the endogenous location decisions of immigrants. The estimates of columns 5 to
8 would fail to control for the endogenous location decisions of natives: the coeffi-
cients are again smaller for rental prices and bigger for purchase prices, compared
to The results obtained by using the immigrant foreign-born stock prediction and
the native stock prediction but using 1981 as the base year (NAT81) are very similar
to the main results.
Table A.16 show the results using different computations of the national inflow
used in equation (1.5), i.e. term ∑Jj 6=i FBstock
n
j,t. Tables show the results for the im-
migration ratio and for the population growth, for rental (top) and purchase prices
(bottom panel). They use the instrument constructed either with the actual national
inflow, not the prediction (”Actual inflow”) either with the estimates of different pre-
dictions of the gravity models of tables A.5 and A.6. ”Column 2” results includes
country dummies but not year dummies. The exclusion of year dummies would be
justified if there existed yearly common shocks to all countries that make Spain a
more attractive country to locate (for example if the country relaxed restrictions to
immigration in a given year, like for example the massive immigrant regularization
carried on in 2005). ”Column 3” and ”Column 4” use the specification that includes
country-group dummies and the time-invariant variables, like distance. The tables
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display the results from the models with region or province dummies and with and
without regional trends, always including controls. When we use the actual inflow
the coefficients are slightly bigger than those of table 1.8 but very similar. When we
use the model of column 2, the results also remain very similar to the baseline ones.
The explanatory power of the gravity model which includes country-fixed effects is
very high. When we use the model with country-group fixed effects the results are
weaker, specially for purchase prices.
Tables A.17 and A.18 show the results changing the base year used as a predictor
of the spatial location patterns of the immigrants. I focus on the results from the
model with region dummies and with or without regional trends and controls, i.e.
they compare to columns 1 and 2 of table 1.8. The results using province dummies
are too imprecise. The instrument is recalculated using as base years 2001, 1985, 1930
and 1940. The tables present the coefficients of the effect of immigration ratio and
population growth. The instrument using 2001 and 1985 as the base year are strong
but the estimated elasticities but only significant for the specifications which do not
include regional trends. The results using 1940 and 1930 are much more imprecise
and all insignificant.
A.5 Effects of immigration on the construction sector
In table A.22 I estimate the effect of changes of the immigration ratio and of popu-
lation growth on the growth of private dwellings stock. The estimated equation is
similar to equation (1.1) but using the change in the log of private dwellings stock
as dependent variable. Instrumental variables are used to obtain these results. I
include the supply attributes that might explain regional trends on the growth of
housing stocks. Columns 1 to 6 present the results for the immigration ratio and
columns 7 to 12 for the population growth. Column 1 includes regional dummies
and province attributes. Column 2 adds the province time-invariant supply related
characteristics. Developable land and altitude are significant a have the expected
signs. The coefficient for ruggedness on the other side has a positive sign, contrary
to expected, even if the coefficient is very small. The coefficient on the share of
rented properties is positive, indicated that more houses are built in regions where
renting is more common. Column 3 adds the time-varying controls and column 4
the regional trends. Columns 5 and 6 show the first-differences fixed-effect estim-
ates, with and without regional trends. Columns 7 to 12 have the same structure.
The coefficients range between 1.15 and 1.6 for the immigration ratio and around
0.75 to 0.95 for the population growth, and are always significantly different from
zero (except in columns 6 and 12, the most demanding specifications). The positive
effect is similar to that of Gonzalez & Ortega (2009), although the estimates are not
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directly comparable because they use a different specification.
These estimates suggest that dwellings stock grew almost proportionally to im-
migration induced population growth. If all these new houses had been sold to or
occupied by immigrants, we would have expected a small effect of immigration on
house prices. However, the effect of immigration on prices is robustly positive and
of size bigger than 1. It could be the case that the positive effect on construction
is just due to the fact that immigrants are more than proportionally concentrated
in the construction sector (as already pointed out in section 1.2.2), so their effect
in construction would be not through demand but through supplying abundant
(non-skilled) labour supply and therefore activating labour-intense sectors like con-
struction. Nevertheless, it does not exist a causal relationship between immigration
and growth in the employment sector. In table A.23 I use the same specifications
and estimation strategy as in table A.22 to test the effect of immigration and popula-
tion growth on employment in the construction sector. The standard errors are very
high and make the estimates highly imprecise, which would suggest that most of
the variation in employment in the construction sector is captured in the time and
regional and province dummies.
A.6 Additional tables and figures
Year Population Housing stock
Stock over
population
2001 40,972,359 20,988,378 0.512
2002 41,692,558 21,504,402 0.516
2003 42,573,670 22,010,730 0.517
2004 43,055,014 22,573,867 0.524
2005 43,967,766 23,160,019 0.527
2006 44,566,232 23,808,108 0.534
2007 45,054,694 24,443,903 0.543
2008 46,008,985 25,076,820 0.545
2009 46,593,673 25,504,442 0.547
2010 46,864,418 25,783,555 0.550
Source: Department of Housing
Table A.1: Residential density in Spain 2001-2010
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1998 2001 2008 2010
Total %Const Total %Const Total %Const Total %Const
Total 13904.2 9.96% 16146.3 11.62% 20257.6 12.11% 18456.5 8.94%
Spanish 13638.4 9.98% 15402.1 11.47% 17122.8 10.66% 15660.5 8.32%
Foreigners 221.5 10.00% 682.8 15.26% 2929.6 20.65% 2549.5 13.05%
from EU 88.7 6.63% 159.6 9.46% 871.3 20.72% 814.1 15.02%
from rest of Europe 11.6 10.54% 84.8 24.10% 112.6 22.02% 104.8 16.60%
from Latin America 43.2 4.28% 262.5 12.50% 1407.2 19.94% 1182.6 12.29%
from rest of the world 78.0 16.90% 176.0 20.39% 538.5 22.12% 447.9 10.65%
Percentage foreigners 1.59% 4.23% 14.46% 13.81%
Source: Labour Force Survey, National Institute of Statistics
Table A.2: Employment in construction for natives and foreigners - selected years
Country group
United Kingdom, Rest of EU15, Romania, Bulgaria Rest Balkans,
France and Norway and Poland and of USSR and
Germany Switzerland Hungary EU27 Turkey
1998 stock 26.99% 18.99% 1.52% 0.23% 1.12%
2010 stock 12.31% 9.36% 19.06% 0.80% 3.28%
total inflow 10.48% 8.16% 21.25% 0.88% 3.55%
Country group
Rest Sub- Rest United States Latin and
of Saharan of and Central
Europe Africa Africa Canada America
1998 stock 0.19% 18.59% 4.63% 2.24% 18.50%
2010 stock 0.05% 14.38% 4.05% 0.50% 30.62%
total inflow 0.03% 13.86% 3.98% 0.28% 32.13%
Country group
Philippines, Rest Rest
China and Indo of Oceania of TOTAL
Continent Asia Countries
1998 stock 4.58% 2.13% 0.25% 0.04% 637,090
2010 stock 5.01% 0.51% 0.04% 0.01% 5,747,734
Total inflow 5.07% 0.31% 0.02% 0.01% 5,110,644
Source: Population Registers, National Institute of Statistics
Table A.3: Foreign-born by nationality groups
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List of countries/nationality groups
France United Kingdom, France & Germany Cote d’Ivoire Rest of Africa
United Kingdom United Kingdom, France & Germany Egypt Rest of Africa
Germany United Kingdom, France & Germany Ethiopia Rest of Africa
Austria Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Guinea-Bissau Rest of Africa
Belgium Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Equatorial Guinea Rest of Africa
Denmark Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Kenya Rest of Africa
Finland Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Liberia Rest of Africa
Greece Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland South Africa Rest of Africa
Ireland Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Sierra Leone Rest of Africa
Italy Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Togo Rest of Africa
Luxembourg Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Zaire Rest of Africa
Norway Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Africa other Rest of Africa
Netherlands Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Canada United States & Canada
Portugal Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland United States of America United States & Canada
Sweden Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Mexico Latin & Central America
Switzerland Rest of EU15, Norway & Switzerland Costa Rica Latin & Central America
Bulgaria Rumania, Bulgaria, Pol& & Hungary Cuba Latin & Central America
Hungary Rumania, Bulgaria, Pol& & Hungary Dominica Latin & Central America
Poland Rumania, Bulgaria, Pol& & Hungary El Salvador Latin & Central America
Romania Rumania, Bulgaria, Pol& & Hungary Guatemala Latin & Central America
Cyprus Rest of EU27 Honduras Latin & Central America
Malta Rest of EU27 Nicaragua Latin & Central America
Latvia Rest of EU27 Panama Latin & Central America
Estonia Rest of EU27 Dominican Republic Latin & Central America
Lithuania Rest of EU27 Argentina Latin & Central America
Czech Republic Rest of EU27 Bolivia Latin & Central America
Slovakia Rest of EU27 Brazil Latin & Central America
Slovenia Rest of EU27 Colombia Latin & Central America
Iceland Rest of Europe Chile Latin & Central America
Liechtenstein Rest of Europe Ecuador Latin & Central America
Andorra Rest of Europe Paraguay Latin & Central America
Europe other Rest of Europe Peru Latin & Central America
Albania Balkans, USSR & Turkey Uruguay Latin & Central America
Ukraine Balkans, USSR & Turkey Venezuela Latin & Central America
Moldova Balkans, USSR & Turkey America other Latin & Central America
Belarus Balkans, USSR & Turkey Bangladesh Philippines, China & Indo-continent
Georgia Balkans, USSR & Turkey China Philippines, China & Indo-continent
Bosnia Herzegovina Balkans, USSR & Turkey Philippines Philippines, China & Indo-continent
Croatia Balkans, USSR & Turkey India Philippines, China & Indo-continent
Armenia Balkans, USSR & Turkey Pakistan Philippines, China & Indo-continent
Russia Balkans, USSR & Turkey Saudi Arabia Rest of Asia
Serbia & Montenegro Balkans, USSR & Turkey Indonesia Rest of Asia
Macedonia Balkans, USSR & Turkey Iraq Rest of Asia
Turkey Balkans, USSR & Turkey Iran Rest of Asia
Gambia Sub-Saharan Africa Israel Rest of Asia
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Japan Rest of Asia
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa Jordan Rest of Asia
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa Lebanon Rest of Asia
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Nepal Rest of Asia
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa South Korea Rest of Asia
Algeria North Africa Syria Rest of Asia
Morocco North Africa Thailand Rest of Asia
Mauritania North Africa Vietnam Rest of Asia
Tunisia North Africa Kazakhstan Rest of Asia
Burkina Faso Rest of Africa Asia other Rest of Asia
Angola Rest of Africa Australia Oceania
Benin Rest of Africa New Zealand Oceania
Cape Verde Rest of Africa Oceania other Oceania
Cameroon Rest of Africa Stateless Stateless
Congo Rest of Africa
Table A.4: List of countries and nationality groups
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Depvar: inflow of immigrants from country n to Spain (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of GDP in billions of const dollars in t-1 -1.386∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -1.093∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗
[0.467] [0.185] [0.434] [0.182]
Log of total population in 1000s in t-1 -1.603 0.890∗∗∗ 1.987 0.960∗∗∗
[1.441] [0.229] [1.231] [0.226]
Percentage of urban population in t-1 0.876 3.355∗∗∗ 3.521 3.141∗∗∗
[4.429] [0.824] [4.194] [0.784]
Percentage of internet users in t-1 -1.934∗∗∗ -0.061 -0.576 0.568
[0.431] [0.453] [0.452] [0.395]
Globalisation index in t-2 0.015 -0.011 0.083∗∗∗ 0.002
[0.017] [0.014] [0.017] [0.013]
Dummy if country belongs to the EU 1.044∗∗∗ 0.464∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.470∗
[0.176] [0.260] [0.210] [0.265]
Log of distance between country and Spain -1.794∗∗∗ -1.806∗∗∗
[0.436] [0.423]
Log of area in sq kms 0.311∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
[0.104] [0.099]
Number of cities in the country in Henderson data -0.308∗∗∗ -0.313∗∗∗
[0.050] [0.053]
Latitude in degrees 0.002 0.000
[0.007] [0.007]
Longitude in degrees 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
[0.008] [0.008]
Dummy if country official language is Spanish 2.246∗∗∗ 2.283∗∗∗
[0.619] [0.668]
Dummy if country is contiguous to Spain -0.413 -0.379
[0.544] [0.543]
Dummy if country was a colony of Spanish Empire -0.285 -0.285
[0.543] [0.556]
Constant 23.327∗ 15.189∗∗∗ -15.664 15.602∗∗∗
[13.297] [3.484] [10.529] [3.567]
Year 1999 0.717∗∗∗ 0.503∗∗∗
[0.113] [0.117]
Year 2000 1.445∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗
[0.154] [0.151]
Year 2001 1.860∗∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗
[0.172] [0.158]
Year 2002 2.101∗∗∗ 1.650∗∗∗
[0.198] [0.175]
Year 2003 1.572∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗
[0.250] [0.227]
Year 2004 2.499∗∗∗ 1.824∗∗∗
[0.256] [0.200]
Year 2005 2.094∗∗∗ 1.281∗∗∗
[0.313] [0.240]
Year 2006 2.075∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗∗
[0.386] [0.276]
Year 2007 2.746∗∗∗ 1.736∗∗∗
[0.370] [0.254]
Year 2008 2.579∗∗∗ 1.416∗∗∗
[0.392] [0.266]
Year 2009 2.019∗∗∗ 0.698∗∗
[0.448] [0.286]
Fixed-effects Country Group Country Group
Observations 1142 1142 1142 1142
Adjusted R2 0.872 0.648 0.818 0.597
Clustered (country) standard errors in brackets. t=2002/2010. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table A.5: Gravity equations inflows estimates
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Depvar: stock of immigrants from country n in Spain (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of GDP in billions of const dollars in t-2 -0.275 -0.207 0.864∗∗ -0.388∗∗
[0.252] [0.146] [0.433] [0.155]
Log of total population in 1000s in t-2 -4.644∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.816 0.847∗∗∗
[1.203] [0.191] [1.299] [0.203]
Percentage of urban population in t-2 -3.328 3.596∗∗∗ 6.141 3.122∗∗∗
[3.315] [0.725] [4.155] [0.728]
Percentage of internet users in t-1 -2.021∗∗∗ -0.377 0.112 1.623∗∗
[0.554] [0.316] [0.288] [0.674]
Globalisation index in t-3 0.018 -0.014 0.097∗∗∗ 0.019
[0.013] [0.012] [0.019] [0.013]
Dummy if country belongs to the EU 0.464∗ 0.263 0.693∗∗ 0.557∗
[0.235] [0.268] [0.269] [0.294]
Log of distance between country and Spain -1.631∗∗∗ -1.732∗∗∗
[0.392] [0.384]
Log of area in sq kms 0.190∗ 0.188∗
[0.108] [0.102]
Number of cities in the country in Henderson data -0.333∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗
[0.047] [0.058]
Latitude in degrees -0.001 -0.004
[0.007] [0.007]
Longitude in degrees 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
[0.007] [0.007]
Dummy if country official language is Spanish 1.905∗∗∗ 2.108∗∗∗
[0.646] [0.782]
Dummy if country is contiguous to Spain -0.148 -0.081
[0.548] [0.546]
Dummy if country was a colony of Spanish Empire -0.133 -0.160
[0.585] [0.659]
Constant 52.244∗∗∗ 18.895∗∗∗ -11.945 18.605∗∗∗
[11.495] [3.241] [10.885] [3.516]
Year 1999 0.121∗∗∗ 0.051
[0.042] [0.033]
Year 2000 0.480∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗
[0.076] [0.053]
Year 2001 0.997∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
[0.127] [0.089]
Year 2002 1.427∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗
[0.167] [0.113]
Year 2003 1.782∗∗∗ 1.403∗∗∗
[0.204] [0.133]
Year 2004 1.981∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗
[0.243] [0.144]
Year 2005 2.332∗∗∗ 1.704∗∗∗
[0.272] [0.154]
Year 2006 2.560∗∗∗ 1.824∗∗∗
[0.305] [0.167]
Year 2007 2.739∗∗∗ 1.902∗∗∗
[0.341] [0.181]
Year 2008 3.017∗∗∗ 2.063∗∗∗
[0.376] [0.191]
Year 2009 3.235∗∗∗ 2.163∗∗∗
[0.412] [0.201]
Fixed-effects Country Group Country Group
Observations 1308 1308 1308 1308
Adjusted R2 0.951 0.745 0.922 0.667
Clustered (country) standard errors in brackets. t=2002/2010. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table A.6: Gravity equations stocks estimates
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PROVINCES
Change of log Change of log Lagged Lagged Lagged
of rent prices of purchase prices population ratio immigration ratio natives ratio
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Alava 0.0382 0.0666 0.0309 0.0129 0.0105 0.0031 0.0090 0.0023 0.0015 0.0014
Albacete 0.0887 0.1056 0.0301 0.0116 0.0100 0.0039 0.0081 0.0043 0.0019 0.0012
Alicante 0.0614 0.1025 0.0345 0.0135 0.0290 0.0158 0.0224 0.0137 0.0066 0.0023
Almeria 0.0899 0.1027 0.0373 0.0202 0.0300 0.0121 0.0219 0.0116 0.0082 0.0019
Avila 0.0693 0.0968 0.0218 0.0099 0.0053 0.0057 0.0076 0.0051 -0.0022 0.0023
Badajoz 0.0835 0.0687 0.0400 0.0221 0.0046 0.0044 0.0034 0.0019 0.0012 0.0033
Baleares (Illes) 0.0600 0.0816 0.0382 0.0125 0.0260 0.0126 0.0201 0.0107 0.0059 0.0032
Barcelona 0.0599 0.0719 0.0398 0.0114 0.0154 0.0082 0.0145 0.0071 0.0009 0.0019
Burgos 0.0512 0.0629 0.0360 0.0114 0.0077 0.0064 0.0096 0.0061 -0.0019 0.0013
Caceres 0.0733 0.0644 0.0193 0.0105 0.0016 0.0020 0.0022 0.0017 -0.0006 0.0014
Cadiz 0.1017 0.1071 0.0398 0.0137 0.0099 0.0029 0.0036 0.0015 0.0063 0.0017
Castellon 0.0790 0.1014 0.0319 0.0148 0.0247 0.0115 0.0187 0.0098 0.0060 0.0022
Ciudad Real 0.0793 0.0872 0.0254 0.0138 0.0113 0.0059 0.0092 0.0050 0.0021 0.0021
Cordoba 0.0942 0.1061 0.0438 0.0189 0.0050 0.0022 0.0033 0.0017 0.0018 0.0011
Corua (La) 0.0683 0.0749 0.0308 0.0096 0.0038 0.0025 0.0042 0.0015 -0.0004 0.0013
Cuenca 0.0887 0.0920 0.0294 0.0151 0.0086 0.0065 0.0131 0.0070 -0.0045 0.0032
Girona 0.0915 0.0946 0.0422 0.0174 0.0296 0.0107 0.0208 0.0090 0.0087 0.0022
Granada 0.0751 0.0868 0.0364 0.0112 0.0137 0.0056 0.0074 0.0031 0.0063 0.0041
Guadalajara 0.0814 0.1206 0.0334 0.0177 0.0435 0.0112 0.0196 0.0089 0.0239 0.0057
Guipuzcoa 0.0578 0.0725 0.0319 0.0138 0.0044 0.0022 0.0063 0.0021 -0.0019 0.0013
Huelva 0.0834 0.0946 0.0230 0.0111 0.0129 0.0045 0.0082 0.0041 0.0046 0.0025
Huesca 0.0836 0.1015 0.0409 0.0146 0.0117 0.0061 0.0126 0.0056 -0.0009 0.0014
Jaen 0.0849 0.0795 0.0312 0.0089 0.0042 0.0022 0.0030 0.0014 0.0012 0.0020
Leon 0.0519 0.0564 0.0289 0.0113 0.0000 0.0047 0.0045 0.0023 -0.0046 0.0031
Lleida 0.0890 0.0863 0.0286 0.0178 0.0209 0.0087 0.0191 0.0083 0.0019 0.0016
Rioja (La) 0.0650 0.0728 0.0312 0.0149 0.0198 0.0115 0.0147 0.0085 0.0051 0.0041
Lugo 0.0636 0.0810 0.0118 0.0074 -0.0033 0.0023 0.0037 0.0020 -0.0070 0.0008
Madrid 0.0650 0.1061 0.0415 0.0137 0.0207 0.0100 0.0165 0.0087 0.0042 0.0031
Malaga 0.0883 0.1369 0.0399 0.0179 0.0239 0.0093 0.0153 0.0067 0.0086 0.0029
Murcia 0.0780 0.1076 0.0378 0.0170 0.0231 0.0084 0.0154 0.0076 0.0077 0.0012
Navarra 0.0463 0.0664 0.0275 0.0156 0.0152 0.0058 0.0117 0.0058 0.0035 0.0010
Orense 0.0485 0.0434 0.0304 0.0121 -0.0031 0.0016 0.0039 0.0014 -0.0069 0.0009
Asturias 0.0721 0.0760 0.0319 0.0076 0.0009 0.0026 0.0047 0.0019 -0.0038 0.0012
Palencia 0.0582 0.0727 0.0377 0.0142 -0.0031 0.0030 0.0041 0.0017 -0.0072 0.0021
Palmas(Las) 0.0420 0.0690 0.0282 0.0131 0.0186 0.0093 0.0128 0.0072 0.0058 0.0023
Pontevedra 0.0744 0.0745 0.0373 0.0083 0.0055 0.0019 0.0045 0.0018 0.0010 0.0012
Salamanca 0.0642 0.0821 0.0185 0.0076 0.0011 0.0055 0.0046 0.0030 -0.0036 0.0038
SC de Tenerife 0.0484 0.0707 0.0263 0.0102 0.0205 0.0107 0.0145 0.0069 0.0060 0.0049
Cantabria 0.0664 0.0819 0.0376 0.0137 0.0108 0.0034 0.0073 0.0025 0.0036 0.0018
Segovia 0.0748 0.0773 0.0493 0.0215 0.0124 0.0092 0.0133 0.0093 -0.0008 0.0022
Sevilla 0.0988 0.0884 0.0376 0.0151 0.0104 0.0033 0.0042 0.0017 0.0061 0.0019
Soria 0.0629 0.0790 0.0227 0.0117 0.0047 0.0057 0.0106 0.0035 -0.0058 0.0049
Tarragona 0.0896 0.1163 0.0394 0.0140 0.0315 0.0121 0.0199 0.0095 0.0115 0.0031
Teruel 0.0634 0.0693 0.0306 0.0160 0.0072 0.0077 0.0124 0.0080 -0.0052 0.0015
Toledo 0.0882 0.1302 0.0425 0.0131 0.0298 0.0104 0.0138 0.0070 0.0160 0.0047
Valencia 0.0722 0.0926 0.0361 0.0106 0.0165 0.0073 0.0129 0.0061 0.0037 0.0018
Valladolid 0.0610 0.0783 0.0267 0.0102 0.0077 0.0034 0.0068 0.0033 0.0009 0.0016
Vizcaya 0.0591 0.0806 0.0457 0.0163 0.0021 0.0020 0.0059 0.0016 -0.0038 0.0012
Zamora 0.0593 0.0806 0.0270 0.0135 -0.0045 0.0030 0.0039 0.0029 -0.0084 0.0012
Zaragoza 0.0827 0.1029 0.0428 0.0135 0.0142 0.0067 0.0133 0.0066 0.0009 0.0026
Total 0.0715 0.0849 0.0333 0.0152 0.0125 0.0127 0.0105 0.0083 0.0021 0.0065
Table A.8: Descriptive statistics by province
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Sum of the squares: provinces (groups) over 9 years
Change of log Change of log Lagged Lagged Lagged
of rent prices of purchase prices population ratio immigration ratio natives ratio
Between groups 0.0258 0.1055 0.0511 0.0156 0.0164
Within groups 0.0774 3.1280 0.0213 0.0150 0.0026
Total 0.1032 3.2335 0.0724 0.0306 0.0190
Table A.9: Sum of squares between and within provinces
YEARS
Change of log Change of log Lagged Lagged Lagged
of rent prices of purchase prices population ratio immigration ratio natives ratio
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
2002 0.0396 0.0135 0.1188 0.0355 0.0134 0.0147 0.0123 0.0087 0.0011 0.0073
2003 0.0380 0.0130 0.1290 0.0451 0.0147 0.0143 0.0131 0.0091 0.0015 0.0075
2004 0.0338 0.0134 0.1454 0.0584 0.0099 0.0104 0.0080 0.0052 0.0019 0.0067
2005 0.0376 0.0163 0.1494 0.0389 0.0180 0.0148 0.0143 0.0099 0.0037 0.0071
2006 0.0385 0.0136 0.1132 0.0266 0.0124 0.0117 0.0094 0.0065 0.0030 0.0068
2007 0.0357 0.0115 0.0766 0.0273 0.0108 0.0114 0.0091 0.0065 0.0017 0.0063
2008 0.0388 0.0116 0.0092 0.0212 0.0193 0.0137 0.0171 0.0090 0.0022 0.0065
2009 0.0272 0.0099 -0.0742 0.0296 0.0104 0.0083 0.0083 0.0044 0.0021 0.0054
2010 0.0103 0.0059 -0.0235 0.0305 0.0040 0.0060 0.0025 0.0025 0.0015 0.0046
Total 0.0715 0.0849 0.0333 0.0152 0.0125 0.0127 0.0105 0.0083 0.0021 0.0065
Table A.10: Descriptive statistics by year
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Persons
1982 - 5560
5561 - 10245
10246 - 23412
23413 - 40071
40072 - 404895
A.1.1 Foreign-born stock 2001
Persons
8789 - 23920
23921 - 39123
39124 - 78364
78365 - 154532
154533 - 1300000
A.1.2 Foreign-born stock 2010
Persons
6435 - 18037
18038 - 31272
31273 - 45391
45392 - 117470
117471 - 863104
A.1.3 Change in foreign-born stock 2001-2010
Figure A.1: Spatial distribution of foreign-born stocks
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Percentage
0.86% - 1.75%
1.76% - 2.4%
2.41% - 3.19%
3.2% - 5.17%
5.18% - 10.73%
A.2.1 Share foreign-born over population 2001
Percentage
3.52% - 6.76%
6.77% - 8.54%
8.55% - 12.81%
12.82% - 17.07%
17.08% - 25.76%
A.2.2 Share foreign-born over population 2010
Growth 2001-10
50.42% - 160.05%
160.06% - 257.25%
257.26% - 316.12%
316.13% - 424.79%
424.8% - 782.6%
A.2.3 Growth foreign-born stocks 2001-2010
Figure A.2: Spatial distribution of share and growth of foreign-born
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Growth 2001-10
41.06% - 70.18%
70.19% - 79.48%
79.49% - 96.5%
96.51% - 121.27%
121.28% - 149.77%
A.3.1 Growth of purchase prices 2001-2010
Growth 2001-10
11.18% - 27.46%
27.47% - 32.01%
32.02% - 38.81%
38.82% - 43.08%
43.09% - 55.91%
A.3.2 Growth of rental prices 2001-2010
Growth 2001-10
10.59% - 16.38%
16.39% - 19.33%
19.34% - 23.76%
23.77% - 28.82%
28.83% - 45.08%
A.3.3 Growth of housing stock 2001-2010
Figure A.3: Spatial distribution of growth in prices and construction
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Change in the log of rental prices in t PROVINCE DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflow of immigrants in t-1 over population in January t-1 0.126 0.283
[0.579] [0.661]
Inflow of natives in t-1 over population in January t-1 -0.253 -0.364
[0.311] [0.358]
Inflow of population in t-1 over population in January t-1 -0.125 0.088 -0.181
[0.233] [0.403] [0.226]
Change in the log of purchase prices in t PROVINCE DUMMIES(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflow of immigrants in t-1 over population in January t-1 2.739∗∗ 2.773∗
[1.233] [1.495]
Inflow of natives in t-1 over population in January t-1 1.013 -0.080
[0.722] [1.094]
Inflow of population in t-1 over population in January t-1 0.973∗∗ 1.912∗∗ 0.726
[0.453] [0.841] [0.531]
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450
LM test stat under-identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 7.37 26.12 7.34 25.33 8.21 25.13
P-value of under-identification LM statistic 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
F-stat weak identification (Kleibergen-Paap) 14.32 515.98 5.33 51.60 27.59 93.88
P-value Hansen J statistic 0.18
A-P F-test of excluded instruments (IMM) 11.01
A-P F-test of excluded instruments (NAT) 488.19
Instrument(s) IMM NAT BOTH BOTH IMM NAT
Clustered (province) standard errors in brackets. t=2002/2010. Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. N=450
All specifications include year dummies, region dummies and trends and controls.
Table A.13: Instrumental variables results rental/purchase prices - different population
groups
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Appendix B
Economic Impacts of Transport Policy
B.1 Methodology
City size
Distance/Travel mode
Avg. distance Tube/Train Motor Other Commuters
More than 1,000,000 10.64 20.34% 70.33% 12.77% 5,688,280
1,000,000 to 500,000 11.78 3.76% 88.36% 15.72% 1,289,221
500,000 to 100,000 12.50 3.56% 87.40% 18.51% 4,525,166
100,000 to 10,000 14.19 4.09% 86.16% 18.76% 4,536,818
Below 10,000 16.42 2.96% 85.65% 14.22% 2,154,226
All people 12.76 8.88% 81.62% 16.07% 18,193,711
Percentages with respect to commuters. Source: Census 2001 - CASWEB. Other includes walking & cycling.
Distance is in kms.
Table B.1: Average commuting distance & mode by city size – aged 16-74
1998/99 2001/02 2004/05 2007/08
Road 3234.5 3687.8 4056.3 4766.8
£ per person 56.8 64.1 69.6 80.2
Rail 2644.3 3654.1 4279.2 5569.2
£ per person 46.4 63.5 73.4 93.7
Source: Department for Transport & Eurostat. Outturn prices: millions of £
Table B.2: Investment in infrastructure in Great Britain – 1998-2008
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Year A roads Motorway Class 1 Motorway Class 2 Class 3 Unclassified Major Minor Alltrunk trunk or A principal or B or C roads roads roads
1997 11,798 3,333 34,558 45 30,213 84,277 223,668 49,734 338,159 387,893
1998 11,682 3,376 34,714 44 30,209 84,392 224,225 49,816 338,825 388,641
1999 11,698 3,404 34,871 45 30,205 84,509 224,783 50,018 339,497 389,515
2000 11,701 3,422 34,906 45 30,200 84,624 225,339 50,074 340,163 390,237
2001 11,369 3,431 35,285 45 30,196 84,742 225,901 50,130 340,839 390,969
2002 10,679 3,433 35,995 45 30,192 84,858 226,462 50,152 341,511 391,663
2003 9,615 3,432 37,037 46 30,188 84,976 227,048 50,130 342,212 392,342
2004 9,147 3,478 37,521 46 30,178 84,223 223,082 50,192 337,482 387,674
2005 8,682 3,466 37,974 54 30,189 84,459 223,184 50,176 337,832 388,008
2006 8,723 3,503 38,032 53 30,018 84,469 229,605 50,311 344,092 394,403
2007 8,683 3,518 38,060 41 30,265 84,423 229,889 50,302 344,577 394,879
2008 8,634 3,518 38,057 41 30,161 84,574 229,482 50,250 344,217 394,467
2009 8,596 3,519 38,173 41 30,141 84,813 229,145 50,329 344,099 394,428
Major roads include motorways and A roads. Minor road include the rest. Units: kilometres. Source:
Transport Statistics Great Britain
Table B.3: Length of roads by type – 1997-2009
Commuting time
Travel mode
Rail/tube Motor Other Commuters % times
Less than 15 minutes 0.27% 79.04% 20.70% 41,846 49.45%
15-30 minutes 2.39% 88.61% 9.00% 25,731 30.41%
30-45 minutes 8.61% 87.82% 3.57% 8,858 10.47%
45-60 minutes 23.01% 75.02% 1.97% 5,440 6.43%
60-90 minutes 34.53% 64.07% 1.40% 2,068 2.44%
90-120 minutes 28.96% 67.71% 3.33% 480 0.57%
More than 120 minutes 23.27% 65.84% 10.89% 202 0.24%
Total times 4.30% 82.15% 13.55% 84,625 100.00%
Percentages with respect to commuters. Source: British Household Panel Survey. Other includes
walking & cycling.
Table B.4: Commuting times by travel mode – 1997-2008
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Wards Mean
Standard 90th Maximum
deviation percentile value
1997 employment and time-varying travel times
All 115,940 14.770 1.180 16.080 19.400
10 kms 15,279 15.450 0.880 16.490 18.590
20 kms 36,850 15.410 0.830 16.340 18.590
30 kms 53,383 15.350 0.850 16.280 18.590
Time-varying employment and 1998 travel times
All 115,940 14.760 1.170 16.060 19.500
10 kms 15,279 15.420 0.860 16.430 18.590
20 kms 36,850 15.400 0.820 16.320 18.590
30 kms 53,383 15.330 0.840 16.260 18.590
Time-varying employment and time-varying travel times
All 115,940 14.760 1.170 16.060 19.500
10 kms 15,279 15.430 0.860 16.430 18.590
20 kms 36,850 15.400 0.820 16.320 18.590
30 kms 53,383 15.340 0.840 16.260 18.590
Sources: Department of Transport, BSD and own authors’ calculations
Table B.5: Summary statistics annual log of accessibility – 1998-2008
Wards Mean
Standard 90th Maximum
deviation percentile value
2001 employment and time-varying travel times
All 73,780 14.710 1.170 19.320 19.320
10 kms 6,034 15.050 0.720 17.620 17.620
20 kms 17,171 15.190 0.710 18.170 18.170
30 kms 27,216 15.260 0.790 18.190 18.190
Time-varying employment and 2001 travel times
All 73,780 14.770 1.170 16.060 19.500
10 kms 6,034 15.090 0.730 15.810 17.800
20 kms 17,171 15.240 0.720 16.000 18.300
30 kms 27,216 15.310 0.790 16.220 18.500
Time-varying employment and time-varying travel times
All 73,780 14.760 1.170 16.060 19.500
10 kms 6,034 15.100 0.730 15.810 17.800
20 kms 17,171 15.240 0.720 16.000 18.300
30 kms 27,216 15.310 0.790 16.220 18.590
Sources: Department of Transport, BSD and own authors’ calculations
Table B.6: Summary statistics annual log of accessibility – 2002-2008
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Wards Mean
Standard 90th Maximum Proportion
deviation percentile value of zeroes
1997 employment and time-varying travel times
All 115,940 0.00000016% 0.800% 0.100% 46.460% 32.330%
10 kms 15,279 -0.00000030% 2.040% 0.930% 46.460% 5.390%
20 kms 36,850 0.00000062% 1.400% 0.510% 46.460% 6.160%
30 kms 53,383 0.00000038% 1.180% 0.380% 46.460% 6.060%
Time-varying employment and 1998 travel times
All 115,940 -0.00000057% 6.000% 7.330% 70.010% 0.000%
10 kms 15,279 -0.00000100% 5.110% 6.540% 41.490% 0.000%
20 kms 36,850 -0.00000115% 5.190% 6.480% 41.490% 0.000%
30 kms 53,383 -0.00000065% 5.140% 6.480% 41.650% 0.000%
Time-varying employment and time-varying travel times
All 115,940 -0.00000005% 6.130% 7.570% 70.010% 0.000%
10 kms 15,279 -0.00000184% 5.890% 7.250% 56.340% 0.000%
20 kms 36,850 -0.00000023% 5.600% 6.880% 56.340% 0.000%
30 kms 53,383 -0.00000010% 5.450% 6.820% 56.340% 0.000%
Sources: Department of Transport, BSD and own authors’ calculations
Table B.7: Summary statistics average within changes log of accessibility – 1998-2008
Wards Mean
Standard 90th Maximum Proportion
deviation percentile value of zeroes
2001 employment and time-varying travel times
All 73,780 0.00000016% 0.660% 0.060% 44.890% 43.410%
10 kms 6,034 -0.00000030% 2.250% 1.120% 44.890% 9.860%
20 kms 17,171 0.00000062% 1.360% 0.430% 44.890% 11.400%
30 kms 27,216 0.00000038% 1.090% 0.310% 44.890% 10.850%
Time-varying employment and 2002 travel times
All 73,780 -0.00000057% 5.750% 6.620% 56.920% 0.000%
10 kms 6,034 -0.00000100% 4.880% 5.840% 24.640% 0.000%
20 kms 17,171 -0.00000115% 5.060% 5.940% 35.570% 0.000%
30 kms 27,216 -0.00000065% 5.010% 5.890% 35.570% 0.000%
Time-varying employment and time-varying travel times
All 73,780 -0.00000005% 5.860% 6.750% 56.920% 0.000%
10 kms 6,034 -0.00000184% 5.970% 6.640% 51.320% 0.000%
20 kms 17,171 -0.00000023% 5.530% 6.400% 51.320% 0.000%
30 kms 27,216 -0.00000010% 5.340% 6.210% 51.320% 0.000%
Sources: Department of Transport, BSD and own authors’ calculations
Table B.8: Summary statistics average within changes log of accessibility – 2002-2008
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Figure B.1: Changes in log accessibility (annual employment) – 2002-2008
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Figure B.2: Changes in log accessibility (2001 employment) – 2002-2008
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B.2 Aggregate and firm outcomes
DISTANCE BAND 10 kilometres 20 kilometres 30 kilometres
Log of accessibility Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1997 employment 15.443 0.858 15.413 0.818 15.346 0.836
Time-varying employment 15.454 0.873 15.423 0.826 15.353 0.842
Employment Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ALL SECTORS 3,730.06 9,639.28 3,155.12 7,266.17 2,878.74 6,324.49
MANUFACTURING 472.21 942.05 435.18 897.29 408.73 852.58
CONSTRUCTION 163.29 298.02 150.93 306.18 143.25 287.25
CONSUMER SERVICES 796.05 2,102.82 710.96 1,615.40 656.79 1,430.97
PRODUCER SERVICES 1,034.15 4,613.95 767.92 3,294.65 674.21 2,811.93
OTHER 1,264.36 2,975.75 1,090.14 2,354.89 995.76 2,076.73
Local units Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ALL SECTORS 313.86 635.59 285.01 459.20 267.28 401.94
MANUFACTURING 24.95 38.02 22.33 33.72 20.71 30.12
CONSTRUCTION 23.76 17.81 23.70 17.27 23.35 17.56
CONSUMER SERVICES 84.72 142.16 76.99 111.97 71.87 100.08
PRODUCER SERVICES 104.31 352.54 91.39 244.38 84.29 215.09
OTHER 76.13 128.94 70.61 93.57 67.06 81.56
Sources: BSD-ONS via SDS and own author calculations.
Table B.9: Summary statistics ward employment and number of plants – 1998-2008
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.263*** 0.024 -0.06 -0.086
Std. Error 0.009 0.023 0.181 0.226
No. observations 101960 101960 100255 99935
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 321 257
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.062*** 0.035 -0.297 -0.45
Std. Error 0.014 0.042 0.302 0.319
No. observations 33183 33183 32908 32839
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 220 243
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.162*** 0.027 0.582 0.695
Std. Error 0.027 0.064 0.749 1.168
No. observations 5351 5351 5294 5263
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 30 26.8
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.268*** 0.03 -0.052 0.174
Std. Error 0.016 0.046 0.341 0.47
No. observations 26848 26848 26331 26229
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 93.8 83
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.423*** 0.031 -0.408 -0.742
Std. Error 0.02 0.043 0.56 1.539
No. observations 19527 19527 19082 18997
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 13.1 3.09
OTHER
Coefficient 0.338*** -0.005 0.195 0.171
Std. Error 0.027 0.061 0.333 0.366
No. observations 17051 17051 16640 16607
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 42.9 30
Distance band 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Plant fixed effects YES YES YES
IV YES YES
Scheme trends YES
Sources: BSD and ARD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at firm level. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table B.10: Firm labour productivity results
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.242*** 0.030* 0.136 0.093
Std. Error 0.006 0.015 0.104 0.125
No. observations 106501 106501 105533 105203
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 352 270
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.083*** 0.046** 0.145 0.151
Std. Error 0.008 0.023 0.154 0.159
No. observations 33624 33624 33460 33391
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 240 267
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.132*** 0.015 0.412 0.435
Std. Error 0.018 0.037 0.349 0.608
No. observations 5365 5365 5316 5285
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 30.7 28.1
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.253*** 0.047 0.216 0.19
Std. Error 0.011 0.035 0.197 0.245
No. observations 27598 27598 27327 27221
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 93.1 80.2
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.378*** 0.03 -0.402 -0.904
Std. Error 0.015 0.027 0.398 1.403
No. observations 19871 19871 19585 19497
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 14.2 1.97
OTHER
Coefficient 0.277*** 0.001 0.118 -0.155
Std. Error 0.013 0.04 0.26 0.274
No. observations 20043 20043 19845 19809
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 59.2 37
Distance band 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Plant fixed effects YES YES YES
IV YES YES
Scheme trends YES
Sources: BSD and ARD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at firm level. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table B.11: Firm wage bill per worker results
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALL SECTORS
Coefficient 0.093*** -0.002 0.092 0.013
Std. Error 0.004 0.015 0.115 0.141
No. observations 60543 60543 53323 53166
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 157 123
MANUFACTURING
Coefficient 0.033*** 0.021 -0.059 -0.136
Std. Error 0.006 0.022 0.146 0.151
No. observations 21081 21081 19318 19286
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 151 200
CONSTRUCTION
Coefficient 0.064*** 0.004 0.273 0.337
Std. Error 0.013 0.058 0.222 0.387
No. observations 3373 3373 2938 2916
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 24 13.2
CONSUMER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.079*** 0.003 0 0.016
Std. Error 0.007 0.024 0.168 0.221
No. observations 15561 15561 13165 13126
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 113 75
PRODUCER SERVICES
Coefficient 0.183*** -0.015 -0.031 1.757
Std. Error 0.012 0.029 0.334 10.488
No. observations 11418 11418 9861 9813
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1.54 0.0444
OTHER
Coefficient 0.122*** -0.013 0.518 0.452
Std. Error 0.012 0.032 0.449 0.588
No. observations 9110 9110 8041 8025
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 34.5 17
Distance band 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms 20 kms
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Plant fixed effects YES YES YES
IV YES YES
Scheme trends YES
Sources: BSD and ARD-ONS via SDS. Standard errors clustered at firm level. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table B.12: Firm gross output results
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B.3 Labour market outcomes
YEAR MANUFACT. CONSTRUCT.
CONSUMER PRODUCER
OTHER
ALL
SERVICES SERVICES SECTORS
2002 7,638 1,615 7,331 7,380 7,249 31,213
2003 7,871 1,747 8,579 8,582 8,027 34,806
2004 7,336 1,706 9,375 8,371 8,147 34,935
2005 7,445 1,692 10,300 8,911 8,764 37,112
2006 6,765 1,921 10,249 9,267 9,087 37,289
2007 4,806 1,800 8,671 9,392 7,122 31,791
2008 4,773 1,850 8,429 9,244 7,094 31,390
Total 46,634 12,331 62,934 61,147 55,490 238,536
Source: ASHE–ONS. Observations within 30 kms of home and work wards.
Table B.13: Number of observations by year and industrial sector
OBSERVATIONS
Individual Individuals
home-work ward id allowed to move wards
Total 238,536 238,536
Number of individuals 114,370 79,286
Average number of T 2.09 3.01
Source: ASHE–ONS. Observations within 30 kms of home and work wards.
Table B.14: Number of individuals for each panel
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VARIABLE
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION
Individual Individuals
home-work ward id allowed to move wards
Basic Overall 10.75 6.96 6.96
hourly Between 6.8 6.64
earnings Within 1.59 2.11
Basic Overall 372.34 263.11 263.11
weekly Between 259.58 255.5
pay Within 48.3 69
Basic Overall 33.78 9.33 9.33
weekly Between 9.81 9.86
hours Within 2.58 3.65
Hourly Overall 11.21 7.3 7.3
earnings Between 7.18 6.89
Within 1.87 2.54
Gross Overall 402.95 277.5 277.5
weekly Between 272.52 266.67
pay Within 62.08 84.54
Total Overall 35.29 10.37 10.37
weekly Between 10.64 10.65
hours Within 3.21 4.27
Log of basic Overall 2.23 0.51 0.51
hourly Between 0.51 0.5
earnings Within 0.11 0.15
Log of basic Overall 5.69 0.73 0.73
weekly Between 0.76 0.76
pay Within 0.14 0.22
Log of basic Overall 3.46 0.41 0.41
weekly Between 0.45 0.46
hours Within 0.12 0.17
Log of Overall 2.27 0.51 0.51
hourly Between 0.51 0.5
earnings Within 0.12 0.16
Log of gross Overall 5.77 0.72 0.72
weekly Between 0.75 0.75
pay Within 0.15 0.22
Log of total Overall 3.5 0.42 0.42
weekly Between 0.45 0.45
hours Within 0.12 0.17
Log of accessibility Overall 15.59 0.71 0.71
(timevar employment) Between 0.72 0.71
from work ward Within 0.03 0.13
Log of accessibility Overall 15.5 0.64 0.64
(timevar employment) Between 0.64 0.65
from home ward Within 0.03 0.1
Log of accessibility Overall 15.52 0.7 0.7
(2001 employment) Between 0.72 0.71
from work ward Within 0.01 0.12
Log of accessibility Overall 15.43 0.63 0.63
(2001 employment) Between 0.64 0.64
from home ward Within 0.01 0.09
Travel Overall 0.26 0.24 0.24
time Between work Between 0.25 0.23
and home wards Within 0.00 0.09
Log of travel Overall -1.95 1.33 1.33
time Between work Between 1.34 1.28
and home wards Within 0.01 0.51
Source: ASHE–ONS, CASWEB and authors’ own calculations. Observations within 30 kms of
home and work wards.
Table B.15: Number of individuals for each panel
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VARIABLE
MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION
Individual Individuals
home-work id allowed to move wards
Distance to closest Overall 16.45 7.45 7.45
improvements Between 7.48 7.34
from work ward Within 0.00 1.87
Distance to closest Overall 15.97 7.44 7.44
improvements Between 7.46 7.42
from home ward Within 0.00 1.33
Proportion of Overall 0.45 0.5 0.5
females Between 0.5 0.5
Within 0.00 0
Age Overall 39.19 11.97 11.97
Between 12.08 12.45
Within 1.17 1.53
Work ward Overall 38.23 3.33 3.33
mean population age Between 3.34 3.19
in 2001 Within 0.00 1.17
Work ward Overall 0.22 0.13 0.13
proportion of high Between 0.13 0.13
degrees in 2001 Within 0.00 0.03
Work ward Overall 0.07 0.04 0.04
unemployment rate Between 0.04 0.04
in 2001 Within 0.00 0.01
Work ward Overall 0.24 0.15 0.15
proportion of living in Between 0.15 0.15
social housing in 2001 Within 0.00 0.05
Work ward Overall 1654.06 1649.58 1649.58
density (addresses over Between 1727.82 1655.39
area) in 2001 Within 0.00 514.62
Work ward Overall 0.66 0.18 0.18
proportion of commuters Between 0.19 0.18
by motor in 2001 Within 0.00 0.04
Work ward Overall 11.64 4.02 4.02
average distance traveled Between 4.03 3.92
Between work and home 2001 Within 0.00 1.11
Home ward Overall 38.52 3.18 3.18
mean population age Between 3.23 3.14
in 2001 Within 0.00 0.91
Home ward Overall 0.19 0.1 0.1
proportion of high Between 0.11 0.1
degrees in 2001 Within 0.00 0.02
Home ward Overall 0.06 0.03 0.03
unemployment rate Between 0.03 0.03
in 2001 Within 0.00 0.01
Home ward Overall 0.21 0.14 0.14
proportion of living in Between 0.15 0.14
social housing in 2001 Within 0.00 0.04
Home ward Overall 1497.02 1458.33 1458.33
density (addresses over Between 1559.06 1531.83
area) in 2001 Within 0.00 367
Home ward Overall 0.73 0.13 0.13
proportion of commuters Between 0.14 0.13
by motor in 2001 Within 0.00 0.03
Home ward Overall 12.53 3.75 3.75
average distance traveled Between 3.74 3.7
Between work and home 2001 Within 0.00 0.83
Source: ASHE–ONS, CASWEB and authors’ own calculations. Observations within 30 kms of
home and work wards.
Table B.16: Number of individuals for each panel
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of accessibility 0.320** 0.502*** 0.232 0.033 0.326
from work ward [0.141] [0.189] [0.281] [0.261] [0.202]
Log of accessibility -0.071 0.119 0.003 -0.201 -0.032
from home ward [0.108] [0.174] [0.186] [0.221] [0.214]
Log of travel time 0.056* 0.097** 0.01 -0.035 0.173**
between work and home [0.032] [0.049] [0.073] [0.082] [0.075]
Observations 38,421 8,834 44,614 42,498 42,309
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 879 881 784 120 1,079
Work-ward no of clusters 1,851 1,245 2,539 2,085 2,754
Home-ward no of clusters 2,983 1,694 3,316 3,172 3,322
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of accessibility 0.049 0.461 0.422 0.115 0.782
from work ward [0.127] [0.390] [0.379] [0.266] [0.516]
Log of accessibility 0.195** 0.106 0.131 -0.2 -1.315
from home ward [0.096] [0.166] [0.206] [0.179] [1.037]
Log of travel time -0.043 0.101 0.145 -0.065 0.088
between work and home [0.039] [0.114] [0.251] [0.067] [0.089]
Observations 38,452 8,802 44,587 42,997 42,122
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 837 863 792 120 1,065
Work-ward no of clusters 1,851 1,238 2,535 2,082 2,749
Home-ward no of clusters 2,990 1,694 3,316 3,183 3,326
Group MANUF CONST CONS S PROD S OTHER
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw
fixed-effects, instrument and all the controls and trends. Source: ASHE–ONS, DfT, CASWEB and
authors own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table B.17: Robustness: by industrial sector – 2002-2008
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of accessibility -0.133 0.474*** 0.325* 0.274
from work ward [0.406] [0.138] [0.184] [0.211]
Log of accessibility 0.17 -0.086 0.037 -0.143
from home ward [0.303] [0.139] [0.130] [0.140]
Log of travel time 0.176** -0.006 0.026 0.117*
between work and home [0.075] [0.069] [0.040] [0.067]
Observations 20,702 75,671 38,322 39,681
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 877 925 598 601
Work-ward no of clusters 2,140 3,033 2,545 2,363
Home-ward no of clusters 2,604 3,588 3,196 3,173
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of accessibility 0.322 0.323*** 0.378 0.584
from work ward [0.394] [0.113] [0.286] [0.424]
Log of accessibility -0.286 -0.012 0.049 -0.707
from home ward [0.337] [0.150] [0.145] [0.706]
Log of travel time -0.029 -0.082* 0.358 0.049
between work and home [0.063] [0.047] [0.267] [0.064]
Observations 20,439 75,458 38,299 40,471
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 874 921 604 569
Work-ward no of clusters 2,131 3,029 2,543 2,368
Home-ward no of clusters 2,590 3,586 3,198 3,187
Group Skill1 Skill2 Skill3 Skill4
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year
dummies, µihw fixed-effects, instrument and all the controls and trends. Source: ASHE–
ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table B.18: Robustness: by skill level (4 categories) – 2002-2008
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of accessibility 0.354*** 0.322*** 0.322** 0.329** 0.468*** 0.182 0.219 0.427***
from work ward [0.123] [0.120] [0.154] [0.166] [0.124] [0.209] [0.177] [0.101]
Log of accessibility 0.035 0.075 -0.084 -0.059 -0.114 0.131 0.045 -0.086
from home ward [0.114] [0.125] [0.130] [0.116] [0.111] [0.118] [0.116] [0.108]
Log of travel time 0.062 0.033 0.038 0.059 0.070** 0.051 0.042 0.054
between work and home [0.049] [0.042] [0.038] [0.044] [0.033] [0.035] [0.050] [0.044]
Observations 27,759 24,485 152,346 155,620 50,087 41,477 130,018 138,628
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,461 686 518 458 1,977 1,186 520 329
Work-ward no of clusters 1,517 860 3,040 2,691 2,790 1,505 3,073 2,046
Home-ward no of clusters 969 1,557 2,855 3,481 1,624 3,215 2,200 3,635
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of accessibility 0.007 0.052 0.502** 0.515*** 0.483 0.169 0.253** 0.510**
from work ward [0.150] [0.173] [0.205] [0.200] [0.312] [0.154] [0.129] [0.217]
Log of accessibility 0.122 0.18 -0.377 -0.317 -0.373 0.103 -0.049 -0.329
from home ward [0.137] [0.196] [0.323] [0.286] [0.437] [0.160] [0.098] [0.302]
Log of travel time 0.023 -0.081 0.041 0.055 0.097 -0.018 -0.032 0.058
between work and home [0.057] [0.060] [0.084] [0.084] [0.095] [0.036] [0.043] [0.099]
Observations 27,722 24,372 152,670 156,020 50,315 41,427 130,077 138,965
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,456 685 511 456 1,974 1,191 511 328
Work-ward no of clusters 1,518 858 3,039 2,690 2,786 1,503 3,068 2,045
Home-ward no of clusters 968 1,553 2,858 3,489 1,624 3,217 2,202 3,645
Home median L access All H access All L density All H density All
Work median All L access All H access All L density All H density
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-effects, instrument
and all the controls and trends. Source: ASHE–ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
Table B.19: Robustness: by initial level of accessibility and density (medians) – 2002-2008
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PANEL A: Log of basic weekly pay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of accessibility 0.282** 0.360** 0.353** 0.313** 0.304* 0.352** 0.290* 0.272*
from work ward [0.116] [0.150] [0.173] [0.158] [0.168] [0.150] [0.148] [0.159]
Log of accessibility -0.113 0.082 0.06 -0.063 0.237* -0.096 -0.094 0.06
from home ward [0.087] [0.149] [0.137] [0.108] [0.134] [0.138] [0.116] [0.113]
Log of travel time 0.105*** 0.038 0.003 0.07 0.088 0.143** 0.037 0.011
between work and home [0.031] [0.031] [0.054] [0.058] [0.059] [0.064] [0.036] [0.026]
Observations 75,556 57,996 104,549 122,109 78,798 111,394 101,307 68,711
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,285 2,102 515 451 474 190 989 1,464
Work-ward no of clusters 2,995 1,794 2,842 1,757 2,815 1,852 2,752 1,699
Home-ward no of clusters 1,933 3,329 1,891 3,494 1,949 3,696 1,875 2,803
PANEL B: Log of total weekly hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of accessibility 0.246* 0.252 0.497 0.442** 0.260* 0.583* 0.372* 0.168
from work ward [0.145] [0.207] [0.305] [0.204] [0.152] [0.301] [0.201] [0.128]
Log of accessibility -0.105 -0.174 -0.353 -0.236 0.288** -0.375 -0.316 0.027
from home ward [0.107] [0.196] [0.488] [0.310] [0.144] [0.421] [0.281] [0.109]
Log of travel time 0.055 0.091 -0.004 -0.022 -0.015 0.191 0.023 -0.045
between work and home [0.084] [0.104] [0.065] [0.043] [0.046] [0.159] [0.078] [0.035]
Observations 75,929 57,975 104,463 122,417 79,363 111,838 101,029 68,554
Kleibergen-Paap F-stat 1,288 2,402 509 448 478 190 993 1,488
Work-ward no of clusters 2,996 1,791 2,837 1,757 2,812 1,850 2,751 1,698
Home-ward no of clusters 1,934 3,333 1,892 3,508 1,951 3,699 1,875 2,809
Home median L unrate All H unrate All L motorc All H motorc All
Work median All L unrate All H unrate All L motorc All H motorc
2-way clustering (work-ward and home-ward). All specifications include sector-year dummies, µihw fixed-effects, instrument
and all the controls and trends. Source: ASHE–ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01
Table B.20: Robustness: by initial level of unemployment rate and commuters by motor
(medians) – 2002-2008
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Depvar: Log of travel time to workplace
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log of accessibility (1997 employment) 0.0585 0.0528 0.0115 -0.0163 -0.0042 -0.0125 0.1219 0.0845
0.0066*** 0.0060*** 0.0046* 0.0039*** 0.0039 0.0040** 0.1223 0.1261
Log of accessibility (annual employment) -0.0569
0.041
Student -0.2406 -0.0566 -0.0599 -0.0643 -0.0641 -0.066 -0.0657 -0.0658
0.0165*** 0.0168*** 0.0161*** 0.0161*** 0.0161*** 0.0161*** 0.0161*** 0.0161***
Skill-other 0.0389 -0.0087 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0013
0.0096*** 0.0089 0.0086 0.0085 0.0085 0.0086 0.0086 0.0086
Skill-O-level 0.0895 -0.0075 0.0055 0.0041 0.0049 0.0036 0.0041 0.0041
0.0099*** 0.0092 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089 0.0089
Skill-teach & A-level 0.1891 0.0267 0.0363 0.0334 0.0352 0.0327 0.0334 0.0334
0.0106*** 0.0101** 0.0097*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0097*** 0.0097*** 0.0097***
Skill-high 0.3443 0.1042 0.0996 0.0952 0.0967 0.0943 0.0948 0.0948
0.0108*** 0.0107*** 0.0103*** 0.0103*** 0.0102*** 0.0103*** 0.0103*** 0.0103***
House- rented from a gov scheme 0.0538 0.1447 0.1259 0.1198 0.1196 0.1256 0.1254 0.1254
0.0099*** 0.0091*** 0.0087*** 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0089***
House- privately rented 0.0531 0.0777 0.0555 0.0527 0.0521 0.0551 0.0549 0.0549
0.0105*** 0.0099*** 0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0089*** 0.0092*** 0.0092*** 0.0092***
Civil status-married -0.0589 -0.065 -0.0469 -0.0474 -0.0463 -0.0452 -0.0453 -0.0453
0.0084*** 0.0075*** 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.0071*** 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 0.0072***
Civil status-separated -0.0509 -0.0588 -0.0418 -0.0414 -0.0403 -0.0384 -0.039 -0.039
0.0162** 0.0143*** 0.0140** 0.0140** 0.0139** 0.0141** 0.0141** 0.0140**
Civil status-divorced -0.0412 -0.055 -0.0359 -0.0349 -0.0337 -0.0343 -0.0344 -0.0344
0.0114*** 0.0100*** 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0098***
Civil status-widowed -0.1187 -0.0999 -0.0793 -0.0778 -0.0789 -0.0757 -0.0755 -0.0754
0.0273*** 0.0248*** 0.0247** 0.0247** 0.0246** 0.0250** 0.0250** 0.0250**
Family status-1 adult,1+ children -0.0303 0.0054 -0.0261 -0.0263 -0.0242 -0.0366 -0.0327 -0.0329
0.0592 0.0524 0.0499 0.0495 0.0491 0.0501 0.05 0.05
Family status-2 adults,no children 0.0144 0.0035 0.0124 0.012 0.0135 0.0139 0.0141 0.014
0.0091 0.0081 0.0078 0.0078 0.0078 0.0079 0.0078 0.0078
Family status-2 adults,1+ children 0.0432 0.0514 0.0263 0.026 0.0286 0.0218 0.0251 0.0249
0.0577 0.0512 0.0484 0.0481 0.0476 0.0486 0.0485 0.0485
Family status-3 adults,no children -0.024 -0.0022 0.009 0.0085 0.0083 0.0104 0.0107 0.0106
0.0108* 0.0098 0.0095 0.0094 0.0094 0.0096 0.0095 0.0095
Family status-3 adults,1+ children 0.0024 0.0295 0.0087 0.0094 0.0119 0.0035 0.0075 0.0074
0.0586 0.0519 0.0493 0.049 0.0485 0.0495 0.0493 0.0493
No kids- 1 child in the house -0.0388 -0.0333 0.0025 0.0021 -0.0012 0.0058 0.0025 0.0026
0.0579 0.0512 0.0485 0.0482 0.0477 0.0487 0.0486 0.0486
No kids- 2 children -0.0876 -0.062 -0.0207 -0.0209 -0.0236 -0.0176 -0.0211 -0.021
0.058 0.0512 0.0485 0.0482 0.0477 0.0487 0.0485 0.0485
No kids- 3 or more -0.1235 -0.0806 -0.0444 -0.0446 -0.0472 -0.0372 -0.0415 -0.0413
0.0586* 0.0518 0.0492 0.0489 0.0484 0.0494 0.0492 0.0493
Occ-Professional 0.0171 0.0175 0.0177 0.0179 0.0169 0.0164 0.0164
0.0091 0.0091 0.0091 0.0091* 0.0091 0.0091 0.0091
Occ-Associate Professional & Technical 0.0021 0.0004 0.0014 0.0015 0.0018 0.0018 0.0017
0.0087 0.0086 0.0086 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085
Occ-Administrative & Secretarial -0.0167 -0.0191 -0.0174 -0.0168 -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.015
0.0088 0.0086* 0.0086* 0.0085* 0.0085 0.0085 0.0085
Occ-Skilled Trades -0.0575 -0.059 -0.0571 -0.0557 -0.0553 -0.0549 -0.055
0.0100*** 0.0097*** 0.0097*** 0.0097*** 0.0096*** 0.0096*** 0.0096***
Occ-Personal Service -0.0888 -0.088 -0.0861 -0.0852 -0.0843 -0.0842 -0.0842
0.0112*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0109***
Occ-Sales & Customer Service -0.0226 -0.0266 -0.0255 -0.0245 -0.0253 -0.025 -0.025
0.0115 0.0113* 0.0113* 0.0113* 0.0113* 0.0113* 0.0113*
Occ-Process, Plant & Machine Operatives -0.1695 -0.1689 -0.1665 -0.1636 -0.1663 -0.1661 -0.1662
0.0107*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0105*** 0.0105***
Occ-Elementary -0.1313 -0.1278 -0.1255 -0.1227 -0.1238 -0.1231 -0.1232
0.0104*** 0.0102*** 0.0102*** 0.0102*** 0.0102*** 0.0102*** 0.0102***
Live & work in same Local Authority -0.6773 -0.7225 -0.7211 -0.723 -0.747 -0.7474 -0.7473
0.0092*** 0.0083*** 0.0082*** 0.0083*** 0.0087*** 0.0087*** 0.0087***
Full time job dummy -0.0778 -0.0696 -0.0698 -0.0699 -0.070 -0.070 -0.070
0.0067*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0066***
Second job dummy -0.0545 -0.0493 -0.05 -0.0487 -0.0487 -0.0486 -0.0486
0.0116*** 0.0113*** 0.0112*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113*** 0.0113***
Public sector worker 0.0312 0.0229 0.0241 0.0243 0.02 0.0197 0.0197
0.0085*** 0.0083** 0.0083** 0.0083** 0.0083* 0.0083* 0.0083*
Distance to closest transport improvement 0.0015 0.0016
0.0008 0.0008*
Mean age of the population -0.0034 -0.0031
0.0011** 0.0011**
% of households living in social housing 0.0238 -0.0777
0.0485 0.0505
% of WAP with qualification level 4 o 5 0.1271 0.1584
0.0570* 0.0592**
Average distance traveled to workplace 0.01160 0.00750
0.0016*** 0.0016***
% of households with cars or vans -0.27740 -0.41340
0.0695*** 0.0740***
% of employees commuting by motor 0.37850 0.57500
0.0614*** 0.0662***
Area 0.0008 0.0014
0.0003** 0.0002***
Observations 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148 110,148
Adjusted R2 0.0272 0.0573 0.2698 0.2955 0.2973 0.2993 0.2716 0.2718 0.2718
Personal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Job characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District dummies YES YES YES
Ward attributes/trends YES YES YES YES
Scheme dummies/trends YES YES YES
Ward fixed-effects YES YES YES
Clustered (ward) s.e. All specifications include year, monthly dummies & pseudo-fe (age, gender, white). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001. Source: LFS-ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations.
Table B.21: LFS results: Log of travel time to workplace
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Depvar: Employment status (employed/out of work)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of accessibility (1997 employment) -0.0118 -0.0008 0.0026 0.0007 0.0001 0.0232 0.0191
0.0018*** 0.0011 0.0012* 0.0012 0.0013 0.0342 0.037
Log of accessibility (annual employment) 0.0059
0.0118
Student -0.3516 -0.3506 -0.3488 -0.3484 -0.3468 -0.3468 -0.3468
0.0044*** 0.0042*** 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 0.0038***
Skill-other 0.1623 0.1593 0.1582 0.1581 0.1558 0.1558 0.1558
0.0028*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0026***
Skill-O-level 0.1942 0.1892 0.1873 0.1871 0.1843 0.1842 0.1842
0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
Skill-teach & A-level 0.2141 0.2109 0.2098 0.2098 0.2081 0.208 0.208
0.0034*** 0.0033*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032***
Skill-high 0.2444 0.2415 0.2416 0.2415 0.2414 0.2415 0.2415
0.0034*** 0.0033*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032***
House-rented from a gov scheme -0.2521 -0.2468 -0.2444 -0.2445 -0.2458 -0.2457 -0.2457
0.0031*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030***
House-privately rented -0.1095 -0.1066 -0.0993 -0.0996 -0.0985 -0.0985 -0.0985
0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0031***
Civil status-married 0.0062 0.0038 0.0029 0.0029 0.0037 0.0038 0.0038
0.0022** 0.0022 0.0023 0.0022 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023
Civil status-separated 0.0136 0.0128 0.0124 0.0121 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118
0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044** 0.0044**
Civil status-divorced 0.024 0.0212 0.0207 0.0205 0.0206 0.0206 0.0206
0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032***
Civil status-widowed -0.047 -0.0481 -0.0491 -0.0492 -0.0472 -0.0473 -0.0473
0.0074*** 0.0074*** 0.0074*** 0.0074*** 0.0074*** 0.0074*** 0.0074***
Family status-1 adult,1+ children -0.0566 -0.0551 -0.0504 -0.0506 -0.0454 -0.0445 -0.0445
0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0135*** 0.0134*** 0.0134***
Family status-2 adults,no children 0.0674 0.0658 0.0644 0.0644 0.0644 0.0643 0.0643
0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0025***
Family status-2 adults,1+ children 0.0505 0.051 0.0554 0.0551 0.0591 0.0597 0.0598
0.0127*** 0.0127*** 0.0127*** 0.0127*** 0.0130*** 0.0129*** 0.0129***
Family status-3 adults,no children 0.0603 0.0593 0.0574 0.0577 0.0604 0.0603 0.0603
0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0031***
Family status-3 adults,1+ children 0.0863 0.0871 0.091 0.0909 0.0957 0.0965 0.0965
0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0132***
No kids-1 child in the house -0.0326 -0.0349 -0.0416 -0.0412 -0.044 -0.0448 -0.0448
0.0127* 0.0127** 0.0127** 0.0127** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0130***
No kids-2 children -0.0594 -0.0628 -0.07 -0.0698 -0.072 -0.0728 -0.0728
0.0128*** 0.0128*** 0.0128*** 0.0128*** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0130***
No kids-3 or more -0.1395 -0.1417 -0.1476 -0.1475 -0.1475 -0.1484 -0.1484
0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0130*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0132***
Distance to closest transport improvement -0.0002 -0.0002
0.0002 0.0002
Mean age of the population 0.0011 0.0014
0.0004** 0.0004***
% of households living in social housing 0.1303 0.1147
0.0159*** 0.0165***
% of WAP with qualification level 4 o 5 -0.0432 -0.0364
0.0168* 0.0176*
Average distance traveled to workplace -0.0039 -0.0044
0.0005*** 0.0005***
% of households with cars or vans 0.3109 0.2778
0.0228*** 0.0239***
% of employees commuting by motor -0.0413 -0.0122
0.0189* 0.0211
Area -0.0001 -0.0001
0.0001* 0.0001
Observations 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811 1,182,811
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.234 0.237 0.238 0.239 0.205 0.206 0.206
Personal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District dummies YES YES YES
Ward attributes/trends YES YES YES YES
Scheme dummies/trends YES YES YES
Ward fixed-effects YES YES YES
Clustered (ward) s.e. All specifications include year, monthly dummies & pseudo-fe (age, gender, white). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.00. Source: LFS-ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations.
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Depvar: Employment status (employed/unemployed)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log of accessibility (1997 employment) -0.0046 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0178 -0.003
0.0007*** 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0163 0.0181
Log of accessibility (annual employment) -0.01
0.0067
Student -0.0384 -0.0391 -0.0395 -0.0394 -0.0406 -0.0406 -0.0406
0.0032*** 0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0032***
Skill-other 0.0377 0.0366 0.0361 0.0361 0.036 0.036 0.036
0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018***
Skill-O-level 0.0446 0.043 0.0419 0.0419 0.0416 0.0416 0.0416
0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018***
Skill-teach & A-level 0.0593 0.0585 0.0571 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.0569
0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
Skill-high 0.0587 0.0572 0.0553 0.0554 0.0556 0.0557 0.0557
0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
House-rented from a gov scheme -0.1203 -0.1191 -0.1174 -0.1174 -0.1185 -0.1184 -0.1184
0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023***
House-privately rented -0.0326 -0.0332 -0.0318 -0.0319 -0.0328 -0.0328 -0.0328
0.0017*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018***
Civil status-married 0.0301 0.0292 0.0288 0.0288 0.0284 0.0284 0.0284
0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013***
Civil status-separated 0.0094 0.0093 0.0092 0.0092 0.0093 0.0092 0.0092
0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029** 0.0029**
Civil status-divorced 0.0151 0.0141 0.0141 0.014 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137
0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
Civil status-widowed 0.0184 0.018 0.0177 0.0177 0.0186 0.0186 0.0186
0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0041***
Family status-1 adult,1+ children 0.0009 0.0015 0.003 0.0031 0.0065 0.0075 0.0075
0.0063 0.0063 0.0064 0.0064 0.0065 0.0065 0.0065
Family status-2 adults,no children 0.0183 0.0177 0.0172 0.0172 0.0176 0.0175 0.0175
0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
Family status-2 adults,1+ children 0.0312 0.0313 0.0325 0.0325 0.0357 0.0366 0.0365
0.0056*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0058***
Family status-3 adults,no children 0.0163 0.016 0.0152 0.0153 0.0159 0.0158 0.0158
0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0017***
Family status-3 adults,1+ children 0.0325 0.0327 0.0338 0.0338 0.0374 0.0383 0.0383
0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0059*** 0.0060*** 0.0060***
No kids-1 child in the house -0.024 -0.0244 -0.0264 -0.0264 -0.0292 -0.0301 -0.0301
0.0056*** 0.0056*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0058*** 0.0058*** 0.0058***
No kids-2 children -0.0297 -0.0306 -0.0329 -0.0329 -0.0356 -0.0365 -0.0364
0.0056*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0058*** 0.0059*** 0.0058***
No kids-3 or more -0.0457 -0.0463 -0.0482 -0.0482 -0.0506 -0.0515 -0.0515
0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0061*** 0.0061*** 0.0061***
Distance to closest transport improvement 0.000 0.000
0.0001 0.0001
Mean age of the population 0.0004 0.0005
0.0002* 0.0002**
% of households living in social housing 0.04 0.0353
0.0077*** 0.0081***
% of WAP with qualification level 4 o 5 -0.0009 -0.0013
0.0082 0.0089
Average distance traveled to workplace -0.001 -0.0012
0.0002*** 0.0002***
% of households with cars or vans 0.1167 0.1104
0.0111*** 0.0120***
% of employees commuting by motor -0.0385 -0.0328
0.0087*** 0.0101**
Area 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000
Observations 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644 920,644
Adjusted R2 0.036 0.085 0.087 0.088 0.088 0.070 0.070 0.070
Personal characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
District dummies YES YES YES
Ward attributes/trends YES YES YES YES
Scheme dummies/trends YES YES YES
Ward fixed-effects YES YES YES
Clustered (ward) s.e. All specifications include year, monthly dummies & pseudo-fe (age, gender, white). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001. Source: LFS-ONS, DfT, CASWEB and authors own calculations.
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